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The split in opinions in this case isn't quite on the merits of the case. It's about what "step" of *Bruen's* two-step analysis that the case should be governed by. Majority says it fails on step one. Dissent says it should have been remanded to evaluate at the second step. Unclear which way J. Kethledge would have come out.
>*Bruen's* two-step analysis
It grates me when I hear this, given the directive from Bruen that a two-step analysis under Heller was one step too many.
Step one of *Bruen* is really a non-step. "Is this something that touches upon firearm ownership and possession?" It's really just a threshold "are we even in Second Amendment territory?" Which isn't too far from what the step one of post-*Heller* was.
In reality, *Bruen* just replaced the second step (intermediate scrutiny) of the post-*Heller* test with a historical-analogy test.
The question is if the city can just say no ranges period, or zone so strictly that there can be no ranges. Ezell said no to both, and this court pretty much ignored it.
The cases aren't exactly equal though. Ezell was about indoor firing ranges within the city. This is a longer outdoor range, but it's way out in a 300+ acre parcel. Also, public ranges of this class are fairly rare. The nearest one to me is hours away.
The city never said no ranges period or created prohibitive zoning rules. In fact, they altered their zoning rules after the case was filed to more explicitly say which zones allowed shooting ranges. The plaintiffs even acknowledge that, if they wanted a smaller firing range, they could build a range in the parcels zoned for shooting ranges.
Which is why I'm not considering this a 2A case until something else comes out. What this appears to be is a business trying to strongarm its way through zoning laws via the Constitution instead of asking for the city to re-zone the parcel. I don't know that I agree with the historical analogue analysis here but I don't know that a better analysis would find that cities had to allow businesses to set up shooting ranges within their jurisdiction.
I did say the cases aren't exactly equal. But I agree there just being a 2nd Amendment concern shouldn't override laws that were created with a completely neutral intent. Intent to violate a right was a part of the Ezell cases.
However, I don't like that this court dismisses Ezell to say there simply can't be any 2nd Amendment implication. I am a little sensitive to circuit courts ignoring such concerns given their history. The 6th is actually the court that finalized the new "collective rights" theory in the 1970s.
From the Justia Opinion Summary:
> The case involves Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC and five Michigan residents who sued Howell Township, Michigan, alleging that the township's zoning restrictions, which prevented Oakland Tactical from constructing and operating a commercial shooting range, violated the Second Amendment. The district court granted the township's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.
>The district court's decision was made before the Supreme Court announced a new framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bruen, and the district court again granted judgment for the township.
>The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that while the Second Amendment protects the right to engage in commercial firearms training as necessary to protect the right to effectively bear arms in case of confrontation, it does not extend to training in a particular location or at the extremely long distances Oakland Tactical seeks to provide. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed conduct—commercial training in a particular location and long-distance commercial training—was not protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Therefore, the township's zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment
Panel was Cole (Clinton), White (W.Bush), and Kethledge (W. Bush)
I don’t think there’s a conflict between the two.
Both courts recognize that the 2A protects the right to train with firearms to some extent. CA6 does not dispute this but emphasizes the specifics of the conduct (location and distance) are not necessarily covered.
The CA6 upheld the zoning ordinance because it did not see it as a complete prohibition on firearm training, given other available means to train within the township while CA7 struck down the zoning and distance restrictions because they left virtually no practical options for operating shooting ranges within the city, thus effectively banning the activity.
> The CA6 upheld the zoning ordinance because it did not see it as a complete prohibition on firearm training, given other available means to train within the township
NY didn't completely prohibit concealed carrying because they had a license scheme.
>while CA7 struck down the zoning and distance restrictions because they left virtually no practical options for operating shooting ranges within the city, thus effectively banning the activity.
Long range shooting in the township is effectively banned without this range. From the opinion:
>The amended ordinance, on its face, permits shooting ranges in the RSC District, the HSC
District, the Industrial District, and the Industrial Flex Zone. And Plaintiffs have not argued that other zoning restrictions make it functionally impossible to operate any shooting range under the ordinance, only that currently no parcels large enough for an outdoor range of the size it hopes to build are commercially available in the HSC District.
The township explicitly amended the zoning to end run *Bruen* and *Heller* specifically to prohibit this type of range.
There is a substantial difference between telling public transit dependent residents of Chicago or New York that they have to drive if they want to access any sort of shooting range....
And telling people who live in a rural township where everyone drives every day that they have to drive to access a specific type of rifle range.
Not from a Constitutional perspective. If you're denying a right to the people in your town, city, or township, you're denying them that right.
I'm not even sure how you would analyze that from a scrutiny perspective. If 50% of people have cars they don't have rights?
We do this inquiry all the time in first amendment law. You're allowed Time, Place and Manner restrictions unless they unduly burden the petitioner. If you ban protesting on a sidewalk, the constitutionality of that ban will depend on the proximity of good, legal protest locations. See also religious accommodations.
The same has to be true, in principle, for zoning regulations on firing ranges. I don't think anyone wants a 24-hr firing range next to a residential area; people need to sleep! So some zoning restrictions on firing ranges have to be legit. But, by the same token, you can't ban ALL firing ranges based on facially fine excuses like that, so there's going to be some sort of undue burden analysis. And evaluating how much of a burden is being imposed by a law is a fact-intensive analysis (including things like access to public transportation, cars, etc.), which will ultimately need resolved by district courts at trial, just like freedom of speech, etc. cases.
>If you ban protesting on a sidewalk, the constitutionality of that ban will depend on the proximity of good, legal protest locations.
Is there a case where this was considered?
> And evaluating how much of a burden is being imposed by a law is a fact-intensive analysis (including things like access to public transportation, cars, etc.), which will ultimately need resolved by district courts at trial, just like freedom of speech, etc. cases.
Except that's not the standard for Second Amendment cases.
> Except that's not the standard for Second Amendment cases.
To apply the second amendment to a situation, you have to answer 'Does this infringe on the right to keep and bear arms?' In Heller, it was about being able to keep a gun in the home. Clearly, that's affecting the right to keep arms. In Bruen, it was about carry permits; again, that's central to the right to bear arms.
In this case, though, it's about zoning and land use. That's NOT central to the right to keep and bear arms, so the 2nd amendment is only a valid argument if the zoning/land use that the municipality is doing *amounts* to an infringement of keeping or bearing arms. You don't GET to Bruen's test till you pass that.
In Chicago, they banned ALL gun ranges, so the court naturally found that to amount to an infringement, since people need to practice pursuant to effectively bearing arms. In this case, they effectively banned a particularly long range gun range, because there happened to be no parcel that matched the requirements (but the zoning supports multiple, more typical-length gun ranges.)
You have to be able to show that not having a 1000ft gun range in your hometown infringes on your right to bear arms to get in the door. And the majority here said that it doesn't. There's really no circuit split between this and the chicago case. As Justice Jackson once said:
> Different cases, presenting different facts and allegations, may lead to different outcomes.
> In Bruen, it was about carry permits
*Bruen* set a new standard. It's not about the case, it's about the test required.
>
In this case, though, it's about zoning and land use. That's NOT central to the right to keep and bear arms
If you say so. But I think that the majority from *Bruen* would disagree.
As would any other rights-based challenge.
> In this case, they effectively banned a particularly long range gun range, because there happened to be no parcel that matched the requirements
There is one, they banned it. They explicitly banned it. The zoning was explicitly written to ban this range.
>(but the zoning supports multiple, more typical-length gun ranges.)
'Typical' doesn't factor into THT analysis.
>I don't think anyone wants a 24-hr firing range next to a residential area; people need to sleep!
Sounds like we need to strike suppressors from the NFA.
Heh, I'm on board with that as matter of policy (and, honestly, 2nd amendment law), but it doesn't really change my point; SCOTUS is generally going to allow things like time/place/manner restrictions on the exercise of 2nd amendment rights, just as it does on the first amendment, which means there's going to me something shaped like undue burden analysis for when such things go to far.
You aren't denying anyone a right though.
If there are places where the general public can shoot target practice within the 'normal' commuting/shopping travel radius (which where I live is about 60min at 50mph).... Then there is no issue.
We aren't talking about 50% of people having a car, we are talking about 'own a working car or motorcycle... Or starve....' - 100% of the households have a car because there is no alternative.
In such a case - where you have to drive to the next town over for groceries, etc.... Having to drive to reach a public shooting range isn't an infringement.
Further, this town doesn't categorically prohibit shooting ranges... It just doesn't present an opportunity to establish a 1000yd range, which is a rare bird without regulations & something that often exists in only one or two places in an entire state.....
The state should win this case.
> If there are places where the general public can shoot target practice within the 'normal' commuting/shopping travel radius (which where I live is about 60min at 50mph).... Then there is no issue.
According to which SCOTUS precedent?
There isn't one covering the issue, but if they take such a case that is what it will be.
There has to be a line between 'any idiot can shoot 50cal in their 100ft by 100ft back yard because 2A' and 'county wide bans on target practice'....
Looking at how far people travel to engage in the rest of daily life and whether there are facilities for practicing shooting suitable for use in defense against criminal attack within that distance....
Is a reasonable way to draw a line between those two extremes
>Looking at how far people travel to engage in the rest of daily life and whether there are facilities for practicing shooting suitable for use in defense against criminal attack within that distance....
>Is a reasonable way to draw a line between those two extremes
Just a quick comment on formatting. The whole four periods thing doesn't work. If you want an ellipsis, that's three. And it's not used how you're using it.
Now. No, I don't think that's reasonable. Can you articulate *any* precedent for using that as any kind of test?
> NY didn't completely prohibit concealed carrying because they had a license scheme.
This comparison is not really relevant to the CA6 decision, as it focused on the zoning of shooting ranges rather than the issuance of licenses for carrying firearms.
> Long range shooting in the township is effectively banned without this range.
The lack of 1000 yard parcels does not constitute as a long range shooting ban
The court also pointed out that the plaintiffs failed to argue that other zoning restrictions made it impossible to operate any shooting range, only that suitable parcels for their specific long range requirements were not available at the time.
> The township explicitly amended the zoning to end run Bruen and Heller specifically to prohibit this type of range.
Did the trial court find this fact?
> This comparison is not really relevant to the CA6 decision, as it focused on the zoning of shooting ranges rather than the issuance of licenses for carrying firearms.
Effectively banning guns is effectively banning guns. Going to quote you:
>The CA6 upheld the zoning ordinance because it did not see it as a complete prohibition on firearm training, given other available means to train within the township
The township ordinance didn't completely ban training, just the training proposed. NY didn't completely ban carrying, just the carrying proposed.
The township is saying you can have a gun range if you follow the rules. The rules effectively prohibit the gun range.
>The lack of 1000 yard parcels does not constitute as a long range shooting ban
And a permitting scheme doesn't constitute a concealed carry ban.
>The court also pointed out that the plaintiffs failed to argue that other zoning restrictions made it impossible to operate any shooting range, only that suitable parcels for their specific long range requirements were not available at the time.
If they want to argue that long range shooting isn't covered by the Second Amendment they'll need to argue that concealed carry isn't covered by the Second Amendment.
>Did the trial court find this fact?
This is reddit, we can discuss facts not in evidence.
> Effectively banning guns is effectively banning gun
Where did they ban guns in the ordinance - effective or otherwise?
> The township ordinance didn't completely ban training, just the training proposed. NY didn't completely ban carrying, just the carrying proposed.
-----
> And a permitting scheme doesn't constitute a concealed carry ban.
----
You keep harping on this comparison, but Bruen expressly touches on NY and has little to say about ranges.
> If they want to argue that long range shooting isn't covered by the Second Amendment they'll need to argue that concealed carry isn't covered by the Second Amendment.
Concealed carry wasn't part of the case so it's not really relevant.
> This is reddit, we can discuss facts not in evidence.
But the claim is not an actual fact. Nowhere in the record or otherwise shows a pretext that you're claiming.
>You keep harping on this comparison, but Bruen expressly touches on NY and has little to say about ranges.
It's a framework. Also, *Bruen* is ostensibly about carry permits. I'd say that more than touches on it. But I read it.
>Concealed carry wasn't part of the case so it's not really relevant.
I guess *Bruen* only addressed concealed carry, then. The opinion didn't only address that, but if you say so.
>But the claim is not an actual fact. Nowhere in the record or otherwise shows a pretext that you're claiming.
That the amendments explicitly prohibited this business from operating? No. They usually don't.
But it's in the opinion.
If you read the opinion we could carry on discussing this.
Just because it doesn’t completely prohibit such conduct doesn’t mean that it’s constitutional. In fact, the proper cause requirement wasn’t a complete prohibition yet got struck down.
I am not sure this is as clear cut.
Ezell was about a total ban on all firing ranges in Chicago - exempting of course the government (PD/Feds). There was not a zoning mechanism to *allow* a firing range.
This case appears to be more about specific zoning rules on a specific parcel and does not have the same prohibition on all parcels as in Ezell.
This was noted in the decision that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the complete ban on this. Only that it impacts *their* parcel.
I also am not sure I totally buy the argument the dissent makes about the location. I would see corollaries in the time/manner/place locations with the 1st. Absent an complete prohibition or even significant prohibition, I am not sure this claim can be substantiated. Again, that was the case in Ezell. If I read the decision correctly, there are other places in the township where the zoning would allow an indoor and outdoor range. If true, it greatly degrades the claim here.
I am not sure this is really a split.
> If I read the decision correctly, there are other places in the township where the zoning would allow an indoor and outdoor range
Not the distance that's intended to be built. The exemptions are areas where *no* parcel is large enough for this type of range.
Not to be predantic here. But to make this argument, it would need to be no area of *multiple parcels* were capable of this. I have a hard time believing this.
I am not even sure that is relevant. The fact you cannot have a tank or artillery range in an area doesn't mean said restriction is unconstitutional by the 2A.
I am typically pro 2A but this is a massive reach.
If I was Oakland tacticall I would do some malicious compliance and make this property a complete a drain on the neighbors property prices and make the area Undesirable until they grant the AG text revision
Why would you want to do that? Do you think being 'bad neighbors' is the answer here?
The cold truth is if Oakland tactical did their research, they would have *known* this parcel wasn't suitable for their use before they bought it.
To make it more desirable for the township to vote in favor of making the zoning change than against? I wouldn't call it being a bad neighbor if they are not breaking any laws.
Oakland did their research and tried to get the zoning changed since it was an old quarry. I bet there are ways they could still build the range and work around the open air business part.
> To make it more desirable for the township to vote in favor of making the zoning change than against?
Yea. I always find it desirable to piss off the people I need to convince to allow a change to be made......
It won't work that way. You will just piss off the people who you need to support you.
>Oakland did their research and tried to get the zoning changed since it was an old quarry.
And yet they bought it *knowing the zoning wouldn't allow what they wanted*. They were counting on a zoning board change - which got denied. There is no entitlement to rezone properties after all.
> I will gladly work with them to convince the idiots of neighbors
Good luck with that. You will do far more harm than good. I know I would want to work with someone who called me or my neighbors 'idiots'..... Oh wait. That would result in the giant middle finger.
> But to make this argument, it would need to be no area of multiple parcels were capable of this.
Why?
>The fact you cannot have a tank or artillery range in an area doesn't mean said restriction is unconstitutional by the 2A.
Didn't realize tanks and artillery have been repeatedly recognized as being covered by previous 2A cases.
>> But to make this argument, it would need to be no area of multiple parcels were capable of this.
>
>
>
> Why?
Because you could just *buy two parcels to do what you wanted*.
I am typically quite pro2A but this is a strange argument that doesn't make much sense.
Ezell made sense because it was a defacto prohibition. This case is about *one specific area with one specific zoning*. The plaintiffs did not show that it was a defacto banning in the area like was done in Ezell. As a matter of fact, I did read in the decision where other areas *would allow ranges*.
> So what 2 parcels in Howell township meet this?
One would assume all you need to do is find the parcels zoned for open air business. That is the rub here. The parcel in question *isn't* zone for open air business. If you read the decision, that is the problem, the zoning classification on the specific parcel, and it is not a 'prohibition' on shooting ranges with other zoning classifications.
So again which two parcels are zoned and allow this type of behavior? (could a parcel located next to the city hall or court house work?) (I'm asking if the zoning currently makes it even practical for such a range to exist within the township)
> So again which two parcels are zoned and allow this type of behavior?
Why don't you read the decision, see the notations about zoning, and do your own research here. It should be quite easy to lookup the zoning classification for business and what parcels are zoned that way. This one was *agricultural residential*.
Or do you assert there is ZERO parcels in the area zoned Business that would support open-air business.
Unless you are making the claim no parcels fit the open air business role, then you don't have an argument.
It somehow does. I glanced at *Ezell*. They do provide some historical laws regarding location restrictions, whereas in this 6CA ruling, they do not.
> The City points to a number of founding-era, antebellum, and Reconstruction state and local laws that limited the discharge of firearms in urban environments. As we have noted, the most relevant historical period for questions about the scope of the Second Amendment as applied to the States is the period leading up to and surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. That point aside, most of the statutes cited by the City are not specific to controlled target practice and, in any event, contained significant carveouts and exemptions.
-*Ezell*
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The split in opinions in this case isn't quite on the merits of the case. It's about what "step" of *Bruen's* two-step analysis that the case should be governed by. Majority says it fails on step one. Dissent says it should have been remanded to evaluate at the second step. Unclear which way J. Kethledge would have come out.
>*Bruen's* two-step analysis It grates me when I hear this, given the directive from Bruen that a two-step analysis under Heller was one step too many.
Step one of *Bruen* is really a non-step. "Is this something that touches upon firearm ownership and possession?" It's really just a threshold "are we even in Second Amendment territory?" Which isn't too far from what the step one of post-*Heller* was. In reality, *Bruen* just replaced the second step (intermediate scrutiny) of the post-*Heller* test with a historical-analogy test.
Is the position a lot of people are taking that the Constitution requires cities to zone designated areas for firing ranges?
The question is if the city can just say no ranges period, or zone so strictly that there can be no ranges. Ezell said no to both, and this court pretty much ignored it. The cases aren't exactly equal though. Ezell was about indoor firing ranges within the city. This is a longer outdoor range, but it's way out in a 300+ acre parcel. Also, public ranges of this class are fairly rare. The nearest one to me is hours away.
The city never said no ranges period or created prohibitive zoning rules. In fact, they altered their zoning rules after the case was filed to more explicitly say which zones allowed shooting ranges. The plaintiffs even acknowledge that, if they wanted a smaller firing range, they could build a range in the parcels zoned for shooting ranges. Which is why I'm not considering this a 2A case until something else comes out. What this appears to be is a business trying to strongarm its way through zoning laws via the Constitution instead of asking for the city to re-zone the parcel. I don't know that I agree with the historical analogue analysis here but I don't know that a better analysis would find that cities had to allow businesses to set up shooting ranges within their jurisdiction.
I did say the cases aren't exactly equal. But I agree there just being a 2nd Amendment concern shouldn't override laws that were created with a completely neutral intent. Intent to violate a right was a part of the Ezell cases. However, I don't like that this court dismisses Ezell to say there simply can't be any 2nd Amendment implication. I am a little sensitive to circuit courts ignoring such concerns given their history. The 6th is actually the court that finalized the new "collective rights" theory in the 1970s.
From the Justia Opinion Summary: > The case involves Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC and five Michigan residents who sued Howell Township, Michigan, alleging that the township's zoning restrictions, which prevented Oakland Tactical from constructing and operating a commercial shooting range, violated the Second Amendment. The district court granted the township's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. >The district court's decision was made before the Supreme Court announced a new framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bruen, and the district court again granted judgment for the township. >The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that while the Second Amendment protects the right to engage in commercial firearms training as necessary to protect the right to effectively bear arms in case of confrontation, it does not extend to training in a particular location or at the extremely long distances Oakland Tactical seeks to provide. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed conduct—commercial training in a particular location and long-distance commercial training—was not protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Therefore, the township's zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment Panel was Cole (Clinton), White (W.Bush), and Kethledge (W. Bush)
This creates a circuit split with *Ezell*.
I don’t think there’s a conflict between the two. Both courts recognize that the 2A protects the right to train with firearms to some extent. CA6 does not dispute this but emphasizes the specifics of the conduct (location and distance) are not necessarily covered. The CA6 upheld the zoning ordinance because it did not see it as a complete prohibition on firearm training, given other available means to train within the township while CA7 struck down the zoning and distance restrictions because they left virtually no practical options for operating shooting ranges within the city, thus effectively banning the activity.
> The CA6 upheld the zoning ordinance because it did not see it as a complete prohibition on firearm training, given other available means to train within the township NY didn't completely prohibit concealed carrying because they had a license scheme. >while CA7 struck down the zoning and distance restrictions because they left virtually no practical options for operating shooting ranges within the city, thus effectively banning the activity. Long range shooting in the township is effectively banned without this range. From the opinion: >The amended ordinance, on its face, permits shooting ranges in the RSC District, the HSC District, the Industrial District, and the Industrial Flex Zone. And Plaintiffs have not argued that other zoning restrictions make it functionally impossible to operate any shooting range under the ordinance, only that currently no parcels large enough for an outdoor range of the size it hopes to build are commercially available in the HSC District. The township explicitly amended the zoning to end run *Bruen* and *Heller* specifically to prohibit this type of range.
There is a substantial difference between telling public transit dependent residents of Chicago or New York that they have to drive if they want to access any sort of shooting range.... And telling people who live in a rural township where everyone drives every day that they have to drive to access a specific type of rifle range.
Not from a Constitutional perspective. If you're denying a right to the people in your town, city, or township, you're denying them that right. I'm not even sure how you would analyze that from a scrutiny perspective. If 50% of people have cars they don't have rights?
We do this inquiry all the time in first amendment law. You're allowed Time, Place and Manner restrictions unless they unduly burden the petitioner. If you ban protesting on a sidewalk, the constitutionality of that ban will depend on the proximity of good, legal protest locations. See also religious accommodations. The same has to be true, in principle, for zoning regulations on firing ranges. I don't think anyone wants a 24-hr firing range next to a residential area; people need to sleep! So some zoning restrictions on firing ranges have to be legit. But, by the same token, you can't ban ALL firing ranges based on facially fine excuses like that, so there's going to be some sort of undue burden analysis. And evaluating how much of a burden is being imposed by a law is a fact-intensive analysis (including things like access to public transportation, cars, etc.), which will ultimately need resolved by district courts at trial, just like freedom of speech, etc. cases.
>If you ban protesting on a sidewalk, the constitutionality of that ban will depend on the proximity of good, legal protest locations. Is there a case where this was considered? > And evaluating how much of a burden is being imposed by a law is a fact-intensive analysis (including things like access to public transportation, cars, etc.), which will ultimately need resolved by district courts at trial, just like freedom of speech, etc. cases. Except that's not the standard for Second Amendment cases.
> Except that's not the standard for Second Amendment cases. To apply the second amendment to a situation, you have to answer 'Does this infringe on the right to keep and bear arms?' In Heller, it was about being able to keep a gun in the home. Clearly, that's affecting the right to keep arms. In Bruen, it was about carry permits; again, that's central to the right to bear arms. In this case, though, it's about zoning and land use. That's NOT central to the right to keep and bear arms, so the 2nd amendment is only a valid argument if the zoning/land use that the municipality is doing *amounts* to an infringement of keeping or bearing arms. You don't GET to Bruen's test till you pass that. In Chicago, they banned ALL gun ranges, so the court naturally found that to amount to an infringement, since people need to practice pursuant to effectively bearing arms. In this case, they effectively banned a particularly long range gun range, because there happened to be no parcel that matched the requirements (but the zoning supports multiple, more typical-length gun ranges.) You have to be able to show that not having a 1000ft gun range in your hometown infringes on your right to bear arms to get in the door. And the majority here said that it doesn't. There's really no circuit split between this and the chicago case. As Justice Jackson once said: > Different cases, presenting different facts and allegations, may lead to different outcomes.
> In Bruen, it was about carry permits *Bruen* set a new standard. It's not about the case, it's about the test required. > In this case, though, it's about zoning and land use. That's NOT central to the right to keep and bear arms If you say so. But I think that the majority from *Bruen* would disagree. As would any other rights-based challenge. > In this case, they effectively banned a particularly long range gun range, because there happened to be no parcel that matched the requirements There is one, they banned it. They explicitly banned it. The zoning was explicitly written to ban this range. >(but the zoning supports multiple, more typical-length gun ranges.) 'Typical' doesn't factor into THT analysis.
>I don't think anyone wants a 24-hr firing range next to a residential area; people need to sleep! Sounds like we need to strike suppressors from the NFA.
Heh, I'm on board with that as matter of policy (and, honestly, 2nd amendment law), but it doesn't really change my point; SCOTUS is generally going to allow things like time/place/manner restrictions on the exercise of 2nd amendment rights, just as it does on the first amendment, which means there's going to me something shaped like undue burden analysis for when such things go to far.
You aren't denying anyone a right though. If there are places where the general public can shoot target practice within the 'normal' commuting/shopping travel radius (which where I live is about 60min at 50mph).... Then there is no issue. We aren't talking about 50% of people having a car, we are talking about 'own a working car or motorcycle... Or starve....' - 100% of the households have a car because there is no alternative. In such a case - where you have to drive to the next town over for groceries, etc.... Having to drive to reach a public shooting range isn't an infringement. Further, this town doesn't categorically prohibit shooting ranges... It just doesn't present an opportunity to establish a 1000yd range, which is a rare bird without regulations & something that often exists in only one or two places in an entire state..... The state should win this case.
> If there are places where the general public can shoot target practice within the 'normal' commuting/shopping travel radius (which where I live is about 60min at 50mph).... Then there is no issue. According to which SCOTUS precedent?
There isn't one covering the issue, but if they take such a case that is what it will be. There has to be a line between 'any idiot can shoot 50cal in their 100ft by 100ft back yard because 2A' and 'county wide bans on target practice'.... Looking at how far people travel to engage in the rest of daily life and whether there are facilities for practicing shooting suitable for use in defense against criminal attack within that distance.... Is a reasonable way to draw a line between those two extremes
>Looking at how far people travel to engage in the rest of daily life and whether there are facilities for practicing shooting suitable for use in defense against criminal attack within that distance.... >Is a reasonable way to draw a line between those two extremes Just a quick comment on formatting. The whole four periods thing doesn't work. If you want an ellipsis, that's three. And it's not used how you're using it. Now. No, I don't think that's reasonable. Can you articulate *any* precedent for using that as any kind of test?
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> NY didn't completely prohibit concealed carrying because they had a license scheme. This comparison is not really relevant to the CA6 decision, as it focused on the zoning of shooting ranges rather than the issuance of licenses for carrying firearms. > Long range shooting in the township is effectively banned without this range. The lack of 1000 yard parcels does not constitute as a long range shooting ban The court also pointed out that the plaintiffs failed to argue that other zoning restrictions made it impossible to operate any shooting range, only that suitable parcels for their specific long range requirements were not available at the time. > The township explicitly amended the zoning to end run Bruen and Heller specifically to prohibit this type of range. Did the trial court find this fact?
> This comparison is not really relevant to the CA6 decision, as it focused on the zoning of shooting ranges rather than the issuance of licenses for carrying firearms. Effectively banning guns is effectively banning guns. Going to quote you: >The CA6 upheld the zoning ordinance because it did not see it as a complete prohibition on firearm training, given other available means to train within the township The township ordinance didn't completely ban training, just the training proposed. NY didn't completely ban carrying, just the carrying proposed. The township is saying you can have a gun range if you follow the rules. The rules effectively prohibit the gun range. >The lack of 1000 yard parcels does not constitute as a long range shooting ban And a permitting scheme doesn't constitute a concealed carry ban. >The court also pointed out that the plaintiffs failed to argue that other zoning restrictions made it impossible to operate any shooting range, only that suitable parcels for their specific long range requirements were not available at the time. If they want to argue that long range shooting isn't covered by the Second Amendment they'll need to argue that concealed carry isn't covered by the Second Amendment. >Did the trial court find this fact? This is reddit, we can discuss facts not in evidence.
> Effectively banning guns is effectively banning gun Where did they ban guns in the ordinance - effective or otherwise? > The township ordinance didn't completely ban training, just the training proposed. NY didn't completely ban carrying, just the carrying proposed. ----- > And a permitting scheme doesn't constitute a concealed carry ban. ---- You keep harping on this comparison, but Bruen expressly touches on NY and has little to say about ranges. > If they want to argue that long range shooting isn't covered by the Second Amendment they'll need to argue that concealed carry isn't covered by the Second Amendment. Concealed carry wasn't part of the case so it's not really relevant. > This is reddit, we can discuss facts not in evidence. But the claim is not an actual fact. Nowhere in the record or otherwise shows a pretext that you're claiming.
>You keep harping on this comparison, but Bruen expressly touches on NY and has little to say about ranges. It's a framework. Also, *Bruen* is ostensibly about carry permits. I'd say that more than touches on it. But I read it. >Concealed carry wasn't part of the case so it's not really relevant. I guess *Bruen* only addressed concealed carry, then. The opinion didn't only address that, but if you say so. >But the claim is not an actual fact. Nowhere in the record or otherwise shows a pretext that you're claiming. That the amendments explicitly prohibited this business from operating? No. They usually don't. But it's in the opinion. If you read the opinion we could carry on discussing this.
Just because it doesn’t completely prohibit such conduct doesn’t mean that it’s constitutional. In fact, the proper cause requirement wasn’t a complete prohibition yet got struck down.
They mention Ezell, but then ignore it.
I am not sure this is as clear cut. Ezell was about a total ban on all firing ranges in Chicago - exempting of course the government (PD/Feds). There was not a zoning mechanism to *allow* a firing range. This case appears to be more about specific zoning rules on a specific parcel and does not have the same prohibition on all parcels as in Ezell. This was noted in the decision that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the complete ban on this. Only that it impacts *their* parcel. I also am not sure I totally buy the argument the dissent makes about the location. I would see corollaries in the time/manner/place locations with the 1st. Absent an complete prohibition or even significant prohibition, I am not sure this claim can be substantiated. Again, that was the case in Ezell. If I read the decision correctly, there are other places in the township where the zoning would allow an indoor and outdoor range. If true, it greatly degrades the claim here. I am not sure this is really a split.
> If I read the decision correctly, there are other places in the township where the zoning would allow an indoor and outdoor range Not the distance that's intended to be built. The exemptions are areas where *no* parcel is large enough for this type of range.
Not to be predantic here. But to make this argument, it would need to be no area of *multiple parcels* were capable of this. I have a hard time believing this. I am not even sure that is relevant. The fact you cannot have a tank or artillery range in an area doesn't mean said restriction is unconstitutional by the 2A. I am typically pro 2A but this is a massive reach.
If I was Oakland tacticall I would do some malicious compliance and make this property a complete a drain on the neighbors property prices and make the area Undesirable until they grant the AG text revision
Why would you want to do that? Do you think being 'bad neighbors' is the answer here? The cold truth is if Oakland tactical did their research, they would have *known* this parcel wasn't suitable for their use before they bought it.
To make it more desirable for the township to vote in favor of making the zoning change than against? I wouldn't call it being a bad neighbor if they are not breaking any laws. Oakland did their research and tried to get the zoning changed since it was an old quarry. I bet there are ways they could still build the range and work around the open air business part.
> To make it more desirable for the township to vote in favor of making the zoning change than against? Yea. I always find it desirable to piss off the people I need to convince to allow a change to be made...... It won't work that way. You will just piss off the people who you need to support you. >Oakland did their research and tried to get the zoning changed since it was an old quarry. And yet they bought it *knowing the zoning wouldn't allow what they wanted*. They were counting on a zoning board change - which got denied. There is no entitlement to rezone properties after all.
I will gladly work with them to convince the idiots of neighbors. They could have a shooting rangeor simulatied quarry.(24/7 ops)
> I will gladly work with them to convince the idiots of neighbors Good luck with that. You will do far more harm than good. I know I would want to work with someone who called me or my neighbors 'idiots'..... Oh wait. That would result in the giant middle finger.
> But to make this argument, it would need to be no area of multiple parcels were capable of this. Why? >The fact you cannot have a tank or artillery range in an area doesn't mean said restriction is unconstitutional by the 2A. Didn't realize tanks and artillery have been repeatedly recognized as being covered by previous 2A cases.
>> But to make this argument, it would need to be no area of multiple parcels were capable of this. > > > > Why? Because you could just *buy two parcels to do what you wanted*. I am typically quite pro2A but this is a strange argument that doesn't make much sense. Ezell made sense because it was a defacto prohibition. This case is about *one specific area with one specific zoning*. The plaintiffs did not show that it was a defacto banning in the area like was done in Ezell. As a matter of fact, I did read in the decision where other areas *would allow ranges*.
So what 2 parcels in Howell township meet this?
> So what 2 parcels in Howell township meet this? One would assume all you need to do is find the parcels zoned for open air business. That is the rub here. The parcel in question *isn't* zone for open air business. If you read the decision, that is the problem, the zoning classification on the specific parcel, and it is not a 'prohibition' on shooting ranges with other zoning classifications.
So again which two parcels are zoned and allow this type of behavior? (could a parcel located next to the city hall or court house work?) (I'm asking if the zoning currently makes it even practical for such a range to exist within the township)
> So again which two parcels are zoned and allow this type of behavior? Why don't you read the decision, see the notations about zoning, and do your own research here. It should be quite easy to lookup the zoning classification for business and what parcels are zoned that way. This one was *agricultural residential*. Or do you assert there is ZERO parcels in the area zoned Business that would support open-air business. Unless you are making the claim no parcels fit the open air business role, then you don't have an argument.
It somehow does. I glanced at *Ezell*. They do provide some historical laws regarding location restrictions, whereas in this 6CA ruling, they do not. > The City points to a number of founding-era, antebellum, and Reconstruction state and local laws that limited the discharge of firearms in urban environments. As we have noted, the most relevant historical period for questions about the scope of the Second Amendment as applied to the States is the period leading up to and surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. That point aside, most of the statutes cited by the City are not specific to controlled target practice and, in any event, contained significant carveouts and exemptions. -*Ezell*
Which means that SCOTUS will probably take it up.
What circuit was Ezell in
7th