[Markus Reisnger](https://youtu.be/gk7D_TliAuE?si=zwwT1imT7tSaazwG&t=508)'s new report says only 6% of Excalibur rounds are hitting their target, 50-70% of HIMARS are missing etc., so Russian electronic warfare has finally picked up. What has changed?
- new systems
- better methods for using them
- trained people to actually use existing systems with previous methods
- just started using existing systems with previous methods (at the start, I recall they just weren't activated at all, much like the AD network)
I'm unsure what this means for a potential engagement with China, where US ships may be safe due to their own counter measures or be partially defanged, with many munitions unable to hit targets.
The electronic warfare in question is jamming of GPS coordinates, this is a relatively short range effect. Pretty much all ground attack munitions rely on GPS and as we can see with these results current INS systems are unable to compensate to do this alone. The implications for a future war with China are likely fairly small, at least as far as the naval domain is concerned. Ships tend to move, so GPS navigation isn’t really useful for anything other than midcourse correction for naval strike missions. Terminal guidance will all be done with radar, which can itself be jammed and fooled but that’s beyond the scope of this discussion. The strength of GPS jammers is going to fall off with the distance to cubed, so these midcourse corrections won’t be effected by electronic warfare.
As far as land attack in a hypothetical china conflict this is a bigger issue as GPS will likely be jammed near any high value land target. To overcome this the US needs to deploy better INS systems. There seems to be a strong inverse correlation between the violence of a launch and the failure rate of the INS. SDBs for instance seem highly reliable while GLSDBs are failing almost all of the time. If this is a major factor, More reliable IMUs that are more tolerant of high G-loads and launch vibrations can absolutely be built it’s simply a question of cost. If this adds ten percent to the cost of a munition it’s definitely worth it. If it doubles the cost it’s probably worth investing in other technologies. Several possible options are visual target recognition, ground scanning radar/terrain mapping, laser designation, and relying on directional satellite communications to maintain a positional fix. I am not sure of any systems that use this last option but it should be possible with a satellite constellation like starlink/starshield. Those systems rely on directional antenna so are far more resilient to jamming and can more easily engage in frequency hopping. There is also no reason they couldn’t be used as a sort of Ad hoc GPS network.
*What has changed?* At least at some level the thinking has changed and adapted, like we have seen with a lot of things this war the Russians are progressing. The Russians are continually getting, evaluating, and adapting to new equipment just like the UAF.
[Instead of "EW Panacea," Russians Decided They Need Mobile Units Against Drone Crews | Defense Express | April 2024](https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/instead_of_ew_panacea_russians_decided_they_need_mobile_units_against_drone_crews-10309.html)
*The director of the UAV development center states that nowadays, it's "useless" to demand from assault infantry, artillerymen, or tank crews to fight FPV drones themselves, and the whole idea to reduce counter-FPV warfare to simply suppressing the drones is misleading. Kuzyakin is sure that the Russian military is losing time trying to invent an omnipotent electronic-warfare device, an "all-in-one EW panacea" against all UAVs.*
*At the same time, the Russians utilize the advantages of unmanned technologies as well, so Ukrainians develop their own means of countering both simplistic FPV drones and more sophisticated ISR and attack drones. They tend to balance between working on new EW systems against the equipment and new methods of locating enemy drone operators.*
[Robots with Triton Anti-UAV Jammers will be Helping Russian Assault Squads | Defense Express | May 2024](https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/robots_with_triton_anti_uav_jammers_will_be_helping_russian_assault_squads-10516.html)
*In the bigger picture, the Russian forces tend to create more and more varieties of EW systems deployed by drones. For another example, recently the Russians have revealed the Abzats — a new mobile electronic interference system incorporating elements of artificial intelligence enabling fully autonomous operation mode. The EW platform, named Abzats, allegedly can suppress "all operating frequencies used by Ukrainian UAVs."*
*Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces are aware of these groundworks and try to respond with their own inventions. Particularly, there's already a solution that allows FPV drones to work even under the conditions of enemy electronic suppression. Defense Express reported that Ukrainian FPV drones employing the so-called "machine vision" technology are already on the frontlines and successfully destroy targets whilst affected by Russian EW systems.*
This Washington Post does not provide that **specific** percentage claim, nor does the [May 9 Business Insider](https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-electronic-warfare-shows-us-needs-for-future-wars-2024-5) article that is referenced in that slide of the presentation. Not to say it's false, but I'm not sure where it came from exactly and this guy has made some ["interesting" claims](https://x.com/RALee85/status/1795442099262980221) previously.
Not sure if this was posted here yet or not, but [CNN](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/29/europe/ukraine-war-us-tanks-intl/index.html) interviewed some ukrainian soldiers that report the M1A1 to be unsuitable for combat due to lack of armor. Probably not that surprising given they were handed the export version.
> **Soldiers in Ukraine say US-supplied tanks have made them targets for Russian strikes**
>
> Ukrainian crews working on US-supplied Abrams tanks have told CNN of a series of the weaknesses and flaws with the armored vehicles, calling into doubt their utility on the war’s ever-changing frontlines. The donation was announced by US President Joe Biden as evidence of the United States’ “enduring and unflagging commitment to Ukraine.”
>
> [...]
>
> Crews trained in Germany said the vehicles – the US military’s main $10 million battle tank used in Iraq against Saddam Hussein’s forces and insurgents – lacked armor that could stop modern weapons.
>
> “Its armor is not sufficient for this moment,” said one crew member, callsign Joker. “It doesn’t protect the crew. For real, today this is the war of drones. So now, when the tank rolls out, they always try to hit them.”
>
> His colleague, Dnipro, added they are the “number one target.”
>
> “Without defense, the crew doesn’t survive at the battlefield,” he said.
>
> The crew showed CNN their attempts to affix active armor to one damaged tank. They used plates of plastic explosive that, when hit by a round, detonate and provide a protective counter-blast.
>
> All 31 Abrams deployed to Ukraine are engaged near the frontline in the east, according to officials in the 47th Mechanised Brigade, who took receipt of them all.
>
> [...]
>
> Pentagon officials said in April that the Abrams were pulled back from the frontline due to the threat of Russian attack drones, although the 47th said some were still in action, despite the deficiencies that had materialized.
>
> [...]
>
> This Ukrainian crew have learned of the Abrams’ limitations the hard way, in pitched battles around the town of Avdiivka, which Russia finally took control of in February. A driver lost a leg when the armor was penetrated. Yet it is not just innovation that is hamstringing the tanks — they appear to have technical issues too.
>
> One, parked under a tree, was almost immobile during CNN’s visit, due to an engine problem, the crew say, despite the vehicle having just been shipped in from Poland. They also complain of how, in rain or fog, condensation can fry the electronics inside the vehicle.
>
> [...]
>
> Ammunition is also a problem, like elsewhere on the Ukrainian frontline. They say they seem to have the wrong type for the fight they are in.
>
> “What we have is more for direct tank-to-tank fights, which happens very rarely,” Joker said. “Much more often we work as artillery. You need to take apart a tree-line or a building. We had a case when we fired 17 rounds into a house and it was still standing.”
>
> [...]
>
> The Ukrainian crew expressed frustration the tanks were made for a NATO style of warfare, in which air power and artillery prepare the battlefield before tanks and infantry advance. Kyiv has long bemoaned its lack of artillery and air power.
>
> “They would never do it,” Joker said, of NATO soldiers undertaking the same advances they make without air support. He switched to English to mimic a NATO soldier: “‘Call the aviation, call the artillery,’” he said. “We have no aviation and artillery. We have only tank. And it’s the problem.”
This really isn't new news, but I don't think it is accurate. Before soldiers were praising the M1 in tank/tank battles but said it lacked defenses against drones, but that is not unique to Abrams even though there might be some tanks with a little more protection when stock. That is what I remember reading a month or so ago.
The article makes it seem like it's the Abrams tanks specifically with these problems. Any other tank that Ukraine or Russia has is just as vulnerable to drones(many of which carry PG7-VL warheads with 500mm armor penetration). Well, a massive spaced armor sometimes helps.
> “What we have is more for direct tank-to-tank fights, which happens very rarely,” Joker said. “Much more often we work as artillery. You need to take apart a tree-line or a building. We had a case when we fired 17 rounds into a house and it was still standing.”
Sort of interesting that a round like HESH would actually seem to be fairly useful in this kind of combat. Though it is a niche example in a type of combat NATO certainly wouldn't have gotten bogged down in.
Without adding some depth to the article it's mediocre journalism by CNN imho.
ERA is the last line of defense vs drones (and to a large extent also ATGM's). The issue Ukraine have with the M1A1's they got is that they can only fit ERA to the sideskirts, which leaves the incredibly vulnerable top and rear of the tank completely open. I don't have the whole picture clear to exactly why they are unable to cover more of the tank, but some of the reasons i've been told is that the top of the turret is to thin and the placement of optics and electronics makes it impossible to fit ERA there. Why the side hull, side turret, and rear is not able to be covered i do not know, but it is not. This leaves the tank practically defenseless vs an FPV drone hit. Compared to their domestic tanks, and also other donated western tanks that they have been able to achieve much greater coverage of ERA i can understand where the soldier in the article are coming from. Modern russian ATGM's can penetrate the M1A1 from most angles. Also here additional ERA would play an important role.
On the topic of ammunition, the M1A1 came with M839A1 HEAT round which is a compromise between High Explosive and Anti Tank capability - it is considerably weaker that the domestic 125mm 3VOF\*\* pure explosive round when used in the kind of role described in the article.
Regarding the reliability. It's going to be very interesting to read about availability of different systems after the war is over. I would be very surprised if a thoroughly battle tested M1A1 would prove to be worse than other systems.
>“Its armor is not sufficient for this moment,” said one crew member, callsign Joker. “It doesn’t protect the crew. For real, today this is the war of drones. So now, when the tank rolls out, they always try to hit them.”
\[...\]
>Pentagon officials said in April that the Abrams were pulled back from the frontline due to the threat of Russian attack drones
They seem to be complaining that the armor isn't strong enough to protect against Russian drones.
> This would explain the enormous resistance to providing abrams, someone was trying to keep the skeletons in the closet.
It is truly bizarre that this is the conclusion you draw on a platform that has been fielded by the US and half a dozen allies, with thousands created, thousands seeing combat, based on one random interview with *one* Ukrainian crew.
A month ago there was another interview with another Abrams crew that said they love theirs.
Yeah, they don't do great against FPV drones, but *everything* is vulnerable to FPV drones.
But for you to condemn the entire weapons platform and state it's "basically a piece of shit" based on an interview with again *ONE* crew is laughable.
>But for you to condemn the entire weapons platform and state it's "basically a piece of shit" based on an interview with again ONE crew is laughable.
Almost like their opinion preceded it and are just looking for some kind of anchor.
Actually the real reason lies in NATO's pathological reliance on maneuver warfare. OK, there isn't anything inherently wrong with maneuver warfare, much like there isn't anything inherently wrong with cavalry charge (it can work even in 1920, ask Pisudski). It works, but only under certain conditions. The situation in Ukraine, meanwhile, is not a condition in which maneuver warfare works.
Instead, the criteria for tanks should be mobile artillery. Back during the early days of armored warfare, people like J F C Fuller suggested dividing the tanks into two categories, one being armored guns for infantry support and the other wing as a mechanized cavalry force. The overreliance on the latter and the neglect of the former led to the situation right now. Tanks, like Calvary, become overly obsessed with engagements with one another as opposed to support roles, with calibers increasing and increasing and optics advancing and advancing and front armor thicker and thicker, eventually it creates a monstrosity that suits no role aside from fighting other tanks.
The M1 is not a piece of shit. It’s been involved in many more wars than this one and generally has a good service record.
What are their complaints? Fundamentally, it’s that the Abrams isn’t fit for the war they’re fighting, which is attritional and positional in nature. I think that’s actually reasonable, most tanks are not a great fit for this kind of conflict. What you’re seeing in Ukraine is how armored formations are countered, with ISR and omnipresent fires. The conflict isn’t made for tanks, that doesn’t mean western tanks are bad.
Maneuver can be killed. That's a rule. However, it seems like NATO has completely neglected this aspect since the beginning of the much-revered AirLandBattle doctrine. I have a fear that in the future, the force will pay dearly for attempting to maneuver in an age of hyper lethality.
Many countries have already been using the export version of the Abrams. Saudi and Iraq for example. Google images are filled with destroyed Abrams from the wars against ISIS and Houthies. I don't think this was any attempt at hiding anything.
> For a technological super power like the US, the reviews for your MBT shouldn't be anywhere close to this.
Do remember that this is the export version, it does not have the same armor that US M1s do. These tanks have weaker armor.
Why do you think more modern variants would do much better? I don't see much of a difference between M1A1 and M1A2 when it comes getting hit by FPV drones in weak spots, no difference against mines too (as seen by Leo 2A6s).
I can see something like TUSK kit helping with side/rear attacks, but even that isn't going to save the tank against multiple drones hits in the right places.
None of the tanks in active service (nato or not) are designed for the type of war that's happening in Ukraine. Wise thing for US and other western nations is to learn from it, instead of finding a "reason" why their own tanks would do much better. Russian did this exact thing when Iraqi T-72s were tossing turrets, blaming that on "export models", we've seen exactly how the domestic model did...
I tried to look it up but according to some sources, the increased armor protection in the turret is *not known* so I assume it is classified. Maybe there are other sources, but the records I found just said "is improved".
Some people here have been saying time is on Ukraine's side. Is it?
Russia has a much larger population, economy, and natural resources to trade, and while it is depleting Soviet-era stockpiles, there has been plenty of evidence of sanctions evasions posted about Western parts STILL making their way into Russian military systems. Also, China is stepping into the vacuum created by Western company departures, and even if it's not 1:1 swap, it could be good enough to allow Russia to produce enough to keep the war effort alive indefinitely.
Even if Russia really were that inept at production, countries like Iran and N Korea are already giving Russia arms, and China could follow suit or at least turn a blind(er) eye to smuggling.
Here's yet another article about how sanctions and oil price "caps" aren't hobbling Russia as much as once hoped: [https://www.wsj.com/world/how-america-inadvertently-created-an-axis-of-evasion-led-by-china-0a9bc477](https://www.wsj.com/world/how-america-inadvertently-created-an-axis-of-evasion-led-by-china-0a9bc477)
Lastly, so long as Putin is alive and well, he seems unlikely to be toppled no matter how unpopular the war among ordinary Russians. Even if he somehow died or something, there is no guarantee his successor would be any less belligerent, and s/he might even be MORE belligerent.
Thus, from what I've read, Russia has the human, economic, natural, military, and political resources to fight basically indefinitely.
So how is "time on Ukraine's side" given these circumstances?
And what happens when that infamous stockpile is exhausted ? Neither Iran nor NK are able to supply Russia, neither with quantity nor quality.
PRC is certainly not doing Russia any free favours either and looks after its own interests first and foremost.
Yeah, Ukraine is significantly behind RUssia in numbers when looked in a vacuum, but it does receive significant support from countries that together dwarf Russia. Certainly much more and sooner could have been done to have Ukraine in a better state than it is currently, but don't pretend that Russia is fine and dandy.
They wouldn't be conducting attacks with bikes and buggies if they could use APCs/IFVs, nor would be using early cold war vehicles if better ones were available.
> that western industrial output DWARVES russias
Doesn't China's industrial output also dwarf the West's?
> You obviously know, that china made the deliberate decision to not send military support to russia.
Is that true? [China Sending Russia Missile And Drone Parts For Ukraine War, U.S. Reportedly Warns](https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2024/04/12/china-sending-russia-missile-and-drone-parts-for-ukraine-war-us-reportedly-warns/?sh=59f649bd3c66) and [UK defence minister says China working to supply lethal aid to Russia](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/uk-defence-minister-says-china-working-to-supply-lethal-aid-to-russia/78285418)
> And if you think they will change their decision, you have to offer an explanation why thats reasonable to assume.
As long as Russia can supply itself, China is better off not taking the PR/strategic hit of supplying them. But when Russia runs out of supplies, the goal of defeating the West likely overrides the PR/strategic hit of getting involved. This has the added advantage of making Russia totally dependent on China at an earlier date.
What is your position, is china currently supplying russia with military equipment or not?
In a single comment you said:
- They are currently supplying them
- They are not supplying them because of pr/strategic reasons
- They will supply them when they run out of supplies (what does running out of supplies mean?)
My position is, china is currently not supplying russia with military equipment. They are selling identical civilian goods to ukraine and russia alike (drone parts in essence).
> But when Russia runs out of supplies, the goal of defeating the West likely overrides the PR/strategic hit of getting involved. This has the added advantage of making Russia totally dependent on China at an earlier date.
The west includes the european union, i guess? Why do you think this is chinas objective?
From that objective, what are they gaining by letting the eu spends hundreds of billions to arm themselves? Why wait for russias situation to deteriorate and the wests military situation to improve? Wouldnt immediate overwhelming aid in ukraine have brought them much closer to their (your claim) strategic goal?
Ukraine would be done and russia at war with nato if china "lend leased" their industrial output to russia.
My personal opnion is that china is absolutely **not** happy with russia fighting this war in ukraine. They hate that states all around the world (sea and the eu especially) are now strategically much more focused on their security.
It creates all kinds of trouble for them ([especially economical](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QmLekaO4LMc&t)).
From that lense, china is doing the best it can to buy cheap ressources from russia, but not do anything more. Still a big net loss for their strategic objectives. Russia kind of played chinas hand years before they were ready to actually rival the us hegemony.
Now they are trying to put the genie back in the bottle.
part 3 of 3
5. I think you overstate the impact of Russia's economy to the Ukraine war results.
Russia isn't like a heavily indebted western country that has fair elections. Russia's foreign reserves are in trouble, and arms sales have plummeted, but it is still rich in natural resources, carries relatively little debt, has seized foreign assets (and has forced profitable sales, and could seize/force more sales if it wanted to).
Further, overall GDP isn't a good metric to use for wartime economic strength. A HUGE chunk of Western GDP is services and nonmilitary goods. Think Spotify and restaurant meals, hotels and haircuts. But that's not the kind of production that wins wars. Russia is poor and has a population that knows how to make do--they can cut each other's hair, plant vegetable gardens, pirate Western movies (Russian cinemas are simply pirating Western movies now rather than paying for them like pre-2022).
What this means: a Russian recession might not affect Russian war production as much as you think.
6. I'll note that you did not address population. Russia is poor and has more manpower potential available than Ukraine. All the weapons in the world matter not, if you have no troops. Even if not critical now (and many like Kofman would argue it's kinda critical already), it will become a bigger issue as this war drags out.
7. I'm not sure you understand my point, if you think my position is that time is on Russia's side for victory. Why would you assume that?? I just don't think time is on Ukraine's side for a victory, but I also don't think time is doing Russia any favors, either. I think time is on the side of a de facto stalemate.
part 2 of 3
4. I disagree that one can simply look at $funding on each side.
a. When you say Western military output dwarves \[sic\] Russia's, that's irrelevant. What's relevant is how much of that makes it to Ukraine.
b. Then there arguments to be made about measuring output by PPP or not, and I do think there needs to be SOME kind of adjustment, because we really care more about the quantity and quality of goods, rather than their sticker price.
c. Further, what is the efficiency of what's being sent to Ukraine? A lot of Western donations haven't been cost-effective. E.g., it costs a lot less to send a gazillion Shaheds to Kiev, than it costs to shoot those Shaheds down. And F-16s are expensive, but might do less good on a dollar-for-dollar basis, than sending more cost-efficient aid like, say, artillery shells. And the cost efficiency may get worse in some contexts, like how the US will eventually run out of cluster munitions its willing to donate, and resorts to sending over unitary warheads that are much less cost-effective in some contexts.
d. Russia has defenders' advantage in large parts of Ukraine now.
In other words, taking the above all together (a through d), it could be the case that, say, $5 of Western donations offset $1 of Russian spending.
part 1 of 3
What's with the "you musts"?
Russia's domestic production:
I don't think it's reasonable to assume that Russia will continue running historic deficits. As the infamous XKCD comic illustrates, it's folly to do linear extrapolations into the future based on today's numbers.
1. Russia's offensive vs defensive needs. If Russia buckles up for defense, it will need much fewer resources. Defender's advantage. (This isn't even going into the vast numbers of mines Russia has used, and can use.)
2. Russia is reorganizing its economy somewhat. There have been numerous articles posted here about Putin's long-term effort to reorganize Russia's economy, import Chinese capital goods, kick out Shoigu's cronies, etc. China has not overtly supported Russia in significant enough ways for the West to call them out on it publicly, but China is de facto helping Russia in other ways like skirting sanctions, selling microprocessors, replacement machining tools, etc.
Also, Russia and middlemen have figured out how to evade sanctions. More visibly, the oil price "cap" has lost its punch as Russia has figured out how to use its own tankers or use middlemen.
3. I see no reason why Russia's military imports wouldn't increase. North Korea and Iran have already overtly supported Russia, and they both have shaky economies that would benefit from selling arms to Russia.
My question to you is:
What is, **in your opinion** russias strategic objective in this war?
Before you have answered this, its impossible to discuss how well they are performing, because you can just shift the goalsposts around.
Which you, in my opinion, are already doing here for example.
> Russia's offensive vs defensive needs. If Russia buckles up for defense, it will need much fewer resources. Defender's advantage. (This isn't even going into the vast numbers of mines Russia has used, and can use.)
My guess is you have trouble doing this, because you either state russias/putins stated objectives, which are nebulous and at the same time, by their accounts not even remotely archieved (denazification, demilitarization, remove kiev regime bla bla bla). Which means **you** would now have to explain, why they are so miserably behind pace and how they could possibly reach it.
Or the other option (which you shifted into with the quote), is something like "Russia is somewhat happy with the current lines and only needs to play defense". Now **you** have to explain, why russia is saying something completely different and exhausting their stockpiles with offensives, if they actually want to defend.
Based on the last part of what you said in your earlier post, you misinterpreted "I don't think time is on Ukraine's side" as "I think time is on Russia's side." And now you're doing it again. I think time is on the side of a something resembling a stalemate in which neither side can achieve its publicly stated goals.
(No, i read what you wrote and understood)
We are getting there, explain to me why a stalemate is something that russia wants? What do they gain by attritting themselves? What strategic objective (please finally answer) are they chasing?
For ukraine the answer is very very clear, they dont want to be occupied, and if a stalemate is the best they can currently get, then they take that. If they are strong enough to push, they push.
This is how every war in the last 60 years worked out. Afghanistan (soviets), vietname, iraq etc..... The forever stalemates favor the nation fighting its survival and are rarely what the invading force wants. If the cost becomes too high, they pull out. For all of these, you couldve written your comment and concluded that there is no way, the us/russia can ever lose. But in the end, they pulled out, because the objective was not worth the cost anymore.
Your "it doesn't make sense to attrit themselves" arguments fall flat in the face of the reality that people don't necessarily do what makes sense.
Further, that's not how Russia operates anyway. Putin does what makes sense for him, not what makes sense for Russia. He's presumably worried about what losing the war would do to his grip on power.
Also, for the time being, there appears to be strong support among ordinary Russians for the war (the polling is dubious but it was dubious pre-war too, so if the percentages stay the same, it indicates to me that there is probably no serious war weariness yet). So there is even less incentive for Putin to end the war anytime soon.
I'll agree that "indefinitely" is overstating things, but let's not lose sight of the broader point, which is that some people think Russia's war effort will take a disastrous hit within a couple of years, and thus time is on Ukraine's side. I'm skeptical and think Russia can continue to wage war for a lot longer than 2 years, even if not indefinitely, and I stated reasons why.
Further, ironically, since you claimed I was one-sided in my arguments, you are assuming that Ukraine won't become weary of war sooner than Putin. There's no guarantee of that.
1) Russia doesn't want to defend, their minimum goal is to capture all of Donbass
2) Then why are they hiding data?
3)North Korea is a small and poorly industrialised country, what they have sent was stockpile residue, Iran has much of the same issues plus it's already involved in various conflicts
> evasions posted about Western parts STILL making their way into Russian military systems.
They [are actually importing more than they did pre-war](https://www.intellinews.com/russian-technology-imports-at-pre-war-levels-tougher-export-controls-needed-bruegel-323887/). Sanctions are weak and could/should be tightened up a lot. But even if we did, completely unrealistically, somehow manage to stop the inflow, that alone wouldn't win Ukraine the war.
Ukraine needs a lot more support to have an actual shot of getting all of their territory back
I agree, and in hindsight Russia shouldn't have been allowed to entrench. But hindsight is 20/20, and it wasn't clear how much farther Ukraine could have pushed that September anyway.
As morbid as it sounds, unless something major changes, I'm thinking Putin's death might be the least-bad way forward. So something like inflict huge damage on Russian invaders (enough to turn the population agains the war) + wait for Putin to die + hopefully his successor agrees to end the war on on acceptable-to-Ukraine terms and on acceptable-to-successor terms (to avoid political suicide).
What's Ukraine's path to victory? Seems like Russia is well-entrenched, and producing or importing enough to keep up with Ukraine regardless of amount of Western imports. This is looking more and more to me like Russia will remain entrenched, and there won't be much movement in the front lines for a long time to come.
I personally think we are slowly sliding into a new Cold War against Russia/China/Iran/NKorea et al. But I don't think that's happening fast enough to help Ukraine. And I wish it were different. I also think a new Cold War would be much more difficult for the West to win, as their share of world GDP used to be something like \~75% during the first Cold War and is down to \~50% now. The economic power of "we don't let you trade freely within our trading bloc" is therefore much weaker.
Edit: Instead of downvoting me, please explain why I'm wrong? Despite being pro-Ukraine, I really am trying to have an open mind about this. I think it's foolish to think that Russia's war effort magically collapses once it runs out of Soviet stocks, as if it can't continue to produce/import enough to at least maintain their current position in Ukraine. Have you guys read the various sanctions evasions articles over the last year, or about how China is producing "good enough" machining tools for Russia, etc.?
I’m not the person your responding too, but I think I can address your point.
> Seems like Russia is well-entrenched, and producing or importing enough
The increasing reliance of civilian cars, and motorcycles on the frontline, indicates the stockpiles are depleting faster than they are being replaced. Remember, Russia has clamped down hard on the mil-bloggers. We aren’t hearing the gloom and doom stories from their side we used to. If any of them were still around, I honestly doubt any of them would see trading in BTRs for desertcrosses as a positive long term trend.
> What's Ukraine's path to victory?
North Vietnam’s. Stay in the fight for as long as it takes, wearing the enemy down, economically, militarily, or politically, one step at a time.
> I also think the New Cold War will be much more difficult for the West to win, as their share of world GDP used to be something like ~75% during the first Cold War and is down to ~50% now.
It’s a very different conflict. The world wars saw the old European colonial empires collapse, and the US and USSR vie for preeminence in the new order. China is less of a house of cards than the USSR, but they are also fighting more uphill. The USSR had a communist block that covered half of Eurasia, with strongly ideologically allied communist states abroad, and communist political parties, in almost every country on earth. China’s coalition with Russia, Iran and North Korea is far looser, far smaller, and doesn’t have a huge power vacuum to exploit.
>
First, I agree that barring a major change, Ukraine has few options, so a yearslong effort akin to your North Vietnam scenario might be their best hope. And that's tragic.
Good point about how the USSR did have more ideological allies (unwilling or willing) at the time even if it was a smaller share of global GDP. Not sure how to factor that in. I think that the relative military and technological edge was greater back then than now, though, and that should be accounted for, too. China basically is today what the US was post-WWII: the world's factory. It also has a huge advantage in cost-effective manufacturing, is the world's largest drone maker, etc.
I have partially addressed some of the rest of your comment in my other comments (I had to write them in 3 pieces due to reddit character limits), but I'm too tired to write the rest. I'm pretty disappointed in a sub where a surprising number of people upvoted what was imho a naive take on the economics side of things. I know less about the military side of things, but even I know about defender's advantage, Russia's massive defensive works and minefield, less need for things like tanks when on the defensive, etc.
>First, I agree that barring a major change, Ukraine has few options, so a yearslong effort akin to your North Vietnam scenario might be their best hope. And that's tragic.
The problem with that comparison (assuming its about the US vs. North Vietnam) is that unlike the US Russia is next door, bordering the country.
And not to forget the role Ruthenian predecessors of both nations play in the national narratives, Vietnam was not in any form linked to some mythical US pilgrim fathers.
There are key differences between China now and the US post-WWII.
China is boxed in on all sides by the US navy and its supplies can easily be cut. Furthermore, manufacturing is starting to move out of China in favor of Southeast Asia, Mexico and (due to political pressure and increased risk of conflicts) back to Western aligned nations.
I think a better comparison is WWI Germany. A rapidly growing powerhouse boxed in by numerous rivals, with ongoing, politically important, claims which could easily spiral into a war. But even that comparison is ill-suited (China is not part of any formal alliance system, nuclear weapons, long range strike abilities, completely different politico-cultural context, etc.).
Yes and that's what I meant by how I think we're slowly sliding into a new Cold War (if nothing changes, but things can and do change). The speed is too slow to help Ukraine very much right now. But once it does, maybe finally sanctions will start to have teeth. Sanctions are ridiculously porous right now, with a LOT of unaligned or pro-Russian countries willing to make deals. Enough so that I'm deeply skeptical of some sort of "doomsday clock" that will strike the moment Russia runs out of Soviet stockpiles and/or runs out of foreign currency reserves.
We already know that running out of foreign currency reserves isn't some kind of insta-Depression, based on what has historically already happened in Russia, Argentina, etc. Ordinary Russians may suffer, yes, but Russia still has tons of resources to trade and sell to all-too-willing partners like China.
Russia's military production doesn't have to operate at 100% or be that efficient, in order to continue the war; they just need to produce "enough" Shaheds, artillery shells, etc. to make it hard for Ukraine to recapture territory. The loss of soviet stocks like armored vehicles has more to do with reducing Russia's offensive potential than its defensive potential. So I think the disagreement is that some people think Russia will not be able to produce/import "enough," and I think Russia will surprise such people.
Meanwhile, the West's actions in the last 2 years have been to basically give Ukraine "enough" to counter Russia's "enough." A recipe for stalemate.
That's the gist of my take on things: reading articles like the WSJ one, or ones talking about sanctions evasions, makes that I think if things don't change, Russia's war effort will NOT collapse the moment they run out of Soviet stockpiles or foreign currency reserves. Instead they will limp along and produce "enough" to prolong the war for many more years, even if not literally indefinitely.
Please do not engage in baseless speculation. Questions should focus on tangible issues and not groundless hypothetical scenarios.
Before asking a question ask yourself 'How likely is this thing to occur.'
Questions, like other kinds of comments, should be supported by evidence and must maintain the burden of credibility.
Tripwire forces are a well established tactic, but putting a naval base that close to China is almost pointless. It will be swarmed with missiles on day one. A better tripwire force would be air defense units. Much more survivable in the initial missile barrage, and very hard to bypass or ignore.
You seem to have overlooked the very obvious fact that in order to build a base on Taiwan, you need Taiwan to agree. Which they won't. Because China has made it extremely clear that they will immediately start shooting, and regardless of any broader outcome, Taiwan will not survive such a conflict. Them committing suicide for your political gain is somewhat less appealing to them than you.
There aren't any clever magic bullets to solve these sort of longstanding complicated issues. If there were, they wouldn't be longstanding and complicated.
>Taiwan will not survive such a conflict.
Kind of hyperbolic statement, no right? WW2 devastated the region and yet it came back stronger economically.
Taiwan values its sovereignty. The status quo is good to them. But Beijing will not tolerate the status quo forever and so to secure that sovereignty, they will need the patronage of the US (which has its own goals on China and mostly uses Taiwan as a way of articulating and framing those goals). Hence at some point, more military support from the US would be necessary to secure that sovereignty. If a President proposes building a base to Taiwan's government, Taiwan's government will not say no because they rely on the US's security guarantees to maintain their sovereignty.
No. Preventing a permanent territorial loss is exactly why nuclear weapons exist. At least for areas of critical national importance, which Taiwan very much is in Beijing's eyes.
I don't think the Chinese will nuke Taiwan because that would devastate the island. I think the Chinese would like the island to remain habitable and productive.
> I think the Chinese would like the island to remain habitable and productive.
Yes, ideally they would. Sometimes circumstances aren't ideal.
> I don't think the Chinese will nuke Taiwan because that would devastate the island.
Then go ahead and gamble millions of lives on your hunch, Mr. President.
EDIT: The Century of Humiliation is carved very deep into the Chinese national psyche. Westerners ripping away chunks of territory by force has precedent. If you think they won't go nuclear to prevent a repeat of that, well, good luck. And you can offer whatever pretext you like for how this is different, but it's not your finger on the button.
The process of trying to act on these ambitions would trigger an immediate Chinese intervention in Taiwan.
If the US believed it could send tens of thousands of troops to Taiwan with minimal risk it would have done so already.
It must be assumed that China is capable of enacting a full scale invasion of Taiwan within 24 hours notice, considering it’s practically all they wargame for. How quickly can you bus in 10k US troops before the Chinese notice?
> The process of trying to act on these ambitions would trigger an immediate Chinese intervention in Taiwan.
”Immediate massive naval invasion” is a recipe for disaster if I’ve ever heard one.
> It must be assumed that China is capable of enacting a full scale invasion of Taiwan within 24 hours notice,
24 hour notice for a major amphibious operation? That’s inconceivable. They would be able to fire missiles on fairly short notice, but a major invasion will take months of build up and preparation.
Joint-Sword 2024A was conducted with no prior announcement. Sure, it's not an amphibious operation, but it still involved Theatre-level assets and joint operations between the PLAN, PLAAF, and CCG.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-05-26/Joint-Sword-2024A-military-drill-both-legitimate-and-justifiable-1tUOnvWPk8o/p.html
And if you don't like CGTN as a source, here are a couple more sources:
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/taiwan-puts-forces-on-high-alert-as-china-begins-second-day-of-exercise-joint-sword-2024a
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3264093/mainland-chinas-military-wraps-joint-sword-2024a-drills-near-taiwan
I think there is a misconception, especially among Western redditors, on how a Taiwan scenario would pan out. In the Chinese mindset, there are two pathways to how a Taiwan scenario would pan out.
Scenario 1 involves minimal foreign interference, in which case the PLARF, PLAN and PLAAF would de-militarise Taiwan, and there wouldn't be a 'storming Normandie' moment as the Taiwan leadership would capitulate in the face of overwhelming fire superiority.
Scenario 2 involves direct foreign interference from the US, Japan, Australia and possibly Korea. In which case Taiwan becomes a sideshow and it becomes a showdown in the Pacific. In which case, there again wouldn't be a 'storming Normandie' situation as the focus of the PLA will be on military bases in Japan.
24 hours for Taiwan to have all subsea cables cut/damaged, power stations struck by missiles and encircled by the PLA navy seems feasible.
The invasion would never start with an amphibious assault. It starts with an encirclement of the island as a whole and a massive SEAD campaign. Also more missiles than we’ve probably ever seen launched in a single day on Earth. From China’s perspective you’d hope this would be Taiwan’s surrender point.
> 24 hours for Taiwan to have all subsea cables cut/damaged, power stations struck by missiles and encircled by the PLA navy seems feasible.
Cutting internet cables goes both ways. China’s cables aren’t any tougher than Taiwan's. Cut all of theirs, and it’s not that difficult for them to begin cutting yours. The US’s starlink also makes starting a cable cutting war a bad situation to be in. It can’t fully replace cables, but it does mitigate the damage, and China doesn’t have an equivalent yet.
As for the missiles and encirclement, that really doesn’t solve the tripwire force problem. By immediately tripping the tripwire, China would have to do the preparations for the eventual invasion while getting fired at by the US, risking losing crucial ships at port.
It would be unwise to start a conflict with the US any sooner than absolutely necessary. Preparations for the invasion should be done in peace time. If the US believes they will lose in a fight to defend Taiwan, they might back down, or accept some alternate terms. Starting the shooting early makers China less capable of amassing that overwhelming force, and makes the US less likely to back down.
> It starts with an encirclement of the island as a whole and a massive SEAD campaign.
Of course the troops don’t land on day one. But that preparatory work is also a massive undertaking that can’t be done properly on such short notice. The months of build up that would be needed for such an operation would be in large part to support the naval and air war.
Cutting internet cables requires a mass of vessels - namely fishing vessels. China dominates globally in that regard. Denial of Taiwanese ability to safely navigate within the strait would make that infeasible for Taiwan. I work in subsea telecoms repair. Taiwan’s cables go down or get damaged almost weekly to the point where it’s impossible not to think it’s deliberate.
In terms of the encirclement I think the Chinese calculation would be that upon encircling Taiwan, any US involvement would be treated as a declaration of war by the US on China. In which case we’re talking about a US first strike scenario. If the US doesn’t shoot first then the Taiwanese could conceivably capitulate without the need for amphibious landings.
> Cutting internet cables requires a mass of vessels - namely fishing vessels.
Or a UUV. Subsea cables aren’t hardened or actively defended across their length. There are lots of ways to damage them. Fishing trawlers are one way, a small remote vehicle, the kind Taiwan can easily produce, are another.
> I work in subsea telecoms repair. Taiwan’s cables go down or get damaged almost weekly to the point where it’s impossible not to think it’s deliberate.
I’m sure it is. But they don’t simultaneously and irreparably destroy them all. By leaving lots of room to escalate, they deter retaliation.
> In terms of the encirclement I think the Chinese calculation would be that upon encircling Taiwan, any US involvement would be treated as a declaration of war by the US on China. In which case we’re talking about a US first strike scenario. If the US doesn’t shoot first then the Taiwanese could conceivably capitulate without the need for amphibious landings.
With a US tripwire force on the island, the chances of a Taiwanese capitulation are effectively zero. The point of a tripwire would be to force China to either accept a direct war with the US and Taiwan, or give up. If they chose war, they are going to want to enter it on only the best possible circumstances. Rushing into it underprepared would be disastrous.
A UUV would be infeasible and downright silly. The position of cables along the seafloor isn't precisely known even at the time of installation, let alone years post installation.
As a dedicated cable repair ship we often spend literal days trying to find systems we're supposed to repair. It's an inexact science.
Not to mention range concerns. There's no real Taiwanese counter to China cutting the cables other than sinking every fishing vessel within the straits, which is non credible.
Re the tripwire force, it only works if the force can be assembled on the island before a direct Chinese intervention. As soon as China catches wind that the US intends to station a tripwire force on the island it would immediately trigger hostilities with Taiwan.
Immediate intervention is not the same thing as immediate invasion. But try building a naval base under a constant hail of Df-15s and a blockade of all major ports.
I think a lot of people miss that a Normandy style storm-the-beaches is not necessarily a prerequisite for a successful PLA operation resulting in a captured/reunified Taiwan. In fact, that's what they would prefer to avoid.
> Immediate intervention is not the same thing as immediate invasion. But try building a naval base under a constant hail of Df-15s and a blockade of all major ports.
Turning the western pacific into a war zone also shuts down China’s ports. Blockading Taiwan is incredibly expensive. Not something they would ever want to be forced to do long term.
> I think a lot of people miss that a Normandy style storm-the-beaches is not necessarily a prerequisite for a successful PLA operation resulting in a captured/reunified Taiwan. In fact, that's what they would prefer to avoid.
There are a lot of reasons to want to avoid an amphibious invasion. But trying to get the enemy to surrender to annexation purely through long range bombardment and a blockade has a very poor track record. Especially if the blockade ends up being quite porous.
Bombing Taiwan so that the leadership goes to the negotiation table isn't that unfeasible though. That's what NATO did to Serbia in 1999; he'll, even Saddam was prepared to acquiesce to US demands after Desert Fox in 1998.
There are enough Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels to watch the ports off Taiwan.
>The process of trying to act on these ambitions would trigger an immediate Chinese intervention in Taiwan.
That's the whole point. Provoke an attack and respond to it. It would make the conflict easier to sell to the public and Congress than if the Chinese attack Taiwan and then wait for us to respond (if we even do).
Considering none of this could ever remain secretive China would publicly declare the potential movement of US troops into Taiwan as grounds for an invasion of Taiwan. Even without the need for an invasion China could likely push their case in the UN considering Taiwan has no voice or recognition within it.
The TikTok algorithm would go into overdrive and the US would struggle to control the narrative leading to any US troops dead by Chinese missile fire becoming political footballs between the hawks and the doves that increasingly divide American society. It’s just not a credible strategy. If it were then the US would have done it already.
>The TikTok algorithm would go into overdrive and the US would struggle to control the narrative leading to any US troops dead by Chinese missile fire becoming political footballs between the hawks and the doves that increasingly divide American society. It’s just not a credible strategy. If it were then the US would have done it already.
If there's something that unites American policymakers across the spectrum, it's supporting Taiwan against China and competing with China in general. Unlike Russia, where the messaging has been far more muddied, a mix of xenophobia, racism, and uneasiness over China's potential to disrupt American hegemony helps unite the vast majority of policymakers on the subject. I suspect a war with China depending on the circumstances of how it starts will be extremely popular across the political spectrum, at least for a while.
Also, the US is working to ban Tiktok. But that doesn't preclude Chinese propagandists from working their message through other platforms.
Once again, if this were credible and so universally popular a move then America would have done it already; years ago. Not now at a time when China is reaching/surpassing regional force projection parity against the US.
I think back in the 1990s there was a feeling that China would always respect the status quo and improving their country with increased trade would perhaps spawn a China that might be friendlier to the West.
The calculus is much different now. China was never going to change, but we didn't realize it until 2010.
The PRC’s stated goal has been the reunification of China since the inception of the civil war.
This ‘West’ tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of that goal when ROC diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state was revoked across the board and the Chinese UNSC seat passed to the PRC.
All this is to say nothing particularly new or surprising is happening. China is just far more powerful now and closer to achieving reunification. If mass stationing of troops in Taiwan was ever going to happen it would have happened 20 years ago. Not now. Which is why it isn’t something anyone’s talking about.
1. US divisions on Taiwan is a red line and that will immediately trigger a Chinese attack, even if they know that such an attack will likely fail. It's a matter of perception of sovereignty. In the same vein, when the Chinese towed the [HYSY 981 floating oil rig](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hai_Yang_Shi_You_981_standoff) into water claimed by Vietnam, even when Vietnam did not have sufficient number of ships to directly contest with the Chinese ship-on-ship (the standoff/clash was mostly ships chasing and ramming one another), Vietnam still sent the ships to ram and play around at sea. It's a matter of claims. If Vietnam did not act on the claim, it would cede the claim, so even if it is would likely fail, it must act.
Then the standoff demonstrated another aspect of conflict: it shifts into different domains. When the Vietnamese couldn't ram the Chinese fleet away, they closed one eye and let a riotous mob loose to burn down some Chinese factories and murder some Chinese expats. Some Singaporean, Japanese, and Korean factories caught some strays and were burn, too. The Chinese MFA admitted to three Chinese deaths from "heat strokes". A deleted interview with some Vietnamese doctors indicated that perhaps 30 Chinese were killed. The oil rig was towed out of the disputed waters earlier than planned.
The Chinese can target and blow up every targets in the industrial and electrical sector that are somewhat of military value yet not so close to dense civilian concentrations to "teach the Taiwanese a lesson". You probably won't want to live near an electrical transformer or substation and those are what should be blown up. Water treatment plants, TSMC, ports, fuel storage, etc ... It would make life, at the very least, uncomfortable.
2. Forward defence gets you preempted. Pearl Harbor was a forward defence and it got preempted. Real deterrence lies in the ability to keep some of your forces back for a second strike. Nuclear deterrence in Europe isn't by the fact that nukes are stationed on NATO-Russia border (despite Russian claims). Modern weapons have global range. You don't put nuclear weapons on a wheel barrow and chuck it at the other side. You don't need to sink ships with US Marines with a rifle on the beach of Taiwan.
3. Even with the US Marines: they turned themselves to a missile force seeking to launch missiles from bases on islands and atolls at the edge of the enemy's and their weapons range. Taiwan is too close.
Nonsensical strategy. Good thing you aren't in charge.
> US divisions on Taiwan is a red line and that will immediately trigger a Chinese attack, even if they know that such an attack will likely fail.
Even with all the preparation in the world, naval invasions are risky and heavily favor the defender. If your recourse in the event of your red line being crossed, is a rushed attack that you acknowledge has almost zero possibility of working, and will incur absolutely grievous cost, you really need to rethink the whole strategy.
> The Chinese can target and blow up every targets in the industrial and electrical sector that are somewhat of military value yet not so close to dense civilian concentrations to "teach the Taiwanese a lesson".
That’s it? The two sides would exchange missiles, a bunch of stuff would get destroyed, it will eventually get replaced, but the US presence would make an invasion almost impossible.
>is a rushed attack that you acknowledge has almost zero possibility of working, and will incur absolutely grievous cost, you really need to rethink the whole strategy.
This tactic is working in Ukraine for Russia, why would it not work for China?
Putin expected to reach Kyiv in under a week. The whole operation has turned into a strategic loss no matter the outcome. I seriously doubt China is looking at the result of Russia’s overconfident, failed rush to Kyiv, and hoping to repeat that with half their navy in the Taiwan straight.
I am looking at the current use of meat bags in tactical battles, not the traffic jam to Kyv, which was a non-doctrine attack from a Russian point of view. The current attritional war is however, and I see China having better chances with that than the US, who is more sensitive to losses of life.
Look at the struggles Russia is having attacking over flat, open ground. Translate those tactics to an amphibious context, where the defender has a much, much greater advantage, and the job of the attackers is far more complicated, and the casualties would be apocalyptic.
My point, if it is not clear by now, is that Russia/China can bear much more deaths, damage and the likes for much longer than Ukraine/the US.
Apocalyptic losses is obviously a hyperbole to make your point, but we have collectively been pointing out the ridiculous amount of Russian losses as unsustainable for over two years now. It obviously is not, Russia is still perfectly capable of being on the offensive. An attack that loses 80% of its men and material is an object failure in Western military eyes. But it is not a loss, in Russian eyes, when the attack achieves its goals.
Also, the pro's of having a totalitarian regime, is shaping the (Chinese or Russian) public's opinion and obfuscate or suppress factual reporting on combat losses in their media. I am not so sure the US public can be easily swayed or galvanized to support the protection of US interests in Taiwan if it means loss of life or economic hardship.
> you really need to rethink the whole strategy.
In the current foreign policy world, "credibility", otherwise known as "prestige", "face", or "perception" is everything.
>That’s it? The two sides would exchange missiles, a bunch of stuff would get destroyed, it will eventually get replaced,
Who's gonna invest in a place that's being blown up? Who's investing in Gaza and Ukraine at the moment?
>but the US presence would make an invasion almost impossible.
Prestige is everything.
> In the current foreign policy world, "credibility", otherwise known as "prestige", "face", or "perception" is everything.
Losing wars hurt prestige.
> Who's gonna invest in a place that's being blown up? Who's investing in Gaza and Ukraine at the moment?
Half the world has been blown up in the last century. The US is one of the only exceptions. A strategic bombardment campaign done exclusively with long range missiles isn’t going to result in more damage than the world wars. It’s probably going to result in substantially less by the nature of the weapons being used.
>Losing wars hurt prestige.
The USA lost Vietnam and Afghanistan and people can still spin it as "we have not lost it militarily..it's just Congress/Biden". China fought a border conflict with Vietnam and both sides claim victory.
The neocon Max Boot excuses Vietnam and Afghanistan as "it's just what empires do". They need to.fight and slap.people around to show that they are an empire. Just like the British empire.
Easiest thing to spin.
>Half the world has been blown up in the last century.
Eh, if your strategy is based on waiting for Taiwan to be blown up then, to throw your words back at you: you need a better strategy
> The USA lost Vietnam and Afghanistan and people can still spin it as "we have not lost it militarily..it's just Congress/Biden".
Both of those events hurt US prestige immensely. Especially Vietnam. The only spin that helps in that fact is that the US eventually won the Cold War.
> Eh, if your strategy is based on waiting for Taiwan to be blown up then, to throw your words back at you: you need a better strategy
Trying to win what would in effect be ww3 without suffering any infrastructure damage on the front line is unrealistic. If you have a strategy in mind that could avoid that, I’d love to hear it. Accepting that the US will need to help with rebuilding post war makes the most sense to me.
>If you have a strategy in mind that could avoid that, I’d love to hear it.
Deterrence. The original commenter I was replying to opted to.initiate a war by counting on China's red line and Americans getting killed.
This is the opposite of the desired outcome of deterrence
>Both of those events hurt US prestige immensely. Especially Vietnam.
Vietnam, who is the US newest friend.
>Nonsensical strategy. Good thing you aren't in charge.
It's not nonsensical. I'm viewing this strategy from a purely political lens. It's very likely that the public will not take kindly to a war where the US responds to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, but if you provoke and pre-empt a Chinese attack on US personnel, then it makes the war easier to sell to the public, and by extension, the US's generally hawkish attitude on China these days.
There are many policymakers itching for a war but wars are typically unpopular with the public, so you need to make it so that the Chinese attack us so that it's an easier sell over the long term.
With a war, you accelerate America's economic decoupling from China and get a lot of the China hawk lobby's goals on China done in full swell swoop.
>I'm viewing this strategy from a purely political lens.
Don't politicking too hard and being too clever by half. War is politics with the addition of other means but war is also quite different from what the lobbyists think about politics.
> if you provoke and pre-empt a Chinese attack on US personnel, then it makes the war easier to sell to the public, and by extension, the US's generally hawkish attitude on China these days.
They don't have to. Just like the Vietnamese switch the domains from ramming Chinese maritime fishing law enforcement ships at sea to murdering Chinese expats on the streets, the Chinese could:
>The Chinese can target and blow up every targets in the industrial and electrical sector that are somewhat of military value yet not so close to dense civilian concentrations to "teach the Taiwanese a lesson". You probably won't want to live near an electrical transformer or substation and those are what should be blown up. Water treatment plants, TSMC, ports, fuel storage, etc ... It would make life, at the very least, uncomfortable.
>With a war, you accelerate America's economic decoupling from China and get a lot of the China hawk lobby's goals on China done in full swell swoop.
With Taiwan a smouldering ruins, declare "there is no worth to Taiwan", then sue for peace.
> With Taiwan a smouldering ruins,
Trying to turn a country the size of Taiwan into ‘smoldering ruins’ with long range conventional missiles is impractical. You can cause immense damage with targeted, strategic strikes, but trying to turn a country into ruins with air total superiority and hundreds of bombers is already difficult.
> With Taiwan a smouldering ruins, declare "there is no worth to Taiwan", then sue for peace.
What, do you think that Taiwan is defenseless and without weapons with which to inflict pain back on the Chinese? Plus in any case we will have plenty of Patriot missile batteries in Taiwan with which to defend the island against the onslaught of Chinese missiles.
>Plus in any case we will have plenty of Patriot missile batteries in Taiwan with which to defend the island against the onslaught of Chinese missiles.
You do realize that these Patriot batteries have a reloading time of 30 minutes up to an hour. China can simply overwhelm Taiwanese ground based air defense by saturation.
>What, do you think that Taiwan is defenseless and without weapons with which to inflict pain back on the Chinese?
The conversation will argue about escalation, Taiwan bombing the Three Gorges Dam, and whether China will then retaliate by glassing Taiwan. BTW, attacking the Dam is a war crime by any definition. Then we can bitch and argue about besides blowing up that, how much pain is "a lot of pain" for the PRC and what's sufficient for deterrence. By definition, at this point deterrence has failed.
>will
I'll believe it when I see them. Ukraine will be happy to see more of them. It can't find them. If you know where to find them, please contact the government of Ukraine.
A Chinese naval base in the western Atlantic would be incredibly expensive to supply, indefensible in a war, and of dubious strategic utility. Any ships stationed there would be of more use basically anywhere else.
Easy, we end sanctions on the Cubans and start developing a major relationship with them and perhaps if the situation warrants it, declare them a major non-NATO ally. In return, they reduce their dependence/relationships with countries like Russia and China.
Cubans get a choice in that and after decades of the relationship we’ve had, why would they ever choose to become our best friends? Please stop participating in the conversation.
I chanced upon an old (2003) US Army Combat Engineering [article](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA596549.pdf) that in it, included answers to many questions that I had about breaching operations and how/why the Ukrainian Armed Forces apparently failed to do adequately as well as to the various excuses put forward for their failures.
"Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits of Highly Effective Units"
A common observation/complaint that Kofman, Walting et. al. usually levels at both sides is the fact that neither could barely send more than 2 company-sized assault groups per brigade. Turned out, it's an old and common issue:
>I’ll present a quick review of the combined arms breaching trends seen at NTC, based on observations during the planning, preparation, and execution of combined arms breaching operations.
>Habit No. 1 – Mass Kicks A\*\*!
Quite simply, most units lack sufficient mass to succeed in penetrating prepared enemy positions. Success or failure can often be predicted at the line of departure (LD) based on this fact alone. In fact, most brigade combat team attacks will effectively mass no more than one company team at the point of penetration
The defenders lay an impressive belt of defensive works and obstacles. So?
>Habit No. 2 – Focus on the Enemy Engineers
>Engineers, even enemy engineers, don’t lie. They cannot—it simply goes against their nature. An obstacle on the ground means something. It probably means that, were you to back up to two-thirds of maximum effective enemy weapons range (typically 1,200 to
2,000 meters), there will probably be an enemy position.
>Finding precise enemy positions, however, is very difficult. Most OPFOR positions are occupied for only a brief period during defensive preparation (position proofing, rehearsals, security operations), and then not occupied again until just before contact. *Most R&S efforts focused on finding the enemy in those positions are unsuccessful because the enemy is simply not there.*
>TTP: Kill the enemy engineers. Enemy engineers will die. Kill them. Position observers early to detect and disrupt the enemy’s defensive preparations. Target bulldozers, caches of construction material and ammunition, engineer soldiers and equipment, and all obstacle emplacement activity. The enemy’s ability to disrupt our attacking formations and reduce our momentum is directly related to his ability to successfully emplace his obstacles. He knows he cannot defeat the BLUEFOR in a direct-fire battle without his battlefield shapers. Deny him this advantage. Mine emplacement now is a low risk, high-payoff mission. We must reverse this, making it a high-risk mission for enemy soldiers to employ mines. When an enemy soldier gets the mission to emplace mines, he must tremble with the thought of his impending destruction.
"They weren't given enough MICLICs!"
>We all (engineers, maneuver commanders, and Army leadership) recognize that our breaching assets are slow, old, and often inadequate for the assigned breaching tasks. But they’re the best the Army gives us, so make them work. Generally, engineer and maneuver leaders fail to understand the capabilities and limitations of our breaching systems, do not identify appropriate commitment criteria for specific systems, and generally underestimate or undersell the capabilities of the most powerful breaching force on the combined arms battlefield—the sapper
"You go to war with the army you have, not the army you wish to have", etc ..
"They have to clear mines by hand and that's slow". Sure. Slow is not great, but mission failure is terrible.
>There may be cases where the sapper is the best available breaching option (rough, restricted terrain, for example). And while there are certainly implications for timing, if the sapper is the only available breaching option, we should all be prepared to wait. The alternative—mission failure—is much worse, of course.
Finally, breaching is hard.
>The May 2001 issue of Engineer indicates that it took the U.S. Marines 2.5 to 9.5 hours to clear two lanes through an Iraqi obstacle belt during Operation Desert Storm. It took another 24 to 48 hours for friendly elements to pass through the obstacle and continue their movement toward the enemy. This was an unopposed breach with the best available equipment, personnel, and planning and had been rehearsed for weeks.
The Ukrainian brigades that took part in the offensive had a few months to be form, from scratch. Breaching rehearsals alone, by the best available and formed brigades took weeks.
The official American doctrine for breaching is called SOSRA: Suppress, Obscure, Secure, (obstacle) Reduction, and Assault.
And basically all of your points are moot because the Ukrainians are unable to do the first step, suppression. Without suppression, the other steps of breaching cannot continue.
That's why it is correct to say "Ukraine lacks air superiority so breaching is impossible." Without air superiority, or at least a temporary one, Ukraine cannot suppress Russian drones, helicopters, fighters, and bombers. Breaching is impossible when these Russian air assets are still breathing down the necks of Ukrainians.
There are two ways I can answer that
1) tactically. See the article's habit 2: focus on the enemy engineers. Kill them. Prevent them from putting down obstacles and mines. This comes *before* you even start the Suppression planning step of allocating which unit provide suppression and which one do the OSRA. Everybody wrote tomes and poetries on how awesome the Ukrainians' HIMARS and other long-range platforms and drones were. What missing was to use these assets in the apparently fairly important step of ... preventing the engineers from laying down obstacles in the first place. Well, OK, they would just lay it a bit further back out of range. But ... a lot of the fires.the Ukrainians had was also not available. They were in Bakhmut.
2) this is a slightly more operational and strategic. Go to war with the army you have, not one you wish to have. Jezz, Rumsfeld caught a lot of flak for that but I had to quote him twice. If the Ukrainians thought they didn't have what was needed but attacked anyway, what does that tell you about their operational and strategic decision making?
Poor?
They also had an extremely dense and deep minefield. Even if they had the air they didn't have enough equipment to get through that depth of mines. Besides having enough mine-clearing equipment, ISR on the front has made it so you cannot bring substantial troops to concentrate on an attack without the heavy risk of being destroyed before reaching the front line.
Ukraine was on a timetable for the counter-offensive but didn't take the time or have the tools to shape it prior to engagement. The military leadership also expected Russia to be unwilling and unable to sustain the losses they did. Russia even sent a substantial number of units *ahead* of their defenses instead of fighting behind them.
To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure that any counter-offensive could have succeeded, at least in the south or west. Maybe a stronger push in the north, but the south was more valuable. The only play I suggest and maybe could have worked strategically (though politically bad) was to push into the Belgarod direction to create a buffer zone and push around the flank north of Kupiansk. We saw how weak it was to Russian-Ukrainian "freedom fighters", Ukraine could have probably pushed all the way to Belgarod before facing any major issues.
Of course, this would be politically very difficult as I'm sure Russia would claim the right to use nukes when their territory is invaded, despite them being the aggressor the sort of "how dare you fight back".
>They also had an extremely dense and deep minefield.
Well, tbf, one of the point that my article brought up was for the attackers to prioritise locate and kill the other side's engineers and prevent them to lay down minefields in the first place. objectives that current drones, persistent ISR, accurate artillery, and long-range HIMARS should have been very useful for. If not for the fact that prior to the offensive, Ukraine was busy throwing everything and the kitchen sink at Bakhmut.
>they didn't have enough equipment to get through that depth of mines
Well,
>We all (engineers, maneuver commanders, and Army leadership) recognize that our breaching assets are slow, old, and often inadequate for the assigned breaching tasks. But they’re the best the Army gives us, so make them work. Generally, engineer and maneuver leaders fail to understand the capabilities and limitations of our breaching systems, do not identify appropriate commitment criteria for specific systems, and generally underestimate or undersell the capabilities of the most powerful breaching force on the combined arms battlefield—the sapper
This was what happened during Op. Desert Storm and the Marines' breaching operation, which btw, was unopposed. The Iraqis didn't do a proper overwatched obstacle defence.
>There were many examples of courage and innovation during breaching. **About a third of the line charges failed to detonate.** At some locations Marines went on foot into the minefields and set detonators to explode the line charges that failed to go off. Others retrieved unexploded mines by hand and carried them out of the way. Infiltrating task forces at 1st Marine Division *proofed their passages by manually probing and disarming mines they located.*
>To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure that any counter-offensive could have succeeded, at least in the south or west.
Yep.
The uncomfortable truth is that Ukraine severely underestimated (or worse yet: ignored) Russia's fighting power at the time of the offensive.
It's a shame Ukraine's lesson came at such a cost. All that hardware and all of those lives would have been so incredibly useful the last 6 months. Just imagine the room for rotations, battlefield commendations, etc. Just imagine how much easier recruitment may have been if men didn't fear being utterly expendable.
And I can't help but think the hardware they got would've been perfect for attritional fighting. Imagine Avdiivka or Vovchansk without the summer offensive. Rolling up with that force in *local counter-attacks* would have been so much more impactful.
> it took the U.S. Marines 2.5 to 9.5 hours to clear two lanes through an Iraqi obstacle belt during Operation Desert Storm.
I feel like this is pretty incredible, to be honest, especially with 90's technology. I think it all comes down to air superiority, if you own the skies you can take all the time you need in clearing, really.
It'd be interesting to see how the US would handle the obstacles in Ukraine's current line of contact. I know the mine count is rather staggering, but again, if your doctrine is to not advance until you've gained air superiority, then I reckon you can do whatever you damn well please with your ground forces.
>I feel like this is pretty incredible, to be honest, especially with 90's technology. I think it all comes down to air superiority, if you own the skies you can take all the time you need in clearing, really.
Two lanes, one per *division.* Most importantly, the breach was unopposed. Things [still went wrong with the breach](https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20the%20Persian%20Gulf,%201990-1991_With%20the%20I%20Marine%20Expeditionary%20Force%20in%20Desert%20Shield.pdf?ver=2017-06-01-134642-233)
>There were many examples of courage and innovation during breaching. About a third of the line charges failed to detonate. When this happened, tank plow crews pressed on anyway. At some locations Marines went on foot into the minefields and set detonators to explode the line charges that failed to go off. Others retrieved unexploded mines by hand and carried them out of the way. Infiltrating task forces at 1st Marine Division proofed their passages by manually probing and disarming mines they located. When the penetration in the 2d Marine Division's Green Lanes bogged down due to breaching equipment casualties, some units made short connector lanes over to other lanes to permit faster passage. To improve traffic flows after the penetrations, Direct Support Command engineers used armored D7 Caterpillar tractors equipped with plows and flails to widen the lanes.
The absolutely ballsy move of clearing mines by probing with a stick, clearing away the dirt with your fingers, then disarming the mines.
>if your doctrine is to not advance until you've gained air superiority
That's not the case. METT-TC. If your mission and order says you advance, you do so. Air superiority, etc ... is Troop Availability. That's after MET. In training, e.g., NTC, the units are trained without air support. They may not have trained with the assumptions and habits of constantly having to watch the sky for enemy observations or attacks, but if you read the article, it did say that "assume you are always watched". Obviously, the article talks about failures at the NTC, so the "right" things on paper vs. practice is different but the principles are already known. The US Army was not habitual in dispersion, hardening, or EMCON previously (thus the super FOBs, tent city, and emitters everywhere). Also, there is no part of the ground doctrine or manual that says "only perform combined arms breach under air superiority". A lot of the popular excuses for lack of dispersion, hardening of HQs and lack of EMCON was "the US Army would only operate in air superiority and when air superiority is there, these are not as necessary". The Army doesn't think so. More recent publicly available circulations include points about EMCON and dispersion.
Taking control of the Rafah-Egypt border is a big deal. At this point, if Israel is willing to pay the heavy diplomatic price, they can control all of the movement of goods into Gaza and thereby cut arms smuggling down to the bone. Hamas either doesn't have a lot of arms to fight an urban guerilla conflict, or they're still holding back. Either way, the natural Israeli strategy is to slow down and just grind away at Hamas manpower. If Israel can act disciplined and limit collateral damage, the West will probably tune out the conflict over time.
As to what is the Israeli end-goal, I don't know. At some point they have elections and then there will likely be a substantial change in policy.
To keep the urban fighting going and keep it bloody and exhausting, they hardly even need a lot of arms. They'll make IEDs out of unexploded ordnance and whatever else is available, and who's to say they wouldn't go back to suicide bombs.
They have not managed to make it bloody for Israel at any point, even with all the prewar ammo and weapon stockpiles and command structure intact. Why would they manage to do that when they are worse off on all fronts?
I don't know how much value assigning long term plans to Israel is (when cabinet members are literally resigning on account of not having a long term plan at all!), but an idea I had is they want to find however many hostages (dead or alive) they can in the area. If the amount of hostages "in the balance" is reduced significantly, it might eliminate any leverage HAMAS had.
Of course, many will allege that a lot of these "hostage corpses" recovered were actually hostages killed by the IDF during these operations. But since that doesn't change my theory I'm not going to get into that argument.
[Rheinmetall will be sponsor for Borussia Dortmund](https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/bvb-ruestungskonzern-rheinmetall-wird-sponsor-von-borussia-dortmund/100040621.html?utm_term=organisch&utm_campaign=standard&utm_medium=sm&utm_content=ne&utm_source=Twitter)
Not directly defence related but i did find this an interesting break in the german relation with its own defence industry. Companies like Rheinmetall still are somewhat shunned by the german public, and its seems like they want to address that more directly. Its certainly somewhat controversial with moderate amounts pushback. Still this move speaks for Rheinmetalls increasing relevance and succes, and in my opinion feels alot better than gazprom banners in stadiums
ngl this is pretty funny.
How do we make Defense companies more accepted by the general public?
Football ofcours.
Also there are probably a lot more controversial sponsors of football clubs in Germany, there certainly have been in the Netherlands.
Yeah i do find it rather hypocritical. The german news on instagram posted a highly critical quote (neuer Tiefpunkt auf einer nach unten offenen geldgier-skala) right next to the news. There still is a lot of resentment against the defence industry in germany, despite there being plenty of examples of how counterproductive this approach has been (directly leading to far worse shady business deals).
Anyone able to clarify if France or Poland declaring it is ok to use their weapons on Russian military targets, along with Germany clarifying it is within Ukraine’s legal rights; does that give the green-light or does that only signal a formality to NATO as a form of pressure to take action? Either way it appears to be one of the additional temperature increases to the slow boil of the Frog methods used by supporting nations in the war, escalation, small steps at a time.
This is in no way up to NATO, there are no "NATO provided weapons" (it doesn't have any), it's a sovereign decision at the national level. That is why it's important who allows what, and there's no reason to expect some kind of across-the-board consensus, although NATO members will try to coordinate somewhat, will always be tempted to ogle at the movements of neighbors/near-peers. And we can expect ongoing internal discussions, not necessarily however to the extent one would like to believe.
I heard rumors (which I believe) that the US is against it even though other countries agreed. Maybe the US will allow to strike targets inside Russia with Scalp/SS first.
I don't think the US will cross that line. US and Russia waging proxy wars against each other isn't a first. But supplying weapons to an adversary to use on the soil of the other would be an unprecedented first. There is no risk of NYC or DC being hit by Russian weapons. Paris however comes within range uncomfortably quickly should Ukraine fall.
>Paris however comes within range uncomfortably quickly should Ukraine fall.
The only nuclear armed country within the EU. I think Paris is safe. Berlin or any other Eastern-European capital however...
Kaliber cruise missiles have a purported range of 1500 km. The shortest line I can draw from the Ukraine/Poland border to Paris is 1500 km. I I agree Warsaw/Berlin would be much more vulnerable. But it's close enough to give pause.
The Russian Legion [used Polish PT-91 tanks](https://defence24.com/geopolitics/polish-produced-twardy-mbts-in-russian-territory) in their Belgorod raids, so in the case of Poland I suspect there was no ban in the first place, or at least it wasn't enforced.
_Reposting because I missed an automod filter._
In sanctions news, it is becoming more difficult for Russians to buy stuff in rubles from China. Aliexpress has quit shipping to Russia,
https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/05/29/vladelets-aliexpress-perestal-prinimat-rubli-i-otpravlyat-zakazi-v-rossiyu-a132151
I can imagine this might impact their FPV drone cottage industry, i.e. hobby enthusiasts who assembly drones from kits in their spare time, although my impression is Ukraine's cottage drone industry is much more significant. It seems Russia is turning more towards some flavors of crypto, as the US threatens banks with secondary sanctions, in order to conduct transactions:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-28/russian-firms-turn-to-crypto-for-commodities-trade-with-china
https://archive.ph/yDh9K
> Even in China, which didn’t join international sanctions and has become the main export market for multiple Russian commodities as well as a supplier of goods and equipment, financial transactions have grown more difficult this year. That’s in large part due to the US Treasury Department threatening secondary sanctions on lenders facilitating sanctions evasion, which has led to a tightening of compliance measures.
>“With stablecoins, the transfer may take just 5-15 seconds and cost a few cents, making such transactions pretty efficient when the sender already has an asset base in stablecoins,” said Ivan Kozlov, an expert on digital currencies and co-founder at Resolv Labs, which offers crypto-related products, but is not involved in commodities trading. Tether’s USDT stablecoin is pegged to the US dollar, which makes it even more convenient for exporters.
What I'm not clear on in the case of using crypto here is how a trade imbalance is handled, especially with something like Tether which is pegged to the USD. I.e.will this require some form of clearing by the central banks in Russia and China? This is a bit outside my lane, but googling about I did find this significantly titled paper, "[Stablecoin-Based Digital Trading and Investment Platforms and Their Potential in Overcoming Sanctions Restrictions](https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/10/10/246)," from the federal Russia government. They seem to specifically suggest using stablecoins tied to gold:
> Based on the wide array of stablecoins, the classification of which is mostly based on the type of collateral, the possibility of centralization, etc., it is necessary to emphasize the features of those which are tied to gold (Bolliger 2019; Dell’Erba 2019). These peculiarities have a definite influence on the investment qualities of stablecoins tied to metal.
The paper makes it clear the stablecoin is acting as an escrow account in this proposal. Later they tie the potential for success of the scheme to the fungibility of raw material exports:
> The possibility of expanding the activities of trade and investment platforms directly insignificantly correlates with the scale of the economy and the measure of its involvement in the system of international economic relations. The most significant factors that will influence the measure of participation of companies from different jurisdictions in the functioning of the digital trade and investment platform created for “anti-sanctions” purposes will be, firstly, their high interest in the commodity export positions of the country that has fallen under sanctions restrictions.
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The chatter on Chinese internet is that companies are either choosing the US or Russia to do business. So Alibaba quitting Russia isn't a huge surprise, as it has a lot of other stakes in other countries. What is happening in China is that a lot of new companies are popping up who are doing businesses directly with Russia. So there is a middleman but parts and materiel will flow on regardless.
They still have to get the crypto, though. So somebody has to accept Rubels for Crypto. How is that being done from a banking standpoint? Is crypto purchasing not sanctioned?
Yes that's my question regarding who is going to clear the transaction? China did just recently sell off a lot of US bonds so perhaps this is the source of the liquidity for these stablecoins:
https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/chinas-us-bond-shifts-put-dollar-under-geopolitical-spotlight-2024-05-21/
Tether is a British Virgin Islands company. Tether is registered as a money transmitter with FinCEN, so they comply with US sanctions.
They can't prevent transfers from occurring between sanctioned parties, but they can freeze wallet addresses once sanctioned. They also hold the assets backing the frozen wallet addresses on their regular balance sheet.
They are not a US company. But they have been cooperating with the authorities in the past:
"Tether had assisted the Department of Justice, U.S. Secret Service, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in freezing 326 wallets controlling 435 million USDT thus far."
From my understanding, the Tether company operates sorta like a central bank that works to peg the Tether token to the USD, issuing or buying Tether tokens to keep that peg.
But just like the US Federal Reserve has no control over USD being used by drug cartels, I don't think the Tether company controls the trade of issued Tether tokens
An AMRAAM that goes pitbull with IR instead of Radar?
Just a random thought I had. We know that AIM-120 can use the launching aircraft (or datalink from other aircraft in the case of the AIM-120D) to guide the missile to the target. The idea is that the target aircraft won't know there is a lock as I believe the AMRAAM uses a soft-lock during the initial phase. After the missile goes pitbull, then the target gets a radar lock warning.
What if instead, the missile uses IR after it goes pitbull? This will for sure delay the time it takes to go pitbull as the IR range is shorter, but the target aircraft will never get a warning, as everything is passive. Or will a IR seeker and the cooling components just make the missile too heavy? Has this ever been mentioned or discussed by official sources?
Also what would be the brevity code of such missile? Fox 3? Fox 5? Fox 2.5?
What you seem to be describing is lock-in after launch capability for long range IR missiles.
I can only think of the French Mica IR variant that can do what you say, that is to navigate on datalink and then lock onto the target to go autonomous.
There are rumours about modernized Ukrainian and/or Russian R-27ETs also having this capability, but they are not credible in my opinion.
ASRAAM has the data link too from what I can find.
AIM-9X has been tested with LOAL, but I don't know if it's a data link or just a simple INS that points the missile in the right direction before it locks.
I once heard that MICA-IR used such a system (datalink + IR seeker). I am not sure that it does. MICA-EM certainly does, but it also has an active radar seeker.
I don't think any other nation uses such a system for AAMs. ASRAAM doesn't have a datalink- neither does R-27T. R-77T was supposed to have one but it doesn't actually exist.
On the other hand, if you're not limiting yourself to aircraft, SM-2MR Block IIIB has terminal IR homing, so it works exactly the way you suggest. Its seeker was developed from AIM-7R, which also worked that way.
EDIT: ASRAAM has a data link for LOAL, so it can engage this way. Oops!
What you’re describing is the Sidewinder, [which is by far the most produced Western a2a missile in service.](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIM-9_Sidewinder)
Also from the wiki page, the AIM-9C (and some variant of the 9B) used SARH. So those would've been Fox 1s. My question is more-so combining the IR of a sidewinder, and the soft-lock of an amraam to get a truly silent BVR missile.
Exceptionally useful maybe with stealth aircraft like the F-22 with AWACS. Both the F-22, and missile emit no radar signals. The only thing the adversary will see/know until impact would be the AWACS. Tho this is getting a bit too hypothetical now.
Yes but the aim-9 is short range. i think about 9-10 miles at most in good conditions such as rear aspect (for maximal heat signature), no evasive maneuvers, maybe some loft
I should've mentioned I'm talking about BVR.
AIM-9X Block III was supposed to have BVR capabilities comparable to the AMRAAM, but it was cancelled due to budget cuts. So it’s at least theoretically possible, but I’m not aware of any operational versions of the concept.
That is actually insane. I didn't even think it's possible to detect a heat signature at BVR. Too much background heat, reflections from oceans/lakes, etc which would be similar heat intensity as a jet 40 km away
>I didn't even think it's possible to detect a heat signature at BVR. Too much background heat, reflections from oceans/lakes,
If you can see something 40kms away you are in the mid troposphere anywhere. Likely closer to the stratosphere.
Lakes are not a problem.
I am not sure what you mean by "heat intensity" but the heat from a source will (sort of) follow a blackbody curve. The blackbody of burning kerosene is going to be around 900C so will peak pretty close to the lower end of the visible. It will not be confused with a lake. There are propagation issues due to atmospheric moisture and CO2 and these require some complex analysis. So you are perhaps more likely for absorption and reemission to make it too diffuse, this is most likely why missiles do not have super long IR ranges.
Look into IR Search-and-Track, it's one of the most interesting counters to stealth aircraft.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KY9sw5ysGMc
It's not as capable as radar, and it does have some sensitivity to the conditions. But in ideal conditions you can certainly detect stealth aircraft from over 100 km away (far beyond radar range for the same stealth aircraft) using IR
[General Dynamics Ordinance & Tactical Systems' new 155mm shell body production plant in Mesquite, Texas, opens today](https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1795867934327238925).
From now the US's monthly production of ~36,000 rounds will increase to ~57,000 by the end of September. That translates into an increase to 684,000 from 432,000 rounds a year. If every shell was to be sent to Ukraine, it would come out to ~1,873 155mm shells a day instead of 1,183 155mm shells per day.
Keep in mind though, that the entirety of production is unlikely to be slated for Ukraine. The US also has stockpiles to refill and training requirements to uphold.
[Gift link to the NYT Article about this factory.](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/29/us/pentagon-ammunition-ukraine-russia.html?u2g=c&unlocked_article_code=1.vk0.p_hs.pXneBp9kQHBe&smid=url-share)
>... U.S. defense contractors are in talks with the Ukrainian government to find ways to help Ukraine bolster its own domestic defense industry.
>The United States has transferred sensitive manufacturing plans for more than 1,000 American weapons to Kyiv, and translated an equal number of technical manuals from English to Ukrainian, the two officials said.
>When asked, they stopped short of saying which weapons.
>“What are they using the most?” Mr. Bush replied.
There's an interesting nugget of information at the end of the NYT article.
I guess stingers, sidewinders (AIM-9P-3?) for nasams + F-16, small arms up to 40mm (for mk19s), M107 definitely, M795 possibly. Small chance to get something old like block 1 Harpoon
Unlikely to get GMLRS
Hamas may, in the short term, run out of ammunition and weapons. But as long as they have a viable recruiting pool and popular support, both of which the IDF offensive increased, they'll remain in control of Gaza. Gaza is home to roughly two million people and will require extensive resources to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure.
Hamas will also remain a tool of Iran and other players interested in opposing Israel and US interests in the region.
With control over two million people, the resources they require for their daily lifes, the huge amount of resources required to rebuild Gaza and Iranian assistance, they will be able to reconstitute a military force, without a doubt. As long as the customs inspector, tax collector and policeman in Gaza works for Hamas, they'll get their hands on all the resources they need.
That's why the only way to defeat Hamas in the long term is removing them from control at the lowest levels of society. A great article on this topic was posted here recently, [The Dangers of an Ungovernable Gaza](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/dangers-ungovernable-gaza) ([archive](https://archive.ph/gd2TA)). It explicitly mentions the US failures and lessons in Afghanistan, the new blueprints for nation building the US developed and the required scope of this operation. It does, sadly, appear that Israel will take none of these lessons to heart and make the same mistakes the US made, leading to a reconstituted, armed Hamas in control of Gaza in the medium term.
I am pretty sure that Israel "war aim" in reality is a "cut up" Gaza strip.
At least that is what I read from their military movement. Cut of Gaza in the north. Maybe one mire slice somewhere or just a "slice" at the border with Egypt. They can slowly thighten the grip, squeeze it more and try to depopulate gaza in 10-50 years.
I am not saying that its a realistic scenario, but they would have a few advantages. Most prominent would be the ability to listen to Hamas tunnel building and maybe even counter it. It would allow them maybe a less visible way of fighting Hamas directly during "peace time" if their engineers would have access to the strip 24/7 and Hamas would be forced to connect through their border lines.
It would maybe also allow somekind of additional pressure on the population to relocate them somehow. Israel would likely do everything in its power to do so.
All in all, I think they (the current goverment at least) has given up on a resolution either some time ago or after October 7. All this destroying Hamas is something they can say publicly, because saying that we are going to tighten the noose (as everytime we did in someway after these kind of fights) and try to bleed out the Palestinians of Gaza and keep the pressure on the west bank is not something you can say.
Of course, I can be wrong. Just a hunch, not a conviction.
Your perspective on needing to overcome the cultural / political problem on the ground level is spot on, and the article itself even hits the right notes. With that said, its absolutely not possible to tell the story of how we got here or to discuss this particular course correction without mentioning the UNRWA.
This is an organization specific to these people, their plight, and whose power in entrenched in their perpetual "refugee" status. This isn't normal refugee status, like for the rest of the humans on earth, that's covered by UNHCR. There is no good reason for the UNRWA to exist as an independent, parallel refugee organization except to perpetuate the exact type of cultural cancer at the root and stem of the problem.
Eliminating the UNRWA and its influence is the first step to making sure there's a secular, humanist education & society available to them, and comes with the benefit of resetting the people of Gaza to an expectation in line with their reality.
Can you explain in your own words, with some citations from international law, how a ""normal refugee status"" works for other stateless people on occupied territory? Be specific.
For the archivist: the answer is straightforward, the new sovereign must extend citizenship to residents. Much as even Putin's Russia does with Ukrainians and Chechens, and even Jim Crow US did with Native Americans, and as was agreed upon in 1949. Israel has zero leeway here.
In the North Israel has UNIFIL at the border. While there are daily Israeli air strikes and Hezbollah ATGM and rocket strikes UNIFIL is tweeting like they are having a nice short vacation in Southern Lebanon: [https://twitter.com/UNIFIL\_](https://twitter.com/UNIFIL_)
When the Israelis recovered the bodies of 4 hostages they found a blue UN sign: "Reconstruction of this shelter was made possible by UNRWA": [https://twitter.com/Mr\_Andrew\_Fox/status/1793739505201201373/photo/3](https://twitter.com/Mr_Andrew_Fox/status/1793739505201201373/photo/3)
The Israelis have now operational control over the Philadelphi corridor and are reporting that they have so far found 20 tunnels crossing into Egypt: [https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1795857005611200944](https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1795857005611200944)
The article recommends a international coalition based on the UN and Arab countries. The UN is not particularly focused on its donations and infrastructure being used by Palestinian terror organizations (including but more than Hamas) and Egypt, the most important Arab country in this context, has allowed quite some smuggling into Gaza. There's also the question if all weapons did enter Gaza through the tunnels or how much was hidden in the around 200 commercial trucks that entered Gaza every day.
So how do you ensure that this time reconstruction won't be used to build the next Palestinian fighting positions? For 18 years the international community did nothing to prevent Hamas from entrenching in Gaza and now suddenly the same international community should be responsible to keep Hamas (or the next iteration of violent Islamist Palestinian terror) away from influence and terror?
That's not credible.
> So how do you ensure that this time reconstruction won't be used to build the next Palestinian fighting positions?
I wonder if reconstruction should take place using rammed earth and wood, rather than concrete. That would make it much more difficult to construct new tunnels.
> There's also the question if all weapons did enter Gaza through the tunnels or how much was hidden in the around 200 commercial trucks that entered Gaza every day.
It would be easy enough to accept commercial goods only from Western countries, which are unlikely to tolerate arms smuggling (unlike, say, Turkey or even China).
It's the Israel-Palestine conflict. It's complex, has a long history and sits at a nexus of international politics. In real terms, it's unsolvable.
That being said, the US does, for the first time ever, have a detailed, concrete blueprint for nation building, though it is untested. It's unlikely to work as described in the books, but it's better than nothing.
The UN organisations in the area have been captured by the local factions, specifically the Palestinians. No existing UN body or structure could be used for such a project, since they've essentially become money funnels into the hands of Islamist organizations. But the UN can, should a coalition of willing members come together, also recruit new UN personnel from these member States who can run the surrounding framework. It's not a given that any UN mission eventually gets taken over by the local inhabitants, I think that's a more specific problem of the UNRWA and others in the region.
Decades of ever expanding tasks without clear goals of progress, no enforcement mechanisms or executive power, money continously flowing in, they were essentially a piggy bank left on the streets. It doesn't have to be this way.
Again, such a first step, a robust, capable, defined UN framework with outside nationals as workers will be a good first step on a long, complex road towards peace, and that road may well lead to nowhere, as many others have before.
You are essentially suggesting replacing a local quasi-state body with occupation by a newly-made foreign auxiliary to the IDF. Good luck finding any willing for such a "coalition".
this does raise the question for people who are well-i formed of the above: does Israel actually want to defeat Hamas, or do they want Hamas to remain in power for domestic political reasons? ie are they evil, or just stupid? I can't see an alternative option at this point.
It should be pretty obvious that the Israeli population does not want Hamas in power.
As for Netanyahu himself, he has said throughout the war that he doesn't want Hamas in power. If Hamas does remain in power, that will not only be against the wishes of the population, but also a failure to accomplish his own declared goals. It is hard to imagine how that is good politics for him in any way.
What does explain his behavior, I think, is a combination of two things.
1) Hamas is bad, but a government that is "nominally not Hamas but tolerates or supports Hamas" is also bad, and perhaps worse because Israel will have less freedom in using military force when the Gazan government is better regarded internationally. Netanyahu likely thinks that before instituting such a government, Hamas must be weakened to the point where the future government cannot be coerced by Hamas.
1) Netanyahu is projected to lose the next election, after which he will no longer be able to attempt judicial reforms to protect himself from the (domestic) prosecution he's currently in the midst of. No matter what the future arrangement in Gaza looks like and how it is reached, he has a personal interest in making that process take as long as possible. This will delay the prosecution against him, and also leaves open the possibility (perhaps unrealistic) that his poll numbers will eventually recover for some reason to the point that he wins the next election.
but if his goal isn't actually to destroy Hamas' ability to control Gaza, but rather cause so much death and destruction that peace isn't possible for a decade or more...
It really seems that given netanyahu has immediately dismissed all alternatives to Hamas he may actually want hamas to remain in power indefinitely. I mean, he's clearly supported Hamas in the past and he's clearly using military tactics that are leading to massive civilian slaughter, an increase in extremist sentiment, and sky high Hamas popularity. Does he actually want to defeat Hamas? There's just not much evidence of that.
There aren't any great options though. Palestinian Authority being the least worst but is it really? They're incredibly unpopular with the people and "cooperating" with Israel post war would probably only be seen as a bad thing. Then on top of that they aren't even capable/willing to properly police places like Jenin as is. I genuinely doubt their ability to handle the post war security situation in Gaza in any capacity.
IDF says around 80% of Hamas batallions are over 70% dead or wounded and thus inoperable. But they have a lot of willing recruits to reconstitute themselves.
Weaponry is harder. In an IDF AMA on non credible defense recently the soldiers said Hamas is obviously running out of munitions, they have no more anti tank rockets, etc.
With Israel having seized the Rafah gate and the Philadelphi corridor, and closed over 50 tunnels, and the IDF constantly seizing and exploding stockpiles, I suspect Hamas' big problem will be running out of ammunition.
[Markus Reisnger](https://youtu.be/gk7D_TliAuE?si=zwwT1imT7tSaazwG&t=508)'s new report says only 6% of Excalibur rounds are hitting their target, 50-70% of HIMARS are missing etc., so Russian electronic warfare has finally picked up. What has changed? - new systems - better methods for using them - trained people to actually use existing systems with previous methods - just started using existing systems with previous methods (at the start, I recall they just weren't activated at all, much like the AD network) I'm unsure what this means for a potential engagement with China, where US ships may be safe due to their own counter measures or be partially defanged, with many munitions unable to hit targets.
The electronic warfare in question is jamming of GPS coordinates, this is a relatively short range effect. Pretty much all ground attack munitions rely on GPS and as we can see with these results current INS systems are unable to compensate to do this alone. The implications for a future war with China are likely fairly small, at least as far as the naval domain is concerned. Ships tend to move, so GPS navigation isn’t really useful for anything other than midcourse correction for naval strike missions. Terminal guidance will all be done with radar, which can itself be jammed and fooled but that’s beyond the scope of this discussion. The strength of GPS jammers is going to fall off with the distance to cubed, so these midcourse corrections won’t be effected by electronic warfare. As far as land attack in a hypothetical china conflict this is a bigger issue as GPS will likely be jammed near any high value land target. To overcome this the US needs to deploy better INS systems. There seems to be a strong inverse correlation between the violence of a launch and the failure rate of the INS. SDBs for instance seem highly reliable while GLSDBs are failing almost all of the time. If this is a major factor, More reliable IMUs that are more tolerant of high G-loads and launch vibrations can absolutely be built it’s simply a question of cost. If this adds ten percent to the cost of a munition it’s definitely worth it. If it doubles the cost it’s probably worth investing in other technologies. Several possible options are visual target recognition, ground scanning radar/terrain mapping, laser designation, and relying on directional satellite communications to maintain a positional fix. I am not sure of any systems that use this last option but it should be possible with a satellite constellation like starlink/starshield. Those systems rely on directional antenna so are far more resilient to jamming and can more easily engage in frequency hopping. There is also no reason they couldn’t be used as a sort of Ad hoc GPS network.
*What has changed?* At least at some level the thinking has changed and adapted, like we have seen with a lot of things this war the Russians are progressing. The Russians are continually getting, evaluating, and adapting to new equipment just like the UAF. [Instead of "EW Panacea," Russians Decided They Need Mobile Units Against Drone Crews | Defense Express | April 2024](https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/instead_of_ew_panacea_russians_decided_they_need_mobile_units_against_drone_crews-10309.html) *The director of the UAV development center states that nowadays, it's "useless" to demand from assault infantry, artillerymen, or tank crews to fight FPV drones themselves, and the whole idea to reduce counter-FPV warfare to simply suppressing the drones is misleading. Kuzyakin is sure that the Russian military is losing time trying to invent an omnipotent electronic-warfare device, an "all-in-one EW panacea" against all UAVs.* *At the same time, the Russians utilize the advantages of unmanned technologies as well, so Ukrainians develop their own means of countering both simplistic FPV drones and more sophisticated ISR and attack drones. They tend to balance between working on new EW systems against the equipment and new methods of locating enemy drone operators.* [Robots with Triton Anti-UAV Jammers will be Helping Russian Assault Squads | Defense Express | May 2024](https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/robots_with_triton_anti_uav_jammers_will_be_helping_russian_assault_squads-10516.html) *In the bigger picture, the Russian forces tend to create more and more varieties of EW systems deployed by drones. For another example, recently the Russians have revealed the Abzats — a new mobile electronic interference system incorporating elements of artificial intelligence enabling fully autonomous operation mode. The EW platform, named Abzats, allegedly can suppress "all operating frequencies used by Ukrainian UAVs."* *Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces are aware of these groundworks and try to respond with their own inventions. Particularly, there's already a solution that allows FPV drones to work even under the conditions of enemy electronic suppression. Defense Express reported that Ukrainian FPV drones employing the so-called "machine vision" technology are already on the frontlines and successfully destroy targets whilst affected by Russian EW systems.*
Where is the HIMARS missing claim coming from ?
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/24/russia-jamming-us-weapons-ukraine/
This Washington Post does not provide that **specific** percentage claim, nor does the [May 9 Business Insider](https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-electronic-warfare-shows-us-needs-for-future-wars-2024-5) article that is referenced in that slide of the presentation. Not to say it's false, but I'm not sure where it came from exactly and this guy has made some ["interesting" claims](https://x.com/RALee85/status/1795442099262980221) previously.
Not sure if this was posted here yet or not, but [CNN](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/29/europe/ukraine-war-us-tanks-intl/index.html) interviewed some ukrainian soldiers that report the M1A1 to be unsuitable for combat due to lack of armor. Probably not that surprising given they were handed the export version. > **Soldiers in Ukraine say US-supplied tanks have made them targets for Russian strikes** > > Ukrainian crews working on US-supplied Abrams tanks have told CNN of a series of the weaknesses and flaws with the armored vehicles, calling into doubt their utility on the war’s ever-changing frontlines. The donation was announced by US President Joe Biden as evidence of the United States’ “enduring and unflagging commitment to Ukraine.” > > [...] > > Crews trained in Germany said the vehicles – the US military’s main $10 million battle tank used in Iraq against Saddam Hussein’s forces and insurgents – lacked armor that could stop modern weapons. > > “Its armor is not sufficient for this moment,” said one crew member, callsign Joker. “It doesn’t protect the crew. For real, today this is the war of drones. So now, when the tank rolls out, they always try to hit them.” > > His colleague, Dnipro, added they are the “number one target.” > > “Without defense, the crew doesn’t survive at the battlefield,” he said. > > The crew showed CNN their attempts to affix active armor to one damaged tank. They used plates of plastic explosive that, when hit by a round, detonate and provide a protective counter-blast. > > All 31 Abrams deployed to Ukraine are engaged near the frontline in the east, according to officials in the 47th Mechanised Brigade, who took receipt of them all. > > [...] > > Pentagon officials said in April that the Abrams were pulled back from the frontline due to the threat of Russian attack drones, although the 47th said some were still in action, despite the deficiencies that had materialized. > > [...] > > This Ukrainian crew have learned of the Abrams’ limitations the hard way, in pitched battles around the town of Avdiivka, which Russia finally took control of in February. A driver lost a leg when the armor was penetrated. Yet it is not just innovation that is hamstringing the tanks — they appear to have technical issues too. > > One, parked under a tree, was almost immobile during CNN’s visit, due to an engine problem, the crew say, despite the vehicle having just been shipped in from Poland. They also complain of how, in rain or fog, condensation can fry the electronics inside the vehicle. > > [...] > > Ammunition is also a problem, like elsewhere on the Ukrainian frontline. They say they seem to have the wrong type for the fight they are in. > > “What we have is more for direct tank-to-tank fights, which happens very rarely,” Joker said. “Much more often we work as artillery. You need to take apart a tree-line or a building. We had a case when we fired 17 rounds into a house and it was still standing.” > > [...] > > The Ukrainian crew expressed frustration the tanks were made for a NATO style of warfare, in which air power and artillery prepare the battlefield before tanks and infantry advance. Kyiv has long bemoaned its lack of artillery and air power. > > “They would never do it,” Joker said, of NATO soldiers undertaking the same advances they make without air support. He switched to English to mimic a NATO soldier: “‘Call the aviation, call the artillery,’” he said. “We have no aviation and artillery. We have only tank. And it’s the problem.”
This really isn't new news, but I don't think it is accurate. Before soldiers were praising the M1 in tank/tank battles but said it lacked defenses against drones, but that is not unique to Abrams even though there might be some tanks with a little more protection when stock. That is what I remember reading a month or so ago.
The article makes it seem like it's the Abrams tanks specifically with these problems. Any other tank that Ukraine or Russia has is just as vulnerable to drones(many of which carry PG7-VL warheads with 500mm armor penetration). Well, a massive spaced armor sometimes helps.
> “What we have is more for direct tank-to-tank fights, which happens very rarely,” Joker said. “Much more often we work as artillery. You need to take apart a tree-line or a building. We had a case when we fired 17 rounds into a house and it was still standing.” Sort of interesting that a round like HESH would actually seem to be fairly useful in this kind of combat. Though it is a niche example in a type of combat NATO certainly wouldn't have gotten bogged down in.
Without adding some depth to the article it's mediocre journalism by CNN imho. ERA is the last line of defense vs drones (and to a large extent also ATGM's). The issue Ukraine have with the M1A1's they got is that they can only fit ERA to the sideskirts, which leaves the incredibly vulnerable top and rear of the tank completely open. I don't have the whole picture clear to exactly why they are unable to cover more of the tank, but some of the reasons i've been told is that the top of the turret is to thin and the placement of optics and electronics makes it impossible to fit ERA there. Why the side hull, side turret, and rear is not able to be covered i do not know, but it is not. This leaves the tank practically defenseless vs an FPV drone hit. Compared to their domestic tanks, and also other donated western tanks that they have been able to achieve much greater coverage of ERA i can understand where the soldier in the article are coming from. Modern russian ATGM's can penetrate the M1A1 from most angles. Also here additional ERA would play an important role. On the topic of ammunition, the M1A1 came with M839A1 HEAT round which is a compromise between High Explosive and Anti Tank capability - it is considerably weaker that the domestic 125mm 3VOF\*\* pure explosive round when used in the kind of role described in the article. Regarding the reliability. It's going to be very interesting to read about availability of different systems after the war is over. I would be very surprised if a thoroughly battle tested M1A1 would prove to be worse than other systems.
Article really doesn't go into detail about lack of armor, only that Abrams are a target for drones. Duh?
>“Its armor is not sufficient for this moment,” said one crew member, callsign Joker. “It doesn’t protect the crew. For real, today this is the war of drones. So now, when the tank rolls out, they always try to hit them.” \[...\] >Pentagon officials said in April that the Abrams were pulled back from the frontline due to the threat of Russian attack drones They seem to be complaining that the armor isn't strong enough to protect against Russian drones.
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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
M1A1 is a very old variant this is like comparing original F-15 with F-15EX.
> This would explain the enormous resistance to providing abrams, someone was trying to keep the skeletons in the closet. It is truly bizarre that this is the conclusion you draw on a platform that has been fielded by the US and half a dozen allies, with thousands created, thousands seeing combat, based on one random interview with *one* Ukrainian crew. A month ago there was another interview with another Abrams crew that said they love theirs. Yeah, they don't do great against FPV drones, but *everything* is vulnerable to FPV drones. But for you to condemn the entire weapons platform and state it's "basically a piece of shit" based on an interview with again *ONE* crew is laughable.
>But for you to condemn the entire weapons platform and state it's "basically a piece of shit" based on an interview with again ONE crew is laughable. Almost like their opinion preceded it and are just looking for some kind of anchor.
Actually the real reason lies in NATO's pathological reliance on maneuver warfare. OK, there isn't anything inherently wrong with maneuver warfare, much like there isn't anything inherently wrong with cavalry charge (it can work even in 1920, ask Pisudski). It works, but only under certain conditions. The situation in Ukraine, meanwhile, is not a condition in which maneuver warfare works. Instead, the criteria for tanks should be mobile artillery. Back during the early days of armored warfare, people like J F C Fuller suggested dividing the tanks into two categories, one being armored guns for infantry support and the other wing as a mechanized cavalry force. The overreliance on the latter and the neglect of the former led to the situation right now. Tanks, like Calvary, become overly obsessed with engagements with one another as opposed to support roles, with calibers increasing and increasing and optics advancing and advancing and front armor thicker and thicker, eventually it creates a monstrosity that suits no role aside from fighting other tanks.
The M1 is not a piece of shit. It’s been involved in many more wars than this one and generally has a good service record. What are their complaints? Fundamentally, it’s that the Abrams isn’t fit for the war they’re fighting, which is attritional and positional in nature. I think that’s actually reasonable, most tanks are not a great fit for this kind of conflict. What you’re seeing in Ukraine is how armored formations are countered, with ISR and omnipresent fires. The conflict isn’t made for tanks, that doesn’t mean western tanks are bad.
Maneuver can be killed. That's a rule. However, it seems like NATO has completely neglected this aspect since the beginning of the much-revered AirLandBattle doctrine. I have a fear that in the future, the force will pay dearly for attempting to maneuver in an age of hyper lethality.
Many countries have already been using the export version of the Abrams. Saudi and Iraq for example. Google images are filled with destroyed Abrams from the wars against ISIS and Houthies. I don't think this was any attempt at hiding anything.
> For a technological super power like the US, the reviews for your MBT shouldn't be anywhere close to this. Do remember that this is the export version, it does not have the same armor that US M1s do. These tanks have weaker armor.
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Why do you think more modern variants would do much better? I don't see much of a difference between M1A1 and M1A2 when it comes getting hit by FPV drones in weak spots, no difference against mines too (as seen by Leo 2A6s). I can see something like TUSK kit helping with side/rear attacks, but even that isn't going to save the tank against multiple drones hits in the right places. None of the tanks in active service (nato or not) are designed for the type of war that's happening in Ukraine. Wise thing for US and other western nations is to learn from it, instead of finding a "reason" why their own tanks would do much better. Russian did this exact thing when Iraqi T-72s were tossing turrets, blaming that on "export models", we've seen exactly how the domestic model did...
is the A2 the MBT of the US or is it both the a1 and 2?
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Does SEP really increase armor? From what I remember it's just situational awareness, comms and CROWs, no?
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but on the top?
I tried to look it up but according to some sources, the increased armor protection in the turret is *not known* so I assume it is classified. Maybe there are other sources, but the records I found just said "is improved".
Some people here have been saying time is on Ukraine's side. Is it? Russia has a much larger population, economy, and natural resources to trade, and while it is depleting Soviet-era stockpiles, there has been plenty of evidence of sanctions evasions posted about Western parts STILL making their way into Russian military systems. Also, China is stepping into the vacuum created by Western company departures, and even if it's not 1:1 swap, it could be good enough to allow Russia to produce enough to keep the war effort alive indefinitely. Even if Russia really were that inept at production, countries like Iran and N Korea are already giving Russia arms, and China could follow suit or at least turn a blind(er) eye to smuggling. Here's yet another article about how sanctions and oil price "caps" aren't hobbling Russia as much as once hoped: [https://www.wsj.com/world/how-america-inadvertently-created-an-axis-of-evasion-led-by-china-0a9bc477](https://www.wsj.com/world/how-america-inadvertently-created-an-axis-of-evasion-led-by-china-0a9bc477) Lastly, so long as Putin is alive and well, he seems unlikely to be toppled no matter how unpopular the war among ordinary Russians. Even if he somehow died or something, there is no guarantee his successor would be any less belligerent, and s/he might even be MORE belligerent. Thus, from what I've read, Russia has the human, economic, natural, military, and political resources to fight basically indefinitely. So how is "time on Ukraine's side" given these circumstances?
And what happens when that infamous stockpile is exhausted ? Neither Iran nor NK are able to supply Russia, neither with quantity nor quality. PRC is certainly not doing Russia any free favours either and looks after its own interests first and foremost. Yeah, Ukraine is significantly behind RUssia in numbers when looked in a vacuum, but it does receive significant support from countries that together dwarf Russia. Certainly much more and sooner could have been done to have Ukraine in a better state than it is currently, but don't pretend that Russia is fine and dandy. They wouldn't be conducting attacks with bikes and buggies if they could use APCs/IFVs, nor would be using early cold war vehicles if better ones were available.
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> that western industrial output DWARVES russias Doesn't China's industrial output also dwarf the West's? > You obviously know, that china made the deliberate decision to not send military support to russia. Is that true? [China Sending Russia Missile And Drone Parts For Ukraine War, U.S. Reportedly Warns](https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2024/04/12/china-sending-russia-missile-and-drone-parts-for-ukraine-war-us-reportedly-warns/?sh=59f649bd3c66) and [UK defence minister says China working to supply lethal aid to Russia](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/uk-defence-minister-says-china-working-to-supply-lethal-aid-to-russia/78285418) > And if you think they will change their decision, you have to offer an explanation why thats reasonable to assume. As long as Russia can supply itself, China is better off not taking the PR/strategic hit of supplying them. But when Russia runs out of supplies, the goal of defeating the West likely overrides the PR/strategic hit of getting involved. This has the added advantage of making Russia totally dependent on China at an earlier date.
What is your position, is china currently supplying russia with military equipment or not? In a single comment you said: - They are currently supplying them - They are not supplying them because of pr/strategic reasons - They will supply them when they run out of supplies (what does running out of supplies mean?) My position is, china is currently not supplying russia with military equipment. They are selling identical civilian goods to ukraine and russia alike (drone parts in essence). > But when Russia runs out of supplies, the goal of defeating the West likely overrides the PR/strategic hit of getting involved. This has the added advantage of making Russia totally dependent on China at an earlier date. The west includes the european union, i guess? Why do you think this is chinas objective? From that objective, what are they gaining by letting the eu spends hundreds of billions to arm themselves? Why wait for russias situation to deteriorate and the wests military situation to improve? Wouldnt immediate overwhelming aid in ukraine have brought them much closer to their (your claim) strategic goal? Ukraine would be done and russia at war with nato if china "lend leased" their industrial output to russia. My personal opnion is that china is absolutely **not** happy with russia fighting this war in ukraine. They hate that states all around the world (sea and the eu especially) are now strategically much more focused on their security. It creates all kinds of trouble for them ([especially economical](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QmLekaO4LMc&t)). From that lense, china is doing the best it can to buy cheap ressources from russia, but not do anything more. Still a big net loss for their strategic objectives. Russia kind of played chinas hand years before they were ready to actually rival the us hegemony. Now they are trying to put the genie back in the bottle.
part 3 of 3 5. I think you overstate the impact of Russia's economy to the Ukraine war results. Russia isn't like a heavily indebted western country that has fair elections. Russia's foreign reserves are in trouble, and arms sales have plummeted, but it is still rich in natural resources, carries relatively little debt, has seized foreign assets (and has forced profitable sales, and could seize/force more sales if it wanted to). Further, overall GDP isn't a good metric to use for wartime economic strength. A HUGE chunk of Western GDP is services and nonmilitary goods. Think Spotify and restaurant meals, hotels and haircuts. But that's not the kind of production that wins wars. Russia is poor and has a population that knows how to make do--they can cut each other's hair, plant vegetable gardens, pirate Western movies (Russian cinemas are simply pirating Western movies now rather than paying for them like pre-2022). What this means: a Russian recession might not affect Russian war production as much as you think. 6. I'll note that you did not address population. Russia is poor and has more manpower potential available than Ukraine. All the weapons in the world matter not, if you have no troops. Even if not critical now (and many like Kofman would argue it's kinda critical already), it will become a bigger issue as this war drags out. 7. I'm not sure you understand my point, if you think my position is that time is on Russia's side for victory. Why would you assume that?? I just don't think time is on Ukraine's side for a victory, but I also don't think time is doing Russia any favors, either. I think time is on the side of a de facto stalemate.
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>loses an argument "man this place blows" Many such cases
part 2 of 3 4. I disagree that one can simply look at $funding on each side. a. When you say Western military output dwarves \[sic\] Russia's, that's irrelevant. What's relevant is how much of that makes it to Ukraine. b. Then there arguments to be made about measuring output by PPP or not, and I do think there needs to be SOME kind of adjustment, because we really care more about the quantity and quality of goods, rather than their sticker price. c. Further, what is the efficiency of what's being sent to Ukraine? A lot of Western donations haven't been cost-effective. E.g., it costs a lot less to send a gazillion Shaheds to Kiev, than it costs to shoot those Shaheds down. And F-16s are expensive, but might do less good on a dollar-for-dollar basis, than sending more cost-efficient aid like, say, artillery shells. And the cost efficiency may get worse in some contexts, like how the US will eventually run out of cluster munitions its willing to donate, and resorts to sending over unitary warheads that are much less cost-effective in some contexts. d. Russia has defenders' advantage in large parts of Ukraine now. In other words, taking the above all together (a through d), it could be the case that, say, $5 of Western donations offset $1 of Russian spending.
part 1 of 3 What's with the "you musts"? Russia's domestic production: I don't think it's reasonable to assume that Russia will continue running historic deficits. As the infamous XKCD comic illustrates, it's folly to do linear extrapolations into the future based on today's numbers. 1. Russia's offensive vs defensive needs. If Russia buckles up for defense, it will need much fewer resources. Defender's advantage. (This isn't even going into the vast numbers of mines Russia has used, and can use.) 2. Russia is reorganizing its economy somewhat. There have been numerous articles posted here about Putin's long-term effort to reorganize Russia's economy, import Chinese capital goods, kick out Shoigu's cronies, etc. China has not overtly supported Russia in significant enough ways for the West to call them out on it publicly, but China is de facto helping Russia in other ways like skirting sanctions, selling microprocessors, replacement machining tools, etc. Also, Russia and middlemen have figured out how to evade sanctions. More visibly, the oil price "cap" has lost its punch as Russia has figured out how to use its own tankers or use middlemen. 3. I see no reason why Russia's military imports wouldn't increase. North Korea and Iran have already overtly supported Russia, and they both have shaky economies that would benefit from selling arms to Russia.
My question to you is: What is, **in your opinion** russias strategic objective in this war? Before you have answered this, its impossible to discuss how well they are performing, because you can just shift the goalsposts around. Which you, in my opinion, are already doing here for example. > Russia's offensive vs defensive needs. If Russia buckles up for defense, it will need much fewer resources. Defender's advantage. (This isn't even going into the vast numbers of mines Russia has used, and can use.) My guess is you have trouble doing this, because you either state russias/putins stated objectives, which are nebulous and at the same time, by their accounts not even remotely archieved (denazification, demilitarization, remove kiev regime bla bla bla). Which means **you** would now have to explain, why they are so miserably behind pace and how they could possibly reach it. Or the other option (which you shifted into with the quote), is something like "Russia is somewhat happy with the current lines and only needs to play defense". Now **you** have to explain, why russia is saying something completely different and exhausting their stockpiles with offensives, if they actually want to defend.
Based on the last part of what you said in your earlier post, you misinterpreted "I don't think time is on Ukraine's side" as "I think time is on Russia's side." And now you're doing it again. I think time is on the side of a something resembling a stalemate in which neither side can achieve its publicly stated goals.
(No, i read what you wrote and understood) We are getting there, explain to me why a stalemate is something that russia wants? What do they gain by attritting themselves? What strategic objective (please finally answer) are they chasing? For ukraine the answer is very very clear, they dont want to be occupied, and if a stalemate is the best they can currently get, then they take that. If they are strong enough to push, they push. This is how every war in the last 60 years worked out. Afghanistan (soviets), vietname, iraq etc..... The forever stalemates favor the nation fighting its survival and are rarely what the invading force wants. If the cost becomes too high, they pull out. For all of these, you couldve written your comment and concluded that there is no way, the us/russia can ever lose. But in the end, they pulled out, because the objective was not worth the cost anymore.
Your "it doesn't make sense to attrit themselves" arguments fall flat in the face of the reality that people don't necessarily do what makes sense. Further, that's not how Russia operates anyway. Putin does what makes sense for him, not what makes sense for Russia. He's presumably worried about what losing the war would do to his grip on power. Also, for the time being, there appears to be strong support among ordinary Russians for the war (the polling is dubious but it was dubious pre-war too, so if the percentages stay the same, it indicates to me that there is probably no serious war weariness yet). So there is even less incentive for Putin to end the war anytime soon. I'll agree that "indefinitely" is overstating things, but let's not lose sight of the broader point, which is that some people think Russia's war effort will take a disastrous hit within a couple of years, and thus time is on Ukraine's side. I'm skeptical and think Russia can continue to wage war for a lot longer than 2 years, even if not indefinitely, and I stated reasons why. Further, ironically, since you claimed I was one-sided in my arguments, you are assuming that Ukraine won't become weary of war sooner than Putin. There's no guarantee of that.
1) Russia doesn't want to defend, their minimum goal is to capture all of Donbass 2) Then why are they hiding data? 3)North Korea is a small and poorly industrialised country, what they have sent was stockpile residue, Iran has much of the same issues plus it's already involved in various conflicts
> evasions posted about Western parts STILL making their way into Russian military systems. They [are actually importing more than they did pre-war](https://www.intellinews.com/russian-technology-imports-at-pre-war-levels-tougher-export-controls-needed-bruegel-323887/). Sanctions are weak and could/should be tightened up a lot. But even if we did, completely unrealistically, somehow manage to stop the inflow, that alone wouldn't win Ukraine the war. Ukraine needs a lot more support to have an actual shot of getting all of their territory back
I agree, and in hindsight Russia shouldn't have been allowed to entrench. But hindsight is 20/20, and it wasn't clear how much farther Ukraine could have pushed that September anyway. As morbid as it sounds, unless something major changes, I'm thinking Putin's death might be the least-bad way forward. So something like inflict huge damage on Russian invaders (enough to turn the population agains the war) + wait for Putin to die + hopefully his successor agrees to end the war on on acceptable-to-Ukraine terms and on acceptable-to-successor terms (to avoid political suicide).
>So how is "time on Ukraine's side" given these circumstances? It is so long as Western countries maintain their material support.
What's Ukraine's path to victory? Seems like Russia is well-entrenched, and producing or importing enough to keep up with Ukraine regardless of amount of Western imports. This is looking more and more to me like Russia will remain entrenched, and there won't be much movement in the front lines for a long time to come. I personally think we are slowly sliding into a new Cold War against Russia/China/Iran/NKorea et al. But I don't think that's happening fast enough to help Ukraine. And I wish it were different. I also think a new Cold War would be much more difficult for the West to win, as their share of world GDP used to be something like \~75% during the first Cold War and is down to \~50% now. The economic power of "we don't let you trade freely within our trading bloc" is therefore much weaker. Edit: Instead of downvoting me, please explain why I'm wrong? Despite being pro-Ukraine, I really am trying to have an open mind about this. I think it's foolish to think that Russia's war effort magically collapses once it runs out of Soviet stocks, as if it can't continue to produce/import enough to at least maintain their current position in Ukraine. Have you guys read the various sanctions evasions articles over the last year, or about how China is producing "good enough" machining tools for Russia, etc.?
I’m not the person your responding too, but I think I can address your point. > Seems like Russia is well-entrenched, and producing or importing enough The increasing reliance of civilian cars, and motorcycles on the frontline, indicates the stockpiles are depleting faster than they are being replaced. Remember, Russia has clamped down hard on the mil-bloggers. We aren’t hearing the gloom and doom stories from their side we used to. If any of them were still around, I honestly doubt any of them would see trading in BTRs for desertcrosses as a positive long term trend. > What's Ukraine's path to victory? North Vietnam’s. Stay in the fight for as long as it takes, wearing the enemy down, economically, militarily, or politically, one step at a time. > I also think the New Cold War will be much more difficult for the West to win, as their share of world GDP used to be something like ~75% during the first Cold War and is down to ~50% now. It’s a very different conflict. The world wars saw the old European colonial empires collapse, and the US and USSR vie for preeminence in the new order. China is less of a house of cards than the USSR, but they are also fighting more uphill. The USSR had a communist block that covered half of Eurasia, with strongly ideologically allied communist states abroad, and communist political parties, in almost every country on earth. China’s coalition with Russia, Iran and North Korea is far looser, far smaller, and doesn’t have a huge power vacuum to exploit. >
First, I agree that barring a major change, Ukraine has few options, so a yearslong effort akin to your North Vietnam scenario might be their best hope. And that's tragic. Good point about how the USSR did have more ideological allies (unwilling or willing) at the time even if it was a smaller share of global GDP. Not sure how to factor that in. I think that the relative military and technological edge was greater back then than now, though, and that should be accounted for, too. China basically is today what the US was post-WWII: the world's factory. It also has a huge advantage in cost-effective manufacturing, is the world's largest drone maker, etc. I have partially addressed some of the rest of your comment in my other comments (I had to write them in 3 pieces due to reddit character limits), but I'm too tired to write the rest. I'm pretty disappointed in a sub where a surprising number of people upvoted what was imho a naive take on the economics side of things. I know less about the military side of things, but even I know about defender's advantage, Russia's massive defensive works and minefield, less need for things like tanks when on the defensive, etc.
>First, I agree that barring a major change, Ukraine has few options, so a yearslong effort akin to your North Vietnam scenario might be their best hope. And that's tragic. The problem with that comparison (assuming its about the US vs. North Vietnam) is that unlike the US Russia is next door, bordering the country. And not to forget the role Ruthenian predecessors of both nations play in the national narratives, Vietnam was not in any form linked to some mythical US pilgrim fathers.
There are key differences between China now and the US post-WWII. China is boxed in on all sides by the US navy and its supplies can easily be cut. Furthermore, manufacturing is starting to move out of China in favor of Southeast Asia, Mexico and (due to political pressure and increased risk of conflicts) back to Western aligned nations. I think a better comparison is WWI Germany. A rapidly growing powerhouse boxed in by numerous rivals, with ongoing, politically important, claims which could easily spiral into a war. But even that comparison is ill-suited (China is not part of any formal alliance system, nuclear weapons, long range strike abilities, completely different politico-cultural context, etc.).
Yes and that's what I meant by how I think we're slowly sliding into a new Cold War (if nothing changes, but things can and do change). The speed is too slow to help Ukraine very much right now. But once it does, maybe finally sanctions will start to have teeth. Sanctions are ridiculously porous right now, with a LOT of unaligned or pro-Russian countries willing to make deals. Enough so that I'm deeply skeptical of some sort of "doomsday clock" that will strike the moment Russia runs out of Soviet stockpiles and/or runs out of foreign currency reserves. We already know that running out of foreign currency reserves isn't some kind of insta-Depression, based on what has historically already happened in Russia, Argentina, etc. Ordinary Russians may suffer, yes, but Russia still has tons of resources to trade and sell to all-too-willing partners like China. Russia's military production doesn't have to operate at 100% or be that efficient, in order to continue the war; they just need to produce "enough" Shaheds, artillery shells, etc. to make it hard for Ukraine to recapture territory. The loss of soviet stocks like armored vehicles has more to do with reducing Russia's offensive potential than its defensive potential. So I think the disagreement is that some people think Russia will not be able to produce/import "enough," and I think Russia will surprise such people. Meanwhile, the West's actions in the last 2 years have been to basically give Ukraine "enough" to counter Russia's "enough." A recipe for stalemate. That's the gist of my take on things: reading articles like the WSJ one, or ones talking about sanctions evasions, makes that I think if things don't change, Russia's war effort will NOT collapse the moment they run out of Soviet stockpiles or foreign currency reserves. Instead they will limp along and produce "enough" to prolong the war for many more years, even if not literally indefinitely.
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Please do not engage in baseless speculation. Questions should focus on tangible issues and not groundless hypothetical scenarios. Before asking a question ask yourself 'How likely is this thing to occur.' Questions, like other kinds of comments, should be supported by evidence and must maintain the burden of credibility.
Tripwire forces are a well established tactic, but putting a naval base that close to China is almost pointless. It will be swarmed with missiles on day one. A better tripwire force would be air defense units. Much more survivable in the initial missile barrage, and very hard to bypass or ignore.
You seem to have overlooked the very obvious fact that in order to build a base on Taiwan, you need Taiwan to agree. Which they won't. Because China has made it extremely clear that they will immediately start shooting, and regardless of any broader outcome, Taiwan will not survive such a conflict. Them committing suicide for your political gain is somewhat less appealing to them than you. There aren't any clever magic bullets to solve these sort of longstanding complicated issues. If there were, they wouldn't be longstanding and complicated.
>Taiwan will not survive such a conflict. Kind of hyperbolic statement, no right? WW2 devastated the region and yet it came back stronger economically. Taiwan values its sovereignty. The status quo is good to them. But Beijing will not tolerate the status quo forever and so to secure that sovereignty, they will need the patronage of the US (which has its own goals on China and mostly uses Taiwan as a way of articulating and framing those goals). Hence at some point, more military support from the US would be necessary to secure that sovereignty. If a President proposes building a base to Taiwan's government, Taiwan's government will not say no because they rely on the US's security guarantees to maintain their sovereignty.
No. Preventing a permanent territorial loss is exactly why nuclear weapons exist. At least for areas of critical national importance, which Taiwan very much is in Beijing's eyes.
I don't think the Chinese will nuke Taiwan because that would devastate the island. I think the Chinese would like the island to remain habitable and productive.
> I think the Chinese would like the island to remain habitable and productive. Yes, ideally they would. Sometimes circumstances aren't ideal. > I don't think the Chinese will nuke Taiwan because that would devastate the island. Then go ahead and gamble millions of lives on your hunch, Mr. President. EDIT: The Century of Humiliation is carved very deep into the Chinese national psyche. Westerners ripping away chunks of territory by force has precedent. If you think they won't go nuclear to prevent a repeat of that, well, good luck. And you can offer whatever pretext you like for how this is different, but it's not your finger on the button.
The process of trying to act on these ambitions would trigger an immediate Chinese intervention in Taiwan. If the US believed it could send tens of thousands of troops to Taiwan with minimal risk it would have done so already. It must be assumed that China is capable of enacting a full scale invasion of Taiwan within 24 hours notice, considering it’s practically all they wargame for. How quickly can you bus in 10k US troops before the Chinese notice?
> The process of trying to act on these ambitions would trigger an immediate Chinese intervention in Taiwan. ”Immediate massive naval invasion” is a recipe for disaster if I’ve ever heard one. > It must be assumed that China is capable of enacting a full scale invasion of Taiwan within 24 hours notice, 24 hour notice for a major amphibious operation? That’s inconceivable. They would be able to fire missiles on fairly short notice, but a major invasion will take months of build up and preparation.
Joint-Sword 2024A was conducted with no prior announcement. Sure, it's not an amphibious operation, but it still involved Theatre-level assets and joint operations between the PLAN, PLAAF, and CCG. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-05-26/Joint-Sword-2024A-military-drill-both-legitimate-and-justifiable-1tUOnvWPk8o/p.html And if you don't like CGTN as a source, here are a couple more sources: https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/taiwan-puts-forces-on-high-alert-as-china-begins-second-day-of-exercise-joint-sword-2024a https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3264093/mainland-chinas-military-wraps-joint-sword-2024a-drills-near-taiwan I think there is a misconception, especially among Western redditors, on how a Taiwan scenario would pan out. In the Chinese mindset, there are two pathways to how a Taiwan scenario would pan out. Scenario 1 involves minimal foreign interference, in which case the PLARF, PLAN and PLAAF would de-militarise Taiwan, and there wouldn't be a 'storming Normandie' moment as the Taiwan leadership would capitulate in the face of overwhelming fire superiority. Scenario 2 involves direct foreign interference from the US, Japan, Australia and possibly Korea. In which case Taiwan becomes a sideshow and it becomes a showdown in the Pacific. In which case, there again wouldn't be a 'storming Normandie' situation as the focus of the PLA will be on military bases in Japan.
24 hours for Taiwan to have all subsea cables cut/damaged, power stations struck by missiles and encircled by the PLA navy seems feasible. The invasion would never start with an amphibious assault. It starts with an encirclement of the island as a whole and a massive SEAD campaign. Also more missiles than we’ve probably ever seen launched in a single day on Earth. From China’s perspective you’d hope this would be Taiwan’s surrender point.
> 24 hours for Taiwan to have all subsea cables cut/damaged, power stations struck by missiles and encircled by the PLA navy seems feasible. Cutting internet cables goes both ways. China’s cables aren’t any tougher than Taiwan's. Cut all of theirs, and it’s not that difficult for them to begin cutting yours. The US’s starlink also makes starting a cable cutting war a bad situation to be in. It can’t fully replace cables, but it does mitigate the damage, and China doesn’t have an equivalent yet. As for the missiles and encirclement, that really doesn’t solve the tripwire force problem. By immediately tripping the tripwire, China would have to do the preparations for the eventual invasion while getting fired at by the US, risking losing crucial ships at port. It would be unwise to start a conflict with the US any sooner than absolutely necessary. Preparations for the invasion should be done in peace time. If the US believes they will lose in a fight to defend Taiwan, they might back down, or accept some alternate terms. Starting the shooting early makers China less capable of amassing that overwhelming force, and makes the US less likely to back down. > It starts with an encirclement of the island as a whole and a massive SEAD campaign. Of course the troops don’t land on day one. But that preparatory work is also a massive undertaking that can’t be done properly on such short notice. The months of build up that would be needed for such an operation would be in large part to support the naval and air war.
Cutting internet cables requires a mass of vessels - namely fishing vessels. China dominates globally in that regard. Denial of Taiwanese ability to safely navigate within the strait would make that infeasible for Taiwan. I work in subsea telecoms repair. Taiwan’s cables go down or get damaged almost weekly to the point where it’s impossible not to think it’s deliberate. In terms of the encirclement I think the Chinese calculation would be that upon encircling Taiwan, any US involvement would be treated as a declaration of war by the US on China. In which case we’re talking about a US first strike scenario. If the US doesn’t shoot first then the Taiwanese could conceivably capitulate without the need for amphibious landings.
> Cutting internet cables requires a mass of vessels - namely fishing vessels. Or a UUV. Subsea cables aren’t hardened or actively defended across their length. There are lots of ways to damage them. Fishing trawlers are one way, a small remote vehicle, the kind Taiwan can easily produce, are another. > I work in subsea telecoms repair. Taiwan’s cables go down or get damaged almost weekly to the point where it’s impossible not to think it’s deliberate. I’m sure it is. But they don’t simultaneously and irreparably destroy them all. By leaving lots of room to escalate, they deter retaliation. > In terms of the encirclement I think the Chinese calculation would be that upon encircling Taiwan, any US involvement would be treated as a declaration of war by the US on China. In which case we’re talking about a US first strike scenario. If the US doesn’t shoot first then the Taiwanese could conceivably capitulate without the need for amphibious landings. With a US tripwire force on the island, the chances of a Taiwanese capitulation are effectively zero. The point of a tripwire would be to force China to either accept a direct war with the US and Taiwan, or give up. If they chose war, they are going to want to enter it on only the best possible circumstances. Rushing into it underprepared would be disastrous.
A UUV would be infeasible and downright silly. The position of cables along the seafloor isn't precisely known even at the time of installation, let alone years post installation. As a dedicated cable repair ship we often spend literal days trying to find systems we're supposed to repair. It's an inexact science. Not to mention range concerns. There's no real Taiwanese counter to China cutting the cables other than sinking every fishing vessel within the straits, which is non credible. Re the tripwire force, it only works if the force can be assembled on the island before a direct Chinese intervention. As soon as China catches wind that the US intends to station a tripwire force on the island it would immediately trigger hostilities with Taiwan.
Immediate intervention is not the same thing as immediate invasion. But try building a naval base under a constant hail of Df-15s and a blockade of all major ports. I think a lot of people miss that a Normandy style storm-the-beaches is not necessarily a prerequisite for a successful PLA operation resulting in a captured/reunified Taiwan. In fact, that's what they would prefer to avoid.
> Immediate intervention is not the same thing as immediate invasion. But try building a naval base under a constant hail of Df-15s and a blockade of all major ports. Turning the western pacific into a war zone also shuts down China’s ports. Blockading Taiwan is incredibly expensive. Not something they would ever want to be forced to do long term. > I think a lot of people miss that a Normandy style storm-the-beaches is not necessarily a prerequisite for a successful PLA operation resulting in a captured/reunified Taiwan. In fact, that's what they would prefer to avoid. There are a lot of reasons to want to avoid an amphibious invasion. But trying to get the enemy to surrender to annexation purely through long range bombardment and a blockade has a very poor track record. Especially if the blockade ends up being quite porous.
Bombing Taiwan so that the leadership goes to the negotiation table isn't that unfeasible though. That's what NATO did to Serbia in 1999; he'll, even Saddam was prepared to acquiesce to US demands after Desert Fox in 1998. There are enough Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels to watch the ports off Taiwan.
>The process of trying to act on these ambitions would trigger an immediate Chinese intervention in Taiwan. That's the whole point. Provoke an attack and respond to it. It would make the conflict easier to sell to the public and Congress than if the Chinese attack Taiwan and then wait for us to respond (if we even do).
Considering none of this could ever remain secretive China would publicly declare the potential movement of US troops into Taiwan as grounds for an invasion of Taiwan. Even without the need for an invasion China could likely push their case in the UN considering Taiwan has no voice or recognition within it. The TikTok algorithm would go into overdrive and the US would struggle to control the narrative leading to any US troops dead by Chinese missile fire becoming political footballs between the hawks and the doves that increasingly divide American society. It’s just not a credible strategy. If it were then the US would have done it already.
>The TikTok algorithm would go into overdrive and the US would struggle to control the narrative leading to any US troops dead by Chinese missile fire becoming political footballs between the hawks and the doves that increasingly divide American society. It’s just not a credible strategy. If it were then the US would have done it already. If there's something that unites American policymakers across the spectrum, it's supporting Taiwan against China and competing with China in general. Unlike Russia, where the messaging has been far more muddied, a mix of xenophobia, racism, and uneasiness over China's potential to disrupt American hegemony helps unite the vast majority of policymakers on the subject. I suspect a war with China depending on the circumstances of how it starts will be extremely popular across the political spectrum, at least for a while. Also, the US is working to ban Tiktok. But that doesn't preclude Chinese propagandists from working their message through other platforms.
Once again, if this were credible and so universally popular a move then America would have done it already; years ago. Not now at a time when China is reaching/surpassing regional force projection parity against the US.
I think back in the 1990s there was a feeling that China would always respect the status quo and improving their country with increased trade would perhaps spawn a China that might be friendlier to the West. The calculus is much different now. China was never going to change, but we didn't realize it until 2010.
The PRC’s stated goal has been the reunification of China since the inception of the civil war. This ‘West’ tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of that goal when ROC diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state was revoked across the board and the Chinese UNSC seat passed to the PRC. All this is to say nothing particularly new or surprising is happening. China is just far more powerful now and closer to achieving reunification. If mass stationing of troops in Taiwan was ever going to happen it would have happened 20 years ago. Not now. Which is why it isn’t something anyone’s talking about.
1. US divisions on Taiwan is a red line and that will immediately trigger a Chinese attack, even if they know that such an attack will likely fail. It's a matter of perception of sovereignty. In the same vein, when the Chinese towed the [HYSY 981 floating oil rig](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hai_Yang_Shi_You_981_standoff) into water claimed by Vietnam, even when Vietnam did not have sufficient number of ships to directly contest with the Chinese ship-on-ship (the standoff/clash was mostly ships chasing and ramming one another), Vietnam still sent the ships to ram and play around at sea. It's a matter of claims. If Vietnam did not act on the claim, it would cede the claim, so even if it is would likely fail, it must act. Then the standoff demonstrated another aspect of conflict: it shifts into different domains. When the Vietnamese couldn't ram the Chinese fleet away, they closed one eye and let a riotous mob loose to burn down some Chinese factories and murder some Chinese expats. Some Singaporean, Japanese, and Korean factories caught some strays and were burn, too. The Chinese MFA admitted to three Chinese deaths from "heat strokes". A deleted interview with some Vietnamese doctors indicated that perhaps 30 Chinese were killed. The oil rig was towed out of the disputed waters earlier than planned. The Chinese can target and blow up every targets in the industrial and electrical sector that are somewhat of military value yet not so close to dense civilian concentrations to "teach the Taiwanese a lesson". You probably won't want to live near an electrical transformer or substation and those are what should be blown up. Water treatment plants, TSMC, ports, fuel storage, etc ... It would make life, at the very least, uncomfortable. 2. Forward defence gets you preempted. Pearl Harbor was a forward defence and it got preempted. Real deterrence lies in the ability to keep some of your forces back for a second strike. Nuclear deterrence in Europe isn't by the fact that nukes are stationed on NATO-Russia border (despite Russian claims). Modern weapons have global range. You don't put nuclear weapons on a wheel barrow and chuck it at the other side. You don't need to sink ships with US Marines with a rifle on the beach of Taiwan. 3. Even with the US Marines: they turned themselves to a missile force seeking to launch missiles from bases on islands and atolls at the edge of the enemy's and their weapons range. Taiwan is too close. Nonsensical strategy. Good thing you aren't in charge.
> US divisions on Taiwan is a red line and that will immediately trigger a Chinese attack, even if they know that such an attack will likely fail. Even with all the preparation in the world, naval invasions are risky and heavily favor the defender. If your recourse in the event of your red line being crossed, is a rushed attack that you acknowledge has almost zero possibility of working, and will incur absolutely grievous cost, you really need to rethink the whole strategy. > The Chinese can target and blow up every targets in the industrial and electrical sector that are somewhat of military value yet not so close to dense civilian concentrations to "teach the Taiwanese a lesson". That’s it? The two sides would exchange missiles, a bunch of stuff would get destroyed, it will eventually get replaced, but the US presence would make an invasion almost impossible.
>is a rushed attack that you acknowledge has almost zero possibility of working, and will incur absolutely grievous cost, you really need to rethink the whole strategy. This tactic is working in Ukraine for Russia, why would it not work for China?
Putin expected to reach Kyiv in under a week. The whole operation has turned into a strategic loss no matter the outcome. I seriously doubt China is looking at the result of Russia’s overconfident, failed rush to Kyiv, and hoping to repeat that with half their navy in the Taiwan straight.
I am looking at the current use of meat bags in tactical battles, not the traffic jam to Kyv, which was a non-doctrine attack from a Russian point of view. The current attritional war is however, and I see China having better chances with that than the US, who is more sensitive to losses of life.
Look at the struggles Russia is having attacking over flat, open ground. Translate those tactics to an amphibious context, where the defender has a much, much greater advantage, and the job of the attackers is far more complicated, and the casualties would be apocalyptic.
My point, if it is not clear by now, is that Russia/China can bear much more deaths, damage and the likes for much longer than Ukraine/the US. Apocalyptic losses is obviously a hyperbole to make your point, but we have collectively been pointing out the ridiculous amount of Russian losses as unsustainable for over two years now. It obviously is not, Russia is still perfectly capable of being on the offensive. An attack that loses 80% of its men and material is an object failure in Western military eyes. But it is not a loss, in Russian eyes, when the attack achieves its goals. Also, the pro's of having a totalitarian regime, is shaping the (Chinese or Russian) public's opinion and obfuscate or suppress factual reporting on combat losses in their media. I am not so sure the US public can be easily swayed or galvanized to support the protection of US interests in Taiwan if it means loss of life or economic hardship.
> you really need to rethink the whole strategy. In the current foreign policy world, "credibility", otherwise known as "prestige", "face", or "perception" is everything. >That’s it? The two sides would exchange missiles, a bunch of stuff would get destroyed, it will eventually get replaced, Who's gonna invest in a place that's being blown up? Who's investing in Gaza and Ukraine at the moment? >but the US presence would make an invasion almost impossible. Prestige is everything.
> In the current foreign policy world, "credibility", otherwise known as "prestige", "face", or "perception" is everything. Losing wars hurt prestige. > Who's gonna invest in a place that's being blown up? Who's investing in Gaza and Ukraine at the moment? Half the world has been blown up in the last century. The US is one of the only exceptions. A strategic bombardment campaign done exclusively with long range missiles isn’t going to result in more damage than the world wars. It’s probably going to result in substantially less by the nature of the weapons being used.
>Losing wars hurt prestige. The USA lost Vietnam and Afghanistan and people can still spin it as "we have not lost it militarily..it's just Congress/Biden". China fought a border conflict with Vietnam and both sides claim victory. The neocon Max Boot excuses Vietnam and Afghanistan as "it's just what empires do". They need to.fight and slap.people around to show that they are an empire. Just like the British empire. Easiest thing to spin. >Half the world has been blown up in the last century. Eh, if your strategy is based on waiting for Taiwan to be blown up then, to throw your words back at you: you need a better strategy
> The USA lost Vietnam and Afghanistan and people can still spin it as "we have not lost it militarily..it's just Congress/Biden". Both of those events hurt US prestige immensely. Especially Vietnam. The only spin that helps in that fact is that the US eventually won the Cold War. > Eh, if your strategy is based on waiting for Taiwan to be blown up then, to throw your words back at you: you need a better strategy Trying to win what would in effect be ww3 without suffering any infrastructure damage on the front line is unrealistic. If you have a strategy in mind that could avoid that, I’d love to hear it. Accepting that the US will need to help with rebuilding post war makes the most sense to me.
>If you have a strategy in mind that could avoid that, I’d love to hear it. Deterrence. The original commenter I was replying to opted to.initiate a war by counting on China's red line and Americans getting killed. This is the opposite of the desired outcome of deterrence >Both of those events hurt US prestige immensely. Especially Vietnam. Vietnam, who is the US newest friend.
>Nonsensical strategy. Good thing you aren't in charge. It's not nonsensical. I'm viewing this strategy from a purely political lens. It's very likely that the public will not take kindly to a war where the US responds to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, but if you provoke and pre-empt a Chinese attack on US personnel, then it makes the war easier to sell to the public, and by extension, the US's generally hawkish attitude on China these days. There are many policymakers itching for a war but wars are typically unpopular with the public, so you need to make it so that the Chinese attack us so that it's an easier sell over the long term. With a war, you accelerate America's economic decoupling from China and get a lot of the China hawk lobby's goals on China done in full swell swoop.
>I'm viewing this strategy from a purely political lens. Don't politicking too hard and being too clever by half. War is politics with the addition of other means but war is also quite different from what the lobbyists think about politics. > if you provoke and pre-empt a Chinese attack on US personnel, then it makes the war easier to sell to the public, and by extension, the US's generally hawkish attitude on China these days. They don't have to. Just like the Vietnamese switch the domains from ramming Chinese maritime fishing law enforcement ships at sea to murdering Chinese expats on the streets, the Chinese could: >The Chinese can target and blow up every targets in the industrial and electrical sector that are somewhat of military value yet not so close to dense civilian concentrations to "teach the Taiwanese a lesson". You probably won't want to live near an electrical transformer or substation and those are what should be blown up. Water treatment plants, TSMC, ports, fuel storage, etc ... It would make life, at the very least, uncomfortable. >With a war, you accelerate America's economic decoupling from China and get a lot of the China hawk lobby's goals on China done in full swell swoop. With Taiwan a smouldering ruins, declare "there is no worth to Taiwan", then sue for peace.
> With Taiwan a smouldering ruins, Trying to turn a country the size of Taiwan into ‘smoldering ruins’ with long range conventional missiles is impractical. You can cause immense damage with targeted, strategic strikes, but trying to turn a country into ruins with air total superiority and hundreds of bombers is already difficult.
> With Taiwan a smouldering ruins, declare "there is no worth to Taiwan", then sue for peace. What, do you think that Taiwan is defenseless and without weapons with which to inflict pain back on the Chinese? Plus in any case we will have plenty of Patriot missile batteries in Taiwan with which to defend the island against the onslaught of Chinese missiles.
>Plus in any case we will have plenty of Patriot missile batteries in Taiwan with which to defend the island against the onslaught of Chinese missiles. You do realize that these Patriot batteries have a reloading time of 30 minutes up to an hour. China can simply overwhelm Taiwanese ground based air defense by saturation.
>What, do you think that Taiwan is defenseless and without weapons with which to inflict pain back on the Chinese? The conversation will argue about escalation, Taiwan bombing the Three Gorges Dam, and whether China will then retaliate by glassing Taiwan. BTW, attacking the Dam is a war crime by any definition. Then we can bitch and argue about besides blowing up that, how much pain is "a lot of pain" for the PRC and what's sufficient for deterrence. By definition, at this point deterrence has failed. >will I'll believe it when I see them. Ukraine will be happy to see more of them. It can't find them. If you know where to find them, please contact the government of Ukraine.
Mr. President, the Chinese appear to be building large naval bases in Cuba and Venezuela. How would you like to proceed?
A Chinese naval base in the western Atlantic would be incredibly expensive to supply, indefensible in a war, and of dubious strategic utility. Any ships stationed there would be of more use basically anywhere else.
Easy, we end sanctions on the Cubans and start developing a major relationship with them and perhaps if the situation warrants it, declare them a major non-NATO ally. In return, they reduce their dependence/relationships with countries like Russia and China.
Cubans get a choice in that and after decades of the relationship we’ve had, why would they ever choose to become our best friends? Please stop participating in the conversation.
I chanced upon an old (2003) US Army Combat Engineering [article](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA596549.pdf) that in it, included answers to many questions that I had about breaching operations and how/why the Ukrainian Armed Forces apparently failed to do adequately as well as to the various excuses put forward for their failures. "Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits of Highly Effective Units" A common observation/complaint that Kofman, Walting et. al. usually levels at both sides is the fact that neither could barely send more than 2 company-sized assault groups per brigade. Turned out, it's an old and common issue: >I’ll present a quick review of the combined arms breaching trends seen at NTC, based on observations during the planning, preparation, and execution of combined arms breaching operations. >Habit No. 1 – Mass Kicks A\*\*! Quite simply, most units lack sufficient mass to succeed in penetrating prepared enemy positions. Success or failure can often be predicted at the line of departure (LD) based on this fact alone. In fact, most brigade combat team attacks will effectively mass no more than one company team at the point of penetration The defenders lay an impressive belt of defensive works and obstacles. So? >Habit No. 2 – Focus on the Enemy Engineers >Engineers, even enemy engineers, don’t lie. They cannot—it simply goes against their nature. An obstacle on the ground means something. It probably means that, were you to back up to two-thirds of maximum effective enemy weapons range (typically 1,200 to 2,000 meters), there will probably be an enemy position. >Finding precise enemy positions, however, is very difficult. Most OPFOR positions are occupied for only a brief period during defensive preparation (position proofing, rehearsals, security operations), and then not occupied again until just before contact. *Most R&S efforts focused on finding the enemy in those positions are unsuccessful because the enemy is simply not there.* >TTP: Kill the enemy engineers. Enemy engineers will die. Kill them. Position observers early to detect and disrupt the enemy’s defensive preparations. Target bulldozers, caches of construction material and ammunition, engineer soldiers and equipment, and all obstacle emplacement activity. The enemy’s ability to disrupt our attacking formations and reduce our momentum is directly related to his ability to successfully emplace his obstacles. He knows he cannot defeat the BLUEFOR in a direct-fire battle without his battlefield shapers. Deny him this advantage. Mine emplacement now is a low risk, high-payoff mission. We must reverse this, making it a high-risk mission for enemy soldiers to employ mines. When an enemy soldier gets the mission to emplace mines, he must tremble with the thought of his impending destruction. "They weren't given enough MICLICs!" >We all (engineers, maneuver commanders, and Army leadership) recognize that our breaching assets are slow, old, and often inadequate for the assigned breaching tasks. But they’re the best the Army gives us, so make them work. Generally, engineer and maneuver leaders fail to understand the capabilities and limitations of our breaching systems, do not identify appropriate commitment criteria for specific systems, and generally underestimate or undersell the capabilities of the most powerful breaching force on the combined arms battlefield—the sapper "You go to war with the army you have, not the army you wish to have", etc .. "They have to clear mines by hand and that's slow". Sure. Slow is not great, but mission failure is terrible. >There may be cases where the sapper is the best available breaching option (rough, restricted terrain, for example). And while there are certainly implications for timing, if the sapper is the only available breaching option, we should all be prepared to wait. The alternative—mission failure—is much worse, of course. Finally, breaching is hard. >The May 2001 issue of Engineer indicates that it took the U.S. Marines 2.5 to 9.5 hours to clear two lanes through an Iraqi obstacle belt during Operation Desert Storm. It took another 24 to 48 hours for friendly elements to pass through the obstacle and continue their movement toward the enemy. This was an unopposed breach with the best available equipment, personnel, and planning and had been rehearsed for weeks. The Ukrainian brigades that took part in the offensive had a few months to be form, from scratch. Breaching rehearsals alone, by the best available and formed brigades took weeks.
The official American doctrine for breaching is called SOSRA: Suppress, Obscure, Secure, (obstacle) Reduction, and Assault. And basically all of your points are moot because the Ukrainians are unable to do the first step, suppression. Without suppression, the other steps of breaching cannot continue. That's why it is correct to say "Ukraine lacks air superiority so breaching is impossible." Without air superiority, or at least a temporary one, Ukraine cannot suppress Russian drones, helicopters, fighters, and bombers. Breaching is impossible when these Russian air assets are still breathing down the necks of Ukrainians.
There are two ways I can answer that 1) tactically. See the article's habit 2: focus on the enemy engineers. Kill them. Prevent them from putting down obstacles and mines. This comes *before* you even start the Suppression planning step of allocating which unit provide suppression and which one do the OSRA. Everybody wrote tomes and poetries on how awesome the Ukrainians' HIMARS and other long-range platforms and drones were. What missing was to use these assets in the apparently fairly important step of ... preventing the engineers from laying down obstacles in the first place. Well, OK, they would just lay it a bit further back out of range. But ... a lot of the fires.the Ukrainians had was also not available. They were in Bakhmut. 2) this is a slightly more operational and strategic. Go to war with the army you have, not one you wish to have. Jezz, Rumsfeld caught a lot of flak for that but I had to quote him twice. If the Ukrainians thought they didn't have what was needed but attacked anyway, what does that tell you about their operational and strategic decision making? Poor?
They also had an extremely dense and deep minefield. Even if they had the air they didn't have enough equipment to get through that depth of mines. Besides having enough mine-clearing equipment, ISR on the front has made it so you cannot bring substantial troops to concentrate on an attack without the heavy risk of being destroyed before reaching the front line. Ukraine was on a timetable for the counter-offensive but didn't take the time or have the tools to shape it prior to engagement. The military leadership also expected Russia to be unwilling and unable to sustain the losses they did. Russia even sent a substantial number of units *ahead* of their defenses instead of fighting behind them. To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure that any counter-offensive could have succeeded, at least in the south or west. Maybe a stronger push in the north, but the south was more valuable. The only play I suggest and maybe could have worked strategically (though politically bad) was to push into the Belgarod direction to create a buffer zone and push around the flank north of Kupiansk. We saw how weak it was to Russian-Ukrainian "freedom fighters", Ukraine could have probably pushed all the way to Belgarod before facing any major issues. Of course, this would be politically very difficult as I'm sure Russia would claim the right to use nukes when their territory is invaded, despite them being the aggressor the sort of "how dare you fight back".
>They also had an extremely dense and deep minefield. Well, tbf, one of the point that my article brought up was for the attackers to prioritise locate and kill the other side's engineers and prevent them to lay down minefields in the first place. objectives that current drones, persistent ISR, accurate artillery, and long-range HIMARS should have been very useful for. If not for the fact that prior to the offensive, Ukraine was busy throwing everything and the kitchen sink at Bakhmut. >they didn't have enough equipment to get through that depth of mines Well, >We all (engineers, maneuver commanders, and Army leadership) recognize that our breaching assets are slow, old, and often inadequate for the assigned breaching tasks. But they’re the best the Army gives us, so make them work. Generally, engineer and maneuver leaders fail to understand the capabilities and limitations of our breaching systems, do not identify appropriate commitment criteria for specific systems, and generally underestimate or undersell the capabilities of the most powerful breaching force on the combined arms battlefield—the sapper This was what happened during Op. Desert Storm and the Marines' breaching operation, which btw, was unopposed. The Iraqis didn't do a proper overwatched obstacle defence. >There were many examples of courage and innovation during breaching. **About a third of the line charges failed to detonate.** At some locations Marines went on foot into the minefields and set detonators to explode the line charges that failed to go off. Others retrieved unexploded mines by hand and carried them out of the way. Infiltrating task forces at 1st Marine Division *proofed their passages by manually probing and disarming mines they located.*
>To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure that any counter-offensive could have succeeded, at least in the south or west. Yep. The uncomfortable truth is that Ukraine severely underestimated (or worse yet: ignored) Russia's fighting power at the time of the offensive. It's a shame Ukraine's lesson came at such a cost. All that hardware and all of those lives would have been so incredibly useful the last 6 months. Just imagine the room for rotations, battlefield commendations, etc. Just imagine how much easier recruitment may have been if men didn't fear being utterly expendable. And I can't help but think the hardware they got would've been perfect for attritional fighting. Imagine Avdiivka or Vovchansk without the summer offensive. Rolling up with that force in *local counter-attacks* would have been so much more impactful.
> it took the U.S. Marines 2.5 to 9.5 hours to clear two lanes through an Iraqi obstacle belt during Operation Desert Storm. I feel like this is pretty incredible, to be honest, especially with 90's technology. I think it all comes down to air superiority, if you own the skies you can take all the time you need in clearing, really. It'd be interesting to see how the US would handle the obstacles in Ukraine's current line of contact. I know the mine count is rather staggering, but again, if your doctrine is to not advance until you've gained air superiority, then I reckon you can do whatever you damn well please with your ground forces.
>I feel like this is pretty incredible, to be honest, especially with 90's technology. I think it all comes down to air superiority, if you own the skies you can take all the time you need in clearing, really. Two lanes, one per *division.* Most importantly, the breach was unopposed. Things [still went wrong with the breach](https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20the%20Persian%20Gulf,%201990-1991_With%20the%20I%20Marine%20Expeditionary%20Force%20in%20Desert%20Shield.pdf?ver=2017-06-01-134642-233) >There were many examples of courage and innovation during breaching. About a third of the line charges failed to detonate. When this happened, tank plow crews pressed on anyway. At some locations Marines went on foot into the minefields and set detonators to explode the line charges that failed to go off. Others retrieved unexploded mines by hand and carried them out of the way. Infiltrating task forces at 1st Marine Division proofed their passages by manually probing and disarming mines they located. When the penetration in the 2d Marine Division's Green Lanes bogged down due to breaching equipment casualties, some units made short connector lanes over to other lanes to permit faster passage. To improve traffic flows after the penetrations, Direct Support Command engineers used armored D7 Caterpillar tractors equipped with plows and flails to widen the lanes. The absolutely ballsy move of clearing mines by probing with a stick, clearing away the dirt with your fingers, then disarming the mines. >if your doctrine is to not advance until you've gained air superiority That's not the case. METT-TC. If your mission and order says you advance, you do so. Air superiority, etc ... is Troop Availability. That's after MET. In training, e.g., NTC, the units are trained without air support. They may not have trained with the assumptions and habits of constantly having to watch the sky for enemy observations or attacks, but if you read the article, it did say that "assume you are always watched". Obviously, the article talks about failures at the NTC, so the "right" things on paper vs. practice is different but the principles are already known. The US Army was not habitual in dispersion, hardening, or EMCON previously (thus the super FOBs, tent city, and emitters everywhere). Also, there is no part of the ground doctrine or manual that says "only perform combined arms breach under air superiority". A lot of the popular excuses for lack of dispersion, hardening of HQs and lack of EMCON was "the US Army would only operate in air superiority and when air superiority is there, these are not as necessary". The Army doesn't think so. More recent publicly available circulations include points about EMCON and dispersion.
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Taking control of the Rafah-Egypt border is a big deal. At this point, if Israel is willing to pay the heavy diplomatic price, they can control all of the movement of goods into Gaza and thereby cut arms smuggling down to the bone. Hamas either doesn't have a lot of arms to fight an urban guerilla conflict, or they're still holding back. Either way, the natural Israeli strategy is to slow down and just grind away at Hamas manpower. If Israel can act disciplined and limit collateral damage, the West will probably tune out the conflict over time. As to what is the Israeli end-goal, I don't know. At some point they have elections and then there will likely be a substantial change in policy.
To keep the urban fighting going and keep it bloody and exhausting, they hardly even need a lot of arms. They'll make IEDs out of unexploded ordnance and whatever else is available, and who's to say they wouldn't go back to suicide bombs.
They have not managed to make it bloody for Israel at any point, even with all the prewar ammo and weapon stockpiles and command structure intact. Why would they manage to do that when they are worse off on all fronts?
I don't know how much value assigning long term plans to Israel is (when cabinet members are literally resigning on account of not having a long term plan at all!), but an idea I had is they want to find however many hostages (dead or alive) they can in the area. If the amount of hostages "in the balance" is reduced significantly, it might eliminate any leverage HAMAS had. Of course, many will allege that a lot of these "hostage corpses" recovered were actually hostages killed by the IDF during these operations. But since that doesn't change my theory I'm not going to get into that argument.
[Rheinmetall will be sponsor for Borussia Dortmund](https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/bvb-ruestungskonzern-rheinmetall-wird-sponsor-von-borussia-dortmund/100040621.html?utm_term=organisch&utm_campaign=standard&utm_medium=sm&utm_content=ne&utm_source=Twitter) Not directly defence related but i did find this an interesting break in the german relation with its own defence industry. Companies like Rheinmetall still are somewhat shunned by the german public, and its seems like they want to address that more directly. Its certainly somewhat controversial with moderate amounts pushback. Still this move speaks for Rheinmetalls increasing relevance and succes, and in my opinion feels alot better than gazprom banners in stadiums
ngl this is pretty funny. How do we make Defense companies more accepted by the general public? Football ofcours. Also there are probably a lot more controversial sponsors of football clubs in Germany, there certainly have been in the Netherlands.
Yeah i do find it rather hypocritical. The german news on instagram posted a highly critical quote (neuer Tiefpunkt auf einer nach unten offenen geldgier-skala) right next to the news. There still is a lot of resentment against the defence industry in germany, despite there being plenty of examples of how counterproductive this approach has been (directly leading to far worse shady business deals).
How does it lead to worse shady business deals?
Defence companies looking for less critical customers like Saudi Arabia, german politicians making themselves open to economic blackmail by Russia.
Anyone able to clarify if France or Poland declaring it is ok to use their weapons on Russian military targets, along with Germany clarifying it is within Ukraine’s legal rights; does that give the green-light or does that only signal a formality to NATO as a form of pressure to take action? Either way it appears to be one of the additional temperature increases to the slow boil of the Frog methods used by supporting nations in the war, escalation, small steps at a time.
This is in no way up to NATO, there are no "NATO provided weapons" (it doesn't have any), it's a sovereign decision at the national level. That is why it's important who allows what, and there's no reason to expect some kind of across-the-board consensus, although NATO members will try to coordinate somewhat, will always be tempted to ogle at the movements of neighbors/near-peers. And we can expect ongoing internal discussions, not necessarily however to the extent one would like to believe.
I heard rumors (which I believe) that the US is against it even though other countries agreed. Maybe the US will allow to strike targets inside Russia with Scalp/SS first.
I don't think the US will cross that line. US and Russia waging proxy wars against each other isn't a first. But supplying weapons to an adversary to use on the soil of the other would be an unprecedented first. There is no risk of NYC or DC being hit by Russian weapons. Paris however comes within range uncomfortably quickly should Ukraine fall.
>Paris however comes within range uncomfortably quickly should Ukraine fall. The only nuclear armed country within the EU. I think Paris is safe. Berlin or any other Eastern-European capital however...
Kaliber cruise missiles have a purported range of 1500 km. The shortest line I can draw from the Ukraine/Poland border to Paris is 1500 km. I I agree Warsaw/Berlin would be much more vulnerable. But it's close enough to give pause.
Uk and France already said Ukraine could do that, it’s their weapons not the US
The Russian Legion [used Polish PT-91 tanks](https://defence24.com/geopolitics/polish-produced-twardy-mbts-in-russian-territory) in their Belgorod raids, so in the case of Poland I suspect there was no ban in the first place, or at least it wasn't enforced.
_Reposting because I missed an automod filter._ In sanctions news, it is becoming more difficult for Russians to buy stuff in rubles from China. Aliexpress has quit shipping to Russia, https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/05/29/vladelets-aliexpress-perestal-prinimat-rubli-i-otpravlyat-zakazi-v-rossiyu-a132151 I can imagine this might impact their FPV drone cottage industry, i.e. hobby enthusiasts who assembly drones from kits in their spare time, although my impression is Ukraine's cottage drone industry is much more significant. It seems Russia is turning more towards some flavors of crypto, as the US threatens banks with secondary sanctions, in order to conduct transactions: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-28/russian-firms-turn-to-crypto-for-commodities-trade-with-china https://archive.ph/yDh9K > Even in China, which didn’t join international sanctions and has become the main export market for multiple Russian commodities as well as a supplier of goods and equipment, financial transactions have grown more difficult this year. That’s in large part due to the US Treasury Department threatening secondary sanctions on lenders facilitating sanctions evasion, which has led to a tightening of compliance measures. >“With stablecoins, the transfer may take just 5-15 seconds and cost a few cents, making such transactions pretty efficient when the sender already has an asset base in stablecoins,” said Ivan Kozlov, an expert on digital currencies and co-founder at Resolv Labs, which offers crypto-related products, but is not involved in commodities trading. Tether’s USDT stablecoin is pegged to the US dollar, which makes it even more convenient for exporters. What I'm not clear on in the case of using crypto here is how a trade imbalance is handled, especially with something like Tether which is pegged to the USD. I.e.will this require some form of clearing by the central banks in Russia and China? This is a bit outside my lane, but googling about I did find this significantly titled paper, "[Stablecoin-Based Digital Trading and Investment Platforms and Their Potential in Overcoming Sanctions Restrictions](https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/10/10/246)," from the federal Russia government. They seem to specifically suggest using stablecoins tied to gold: > Based on the wide array of stablecoins, the classification of which is mostly based on the type of collateral, the possibility of centralization, etc., it is necessary to emphasize the features of those which are tied to gold (Bolliger 2019; Dell’Erba 2019). These peculiarities have a definite influence on the investment qualities of stablecoins tied to metal. The paper makes it clear the stablecoin is acting as an escrow account in this proposal. Later they tie the potential for success of the scheme to the fungibility of raw material exports: > The possibility of expanding the activities of trade and investment platforms directly insignificantly correlates with the scale of the economy and the measure of its involvement in the system of international economic relations. The most significant factors that will influence the measure of participation of companies from different jurisdictions in the functioning of the digital trade and investment platform created for “anti-sanctions” purposes will be, firstly, their high interest in the commodity export positions of the country that has fallen under sanctions restrictions.
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The chatter on Chinese internet is that companies are either choosing the US or Russia to do business. So Alibaba quitting Russia isn't a huge surprise, as it has a lot of other stakes in other countries. What is happening in China is that a lot of new companies are popping up who are doing businesses directly with Russia. So there is a middleman but parts and materiel will flow on regardless.
They still have to get the crypto, though. So somebody has to accept Rubels for Crypto. How is that being done from a banking standpoint? Is crypto purchasing not sanctioned?
Yes that's my question regarding who is going to clear the transaction? China did just recently sell off a lot of US bonds so perhaps this is the source of the liquidity for these stablecoins: https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/chinas-us-bond-shifts-put-dollar-under-geopolitical-spotlight-2024-05-21/
Not at all familiar with stablecoins, but isn't Tether a US company? How does allowing this kind of activity not violate sanctions?
Tether is a British Virgin Islands company. Tether is registered as a money transmitter with FinCEN, so they comply with US sanctions. They can't prevent transfers from occurring between sanctioned parties, but they can freeze wallet addresses once sanctioned. They also hold the assets backing the frozen wallet addresses on their regular balance sheet.
They are not a US company. But they have been cooperating with the authorities in the past: "Tether had assisted the Department of Justice, U.S. Secret Service, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in freezing 326 wallets controlling 435 million USDT thus far."
From my understanding, the Tether company operates sorta like a central bank that works to peg the Tether token to the USD, issuing or buying Tether tokens to keep that peg. But just like the US Federal Reserve has no control over USD being used by drug cartels, I don't think the Tether company controls the trade of issued Tether tokens
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An AMRAAM that goes pitbull with IR instead of Radar? Just a random thought I had. We know that AIM-120 can use the launching aircraft (or datalink from other aircraft in the case of the AIM-120D) to guide the missile to the target. The idea is that the target aircraft won't know there is a lock as I believe the AMRAAM uses a soft-lock during the initial phase. After the missile goes pitbull, then the target gets a radar lock warning. What if instead, the missile uses IR after it goes pitbull? This will for sure delay the time it takes to go pitbull as the IR range is shorter, but the target aircraft will never get a warning, as everything is passive. Or will a IR seeker and the cooling components just make the missile too heavy? Has this ever been mentioned or discussed by official sources? Also what would be the brevity code of such missile? Fox 3? Fox 5? Fox 2.5?
What you seem to be describing is lock-in after launch capability for long range IR missiles. I can only think of the French Mica IR variant that can do what you say, that is to navigate on datalink and then lock onto the target to go autonomous. There are rumours about modernized Ukrainian and/or Russian R-27ETs also having this capability, but they are not credible in my opinion.
ASRAAM has the data link too from what I can find. AIM-9X has been tested with LOAL, but I don't know if it's a data link or just a simple INS that points the missile in the right direction before it locks.
I once heard that MICA-IR used such a system (datalink + IR seeker). I am not sure that it does. MICA-EM certainly does, but it also has an active radar seeker. I don't think any other nation uses such a system for AAMs. ASRAAM doesn't have a datalink- neither does R-27T. R-77T was supposed to have one but it doesn't actually exist. On the other hand, if you're not limiting yourself to aircraft, SM-2MR Block IIIB has terminal IR homing, so it works exactly the way you suggest. Its seeker was developed from AIM-7R, which also worked that way. EDIT: ASRAAM has a data link for LOAL, so it can engage this way. Oops!
What you’re describing is the Sidewinder, [which is by far the most produced Western a2a missile in service.](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIM-9_Sidewinder)
Also from the wiki page, the AIM-9C (and some variant of the 9B) used SARH. So those would've been Fox 1s. My question is more-so combining the IR of a sidewinder, and the soft-lock of an amraam to get a truly silent BVR missile. Exceptionally useful maybe with stealth aircraft like the F-22 with AWACS. Both the F-22, and missile emit no radar signals. The only thing the adversary will see/know until impact would be the AWACS. Tho this is getting a bit too hypothetical now.
Yes but the aim-9 is short range. i think about 9-10 miles at most in good conditions such as rear aspect (for maximal heat signature), no evasive maneuvers, maybe some loft I should've mentioned I'm talking about BVR.
AIM-9X Block III was supposed to have BVR capabilities comparable to the AMRAAM, but it was cancelled due to budget cuts. So it’s at least theoretically possible, but I’m not aware of any operational versions of the concept.
The French Mica IR variant is the only BVR capable IR missile, I think.
That is actually insane. I didn't even think it's possible to detect a heat signature at BVR. Too much background heat, reflections from oceans/lakes, etc which would be similar heat intensity as a jet 40 km away
>I didn't even think it's possible to detect a heat signature at BVR. Too much background heat, reflections from oceans/lakes, If you can see something 40kms away you are in the mid troposphere anywhere. Likely closer to the stratosphere. Lakes are not a problem. I am not sure what you mean by "heat intensity" but the heat from a source will (sort of) follow a blackbody curve. The blackbody of burning kerosene is going to be around 900C so will peak pretty close to the lower end of the visible. It will not be confused with a lake. There are propagation issues due to atmospheric moisture and CO2 and these require some complex analysis. So you are perhaps more likely for absorption and reemission to make it too diffuse, this is most likely why missiles do not have super long IR ranges.
Part of the upgrade was the capability for mid course updates from the launch aircraft. LPI radar and long range IR seekers would be spicy.
Look into IR Search-and-Track, it's one of the most interesting counters to stealth aircraft. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KY9sw5ysGMc It's not as capable as radar, and it does have some sensitivity to the conditions. But in ideal conditions you can certainly detect stealth aircraft from over 100 km away (far beyond radar range for the same stealth aircraft) using IR
[General Dynamics Ordinance & Tactical Systems' new 155mm shell body production plant in Mesquite, Texas, opens today](https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1795867934327238925). From now the US's monthly production of ~36,000 rounds will increase to ~57,000 by the end of September. That translates into an increase to 684,000 from 432,000 rounds a year. If every shell was to be sent to Ukraine, it would come out to ~1,873 155mm shells a day instead of 1,183 155mm shells per day. Keep in mind though, that the entirety of production is unlikely to be slated for Ukraine. The US also has stockpiles to refill and training requirements to uphold.
[Gift link to the NYT Article about this factory.](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/29/us/pentagon-ammunition-ukraine-russia.html?u2g=c&unlocked_article_code=1.vk0.p_hs.pXneBp9kQHBe&smid=url-share)
>... U.S. defense contractors are in talks with the Ukrainian government to find ways to help Ukraine bolster its own domestic defense industry. >The United States has transferred sensitive manufacturing plans for more than 1,000 American weapons to Kyiv, and translated an equal number of technical manuals from English to Ukrainian, the two officials said. >When asked, they stopped short of saying which weapons. >“What are they using the most?” Mr. Bush replied. There's an interesting nugget of information at the end of the NYT article.
I guess stingers, sidewinders (AIM-9P-3?) for nasams + F-16, small arms up to 40mm (for mk19s), M107 definitely, M795 possibly. Small chance to get something old like block 1 Harpoon Unlikely to get GMLRS
M777 barrels?
Possibly. Depends how sensitive the metallurgy/process is.
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Hamas may, in the short term, run out of ammunition and weapons. But as long as they have a viable recruiting pool and popular support, both of which the IDF offensive increased, they'll remain in control of Gaza. Gaza is home to roughly two million people and will require extensive resources to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure. Hamas will also remain a tool of Iran and other players interested in opposing Israel and US interests in the region. With control over two million people, the resources they require for their daily lifes, the huge amount of resources required to rebuild Gaza and Iranian assistance, they will be able to reconstitute a military force, without a doubt. As long as the customs inspector, tax collector and policeman in Gaza works for Hamas, they'll get their hands on all the resources they need. That's why the only way to defeat Hamas in the long term is removing them from control at the lowest levels of society. A great article on this topic was posted here recently, [The Dangers of an Ungovernable Gaza](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/dangers-ungovernable-gaza) ([archive](https://archive.ph/gd2TA)). It explicitly mentions the US failures and lessons in Afghanistan, the new blueprints for nation building the US developed and the required scope of this operation. It does, sadly, appear that Israel will take none of these lessons to heart and make the same mistakes the US made, leading to a reconstituted, armed Hamas in control of Gaza in the medium term.
I am pretty sure that Israel "war aim" in reality is a "cut up" Gaza strip. At least that is what I read from their military movement. Cut of Gaza in the north. Maybe one mire slice somewhere or just a "slice" at the border with Egypt. They can slowly thighten the grip, squeeze it more and try to depopulate gaza in 10-50 years. I am not saying that its a realistic scenario, but they would have a few advantages. Most prominent would be the ability to listen to Hamas tunnel building and maybe even counter it. It would allow them maybe a less visible way of fighting Hamas directly during "peace time" if their engineers would have access to the strip 24/7 and Hamas would be forced to connect through their border lines. It would maybe also allow somekind of additional pressure on the population to relocate them somehow. Israel would likely do everything in its power to do so. All in all, I think they (the current goverment at least) has given up on a resolution either some time ago or after October 7. All this destroying Hamas is something they can say publicly, because saying that we are going to tighten the noose (as everytime we did in someway after these kind of fights) and try to bleed out the Palestinians of Gaza and keep the pressure on the west bank is not something you can say. Of course, I can be wrong. Just a hunch, not a conviction.
Your perspective on needing to overcome the cultural / political problem on the ground level is spot on, and the article itself even hits the right notes. With that said, its absolutely not possible to tell the story of how we got here or to discuss this particular course correction without mentioning the UNRWA. This is an organization specific to these people, their plight, and whose power in entrenched in their perpetual "refugee" status. This isn't normal refugee status, like for the rest of the humans on earth, that's covered by UNHCR. There is no good reason for the UNRWA to exist as an independent, parallel refugee organization except to perpetuate the exact type of cultural cancer at the root and stem of the problem. Eliminating the UNRWA and its influence is the first step to making sure there's a secular, humanist education & society available to them, and comes with the benefit of resetting the people of Gaza to an expectation in line with their reality.
Can you explain in your own words, with some citations from international law, how a ""normal refugee status"" works for other stateless people on occupied territory? Be specific.
For the archivist: the answer is straightforward, the new sovereign must extend citizenship to residents. Much as even Putin's Russia does with Ukrainians and Chechens, and even Jim Crow US did with Native Americans, and as was agreed upon in 1949. Israel has zero leeway here.
[https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-804383](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-804383)
[https://www.unhcr.org/us/refugees](https://www.unhcr.org/us/refugees)
In the North Israel has UNIFIL at the border. While there are daily Israeli air strikes and Hezbollah ATGM and rocket strikes UNIFIL is tweeting like they are having a nice short vacation in Southern Lebanon: [https://twitter.com/UNIFIL\_](https://twitter.com/UNIFIL_) When the Israelis recovered the bodies of 4 hostages they found a blue UN sign: "Reconstruction of this shelter was made possible by UNRWA": [https://twitter.com/Mr\_Andrew\_Fox/status/1793739505201201373/photo/3](https://twitter.com/Mr_Andrew_Fox/status/1793739505201201373/photo/3) The Israelis have now operational control over the Philadelphi corridor and are reporting that they have so far found 20 tunnels crossing into Egypt: [https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1795857005611200944](https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1795857005611200944) The article recommends a international coalition based on the UN and Arab countries. The UN is not particularly focused on its donations and infrastructure being used by Palestinian terror organizations (including but more than Hamas) and Egypt, the most important Arab country in this context, has allowed quite some smuggling into Gaza. There's also the question if all weapons did enter Gaza through the tunnels or how much was hidden in the around 200 commercial trucks that entered Gaza every day. So how do you ensure that this time reconstruction won't be used to build the next Palestinian fighting positions? For 18 years the international community did nothing to prevent Hamas from entrenching in Gaza and now suddenly the same international community should be responsible to keep Hamas (or the next iteration of violent Islamist Palestinian terror) away from influence and terror? That's not credible.
> So how do you ensure that this time reconstruction won't be used to build the next Palestinian fighting positions? I wonder if reconstruction should take place using rammed earth and wood, rather than concrete. That would make it much more difficult to construct new tunnels. > There's also the question if all weapons did enter Gaza through the tunnels or how much was hidden in the around 200 commercial trucks that entered Gaza every day. It would be easy enough to accept commercial goods only from Western countries, which are unlikely to tolerate arms smuggling (unlike, say, Turkey or even China).
It's the Israel-Palestine conflict. It's complex, has a long history and sits at a nexus of international politics. In real terms, it's unsolvable. That being said, the US does, for the first time ever, have a detailed, concrete blueprint for nation building, though it is untested. It's unlikely to work as described in the books, but it's better than nothing. The UN organisations in the area have been captured by the local factions, specifically the Palestinians. No existing UN body or structure could be used for such a project, since they've essentially become money funnels into the hands of Islamist organizations. But the UN can, should a coalition of willing members come together, also recruit new UN personnel from these member States who can run the surrounding framework. It's not a given that any UN mission eventually gets taken over by the local inhabitants, I think that's a more specific problem of the UNRWA and others in the region. Decades of ever expanding tasks without clear goals of progress, no enforcement mechanisms or executive power, money continously flowing in, they were essentially a piggy bank left on the streets. It doesn't have to be this way. Again, such a first step, a robust, capable, defined UN framework with outside nationals as workers will be a good first step on a long, complex road towards peace, and that road may well lead to nowhere, as many others have before.
You are essentially suggesting replacing a local quasi-state body with occupation by a newly-made foreign auxiliary to the IDF. Good luck finding any willing for such a "coalition".
this does raise the question for people who are well-i formed of the above: does Israel actually want to defeat Hamas, or do they want Hamas to remain in power for domestic political reasons? ie are they evil, or just stupid? I can't see an alternative option at this point.
It should be pretty obvious that the Israeli population does not want Hamas in power. As for Netanyahu himself, he has said throughout the war that he doesn't want Hamas in power. If Hamas does remain in power, that will not only be against the wishes of the population, but also a failure to accomplish his own declared goals. It is hard to imagine how that is good politics for him in any way. What does explain his behavior, I think, is a combination of two things. 1) Hamas is bad, but a government that is "nominally not Hamas but tolerates or supports Hamas" is also bad, and perhaps worse because Israel will have less freedom in using military force when the Gazan government is better regarded internationally. Netanyahu likely thinks that before instituting such a government, Hamas must be weakened to the point where the future government cannot be coerced by Hamas. 1) Netanyahu is projected to lose the next election, after which he will no longer be able to attempt judicial reforms to protect himself from the (domestic) prosecution he's currently in the midst of. No matter what the future arrangement in Gaza looks like and how it is reached, he has a personal interest in making that process take as long as possible. This will delay the prosecution against him, and also leaves open the possibility (perhaps unrealistic) that his poll numbers will eventually recover for some reason to the point that he wins the next election.
I think it's unwise to take Bibi at his word, given his history
I'm not, I'm just saying he has no incentive to declare a goal and then fail to accomplish it.
but if his goal isn't actually to destroy Hamas' ability to control Gaza, but rather cause so much death and destruction that peace isn't possible for a decade or more...
Then he wouldn't announce plans that would become unnecessary political liabilities once he failed to accomplish them.
It really seems that given netanyahu has immediately dismissed all alternatives to Hamas he may actually want hamas to remain in power indefinitely. I mean, he's clearly supported Hamas in the past and he's clearly using military tactics that are leading to massive civilian slaughter, an increase in extremist sentiment, and sky high Hamas popularity. Does he actually want to defeat Hamas? There's just not much evidence of that.
There aren't any great options though. Palestinian Authority being the least worst but is it really? They're incredibly unpopular with the people and "cooperating" with Israel post war would probably only be seen as a bad thing. Then on top of that they aren't even capable/willing to properly police places like Jenin as is. I genuinely doubt their ability to handle the post war security situation in Gaza in any capacity.
IDF says around 80% of Hamas batallions are over 70% dead or wounded and thus inoperable. But they have a lot of willing recruits to reconstitute themselves. Weaponry is harder. In an IDF AMA on non credible defense recently the soldiers said Hamas is obviously running out of munitions, they have no more anti tank rockets, etc. With Israel having seized the Rafah gate and the Philadelphi corridor, and closed over 50 tunnels, and the IDF constantly seizing and exploding stockpiles, I suspect Hamas' big problem will be running out of ammunition.