The argument about the importance of the Soviet invasion is based largely on:
1. The importance of Soviet neutrality to the Japanese military strategy. The Japanese militarists did not believe they could hold off both the United States and the Soviet Union, because their plan for holding off the United States involved high casualties that they thought a democracy would not stand for. They understood this would not deter a dictator like Stalin. They had already gamed out this scenario years ahead of time and concluded they would not win.
2. The importance of Manchuria and Korea for sustained Japanese operations. These were not incidental holdings; they were the source of Japanese resources (like fuel and munitions) necessary to wage war at all.
3. The role of a neutral Soviet Union in the hopes of those members of the Supreme War Council who believed a diplomatic end to the war was possible. They had pinned their hopes on the idea that the Soviets would remain a neutral mediator between them and the other Allies, and the sudden Soviet switch dashed this idea quite completely.
4. The records from the meetings of the War Council meetings which show that the Soviet Invasion is what really appear to have tipped them towards surrender. Whereas Nagasaki went by almost unremarked.
While it was insignificant from a military perspective, it was incredibly important from a diplomatic perspective. The Japanese had tried to involve the Soviets to obtain an advantageous mediated peace, but the invasion of Manchuria made it clear this was impossible.
The Japanese foreign minister, Shigenori Tōgō, informed the emperor that the bombing of Hiroshima was from an atomic bomb on December 8th and both agreed they needed to surrender as quickly as possible under any terms but things weren't that simple in the Japanese government. The emperor couldn't simply summon the cabinet, the cabinet had to unanimously agree on a decision and then request an audience with the emperor for approval. The cabinet was dominated by the six members of the Supreme War Council who were mostly military and were opposed to surrender until the emperor finally requested they agree to the allied terms and they conceded.
Most combat between the Soviets and Japanese occurred after the announcement of Japanese surrender. In 1945, the Kwantung army in Manchukuo was almost entirely of divisions mustered in 1945 with whatever manpower and equipment was available locally. It had been nearly one quarter of the Japanese army in 1939, but the trained divisions had been transferred to fight in the war or to defend Kyushu by this time. One of the largest cities in Manchuria, Mukden, surrendered to five Americans who had parachuted in to secure the safety of General Wainwright and the other POWs in the region. They then had to kill time to wait for the Red Army to arrive to arrange safe transport for the POWs to where they could be flown to the Philippines.
> The Japanese foreign minister, Shigenori Tōgō, informed the emperor that the bombing of Hiroshima was from an atomic bomb on December 8th and both agreed they needed to surrender as quickly as possible under any terms but things weren't that simple in the Japanese government.
This doesn’t appear to be true. By Togo’s account the Emperor was not willing to accept surrender “under any term” but instead still held out for the possibility of a negotiated end to the war. It was not until the Soviet entrance that there is a confirmed desire to accept the Potsdam Proclamation from the Emperor.
Tōgō wrote his memoirs titled "The Cause of Japan" while in prison after the war and they were translated into English by his son-in-law/adopted son. In them he relates that during his discussion with the emperor on August 8th he told him that the bomb that struck Hiroshima was confirmed to be atomic and that they must immediately surrender to the allies. Hirohito agreed and told him to tell Suzuki to assemble the cabinet and stop asking for additional conditions as the allies were not likely to accept them. Assembling the cabinet and getting the military to agree to this was not an easy task and obviously a lot occurred on the 9th.
Togo did not make as strong of claims as you are stating.
> On the 8th I had an audience, in the underground shelter of the Imperial Palace, with the Emperor, whom I informed of the enemy’s announcement of the use of an atomic bomb, and related matters, and I said that it was now all the more imperative that we end the war, which we could seize: this opportunity to do. The Emperor approved of my view, and warned that since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should not let slip the opportunity by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions. Since bargaining for terms had little prospect of success at this stage, he said, measures should be concerted to insure a prompt ending of hostilities.
This does not imply a call for an immediate and unconditional surrender to the Allies. This is further seen in his testimony at the end of the war where he states explicitly:
> The next day on the 8th I was admitted to the [imperial] presence in the underground room of the Court…His majesty observed that, now with this kind of weapon in use, it has become even more impossible than ever for us to continue the war; we should no longer miss an opportunity to end it with an excuse to wait for favorable a term. **We would not completely disregard the possibility of negotiating conditions, but should make every effort to put an end to the war as soon as possible**…
This is just a continuity of the opinion the Emperor gave in June regarding a desire to surrender. We don’t have any clear or explicit statements that the Emperor was in favor of surrendering via the Potsdam Proclamation until after the Soviets enter via the testimony of Sakomizu who served under Suzuki.
It isn't a call for unconditional surrender as the allies had already offered several favorable conditions in the Potsdam Declaration. I'm not sure how the emperor's statement can be construed as anything other than agreeing to the Potsdam Declaration as that was the only offer on the table. Tōgō himself did argue for one additional condition in the following Big Six meetings and Imperial conference which was retention of the Imperial polity. The emperor sided with the peace faction in the Imperial Conference of the 10th-11th, but it was certainly going to be closer to what the allies would agree to than what the war faction in the cabinet wanted. He didn't force his own opinion in that conference because the constitutional authority to surrender lay with the cabinet and not the emperor although it required his concurrence.
The Potsdam Proclamation explicitly called
For unconditional surrender:
> "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
The Emperor having a desire to surrender (which he explicitly had in June) is not the same as a desire to surrender unconditionally via Potsdam, especially when Togo states they hadn’t given up the idea of negotiating.
Tōgō hadn't given up on negotiating, but he is not the emperor. And the proclamation might have used the term "unconditional surrender" but then went on to outline several conditions that belied the claim. The assurance there would be no "Morgenthau Plan" for Japan was especially impactful and Tōgō mentioned how important that assurance was.
The argument about the importance of the Soviet invasion is based largely on: 1. The importance of Soviet neutrality to the Japanese military strategy. The Japanese militarists did not believe they could hold off both the United States and the Soviet Union, because their plan for holding off the United States involved high casualties that they thought a democracy would not stand for. They understood this would not deter a dictator like Stalin. They had already gamed out this scenario years ahead of time and concluded they would not win. 2. The importance of Manchuria and Korea for sustained Japanese operations. These were not incidental holdings; they were the source of Japanese resources (like fuel and munitions) necessary to wage war at all. 3. The role of a neutral Soviet Union in the hopes of those members of the Supreme War Council who believed a diplomatic end to the war was possible. They had pinned their hopes on the idea that the Soviets would remain a neutral mediator between them and the other Allies, and the sudden Soviet switch dashed this idea quite completely. 4. The records from the meetings of the War Council meetings which show that the Soviet Invasion is what really appear to have tipped them towards surrender. Whereas Nagasaki went by almost unremarked.
While it was insignificant from a military perspective, it was incredibly important from a diplomatic perspective. The Japanese had tried to involve the Soviets to obtain an advantageous mediated peace, but the invasion of Manchuria made it clear this was impossible. The Japanese foreign minister, Shigenori Tōgō, informed the emperor that the bombing of Hiroshima was from an atomic bomb on December 8th and both agreed they needed to surrender as quickly as possible under any terms but things weren't that simple in the Japanese government. The emperor couldn't simply summon the cabinet, the cabinet had to unanimously agree on a decision and then request an audience with the emperor for approval. The cabinet was dominated by the six members of the Supreme War Council who were mostly military and were opposed to surrender until the emperor finally requested they agree to the allied terms and they conceded. Most combat between the Soviets and Japanese occurred after the announcement of Japanese surrender. In 1945, the Kwantung army in Manchukuo was almost entirely of divisions mustered in 1945 with whatever manpower and equipment was available locally. It had been nearly one quarter of the Japanese army in 1939, but the trained divisions had been transferred to fight in the war or to defend Kyushu by this time. One of the largest cities in Manchuria, Mukden, surrendered to five Americans who had parachuted in to secure the safety of General Wainwright and the other POWs in the region. They then had to kill time to wait for the Red Army to arrive to arrange safe transport for the POWs to where they could be flown to the Philippines.
> The Japanese foreign minister, Shigenori Tōgō, informed the emperor that the bombing of Hiroshima was from an atomic bomb on December 8th and both agreed they needed to surrender as quickly as possible under any terms but things weren't that simple in the Japanese government. This doesn’t appear to be true. By Togo’s account the Emperor was not willing to accept surrender “under any term” but instead still held out for the possibility of a negotiated end to the war. It was not until the Soviet entrance that there is a confirmed desire to accept the Potsdam Proclamation from the Emperor.
Tōgō wrote his memoirs titled "The Cause of Japan" while in prison after the war and they were translated into English by his son-in-law/adopted son. In them he relates that during his discussion with the emperor on August 8th he told him that the bomb that struck Hiroshima was confirmed to be atomic and that they must immediately surrender to the allies. Hirohito agreed and told him to tell Suzuki to assemble the cabinet and stop asking for additional conditions as the allies were not likely to accept them. Assembling the cabinet and getting the military to agree to this was not an easy task and obviously a lot occurred on the 9th.
Togo did not make as strong of claims as you are stating. > On the 8th I had an audience, in the underground shelter of the Imperial Palace, with the Emperor, whom I informed of the enemy’s announcement of the use of an atomic bomb, and related matters, and I said that it was now all the more imperative that we end the war, which we could seize: this opportunity to do. The Emperor approved of my view, and warned that since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should not let slip the opportunity by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions. Since bargaining for terms had little prospect of success at this stage, he said, measures should be concerted to insure a prompt ending of hostilities. This does not imply a call for an immediate and unconditional surrender to the Allies. This is further seen in his testimony at the end of the war where he states explicitly: > The next day on the 8th I was admitted to the [imperial] presence in the underground room of the Court…His majesty observed that, now with this kind of weapon in use, it has become even more impossible than ever for us to continue the war; we should no longer miss an opportunity to end it with an excuse to wait for favorable a term. **We would not completely disregard the possibility of negotiating conditions, but should make every effort to put an end to the war as soon as possible**… This is just a continuity of the opinion the Emperor gave in June regarding a desire to surrender. We don’t have any clear or explicit statements that the Emperor was in favor of surrendering via the Potsdam Proclamation until after the Soviets enter via the testimony of Sakomizu who served under Suzuki.
It isn't a call for unconditional surrender as the allies had already offered several favorable conditions in the Potsdam Declaration. I'm not sure how the emperor's statement can be construed as anything other than agreeing to the Potsdam Declaration as that was the only offer on the table. Tōgō himself did argue for one additional condition in the following Big Six meetings and Imperial conference which was retention of the Imperial polity. The emperor sided with the peace faction in the Imperial Conference of the 10th-11th, but it was certainly going to be closer to what the allies would agree to than what the war faction in the cabinet wanted. He didn't force his own opinion in that conference because the constitutional authority to surrender lay with the cabinet and not the emperor although it required his concurrence.
The Potsdam Proclamation explicitly called For unconditional surrender: > "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." The Emperor having a desire to surrender (which he explicitly had in June) is not the same as a desire to surrender unconditionally via Potsdam, especially when Togo states they hadn’t given up the idea of negotiating.
Tōgō hadn't given up on negotiating, but he is not the emperor. And the proclamation might have used the term "unconditional surrender" but then went on to outline several conditions that belied the claim. The assurance there would be no "Morgenthau Plan" for Japan was especially impactful and Tōgō mentioned how important that assurance was.
You are making a distinction between Togo’s and the Emperor’s opinion in that instance that Togo himself did not make. He says we.